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Abstract: 
In order for a state to be legitimate vis-à-vis its citizens, those citizens must be 
reasonably able to, minimally, trust that it is both able and willing to create laws that are 
morally just.  For liberal theories of legitimacy, generally speaking, just laws are laws 
that respect the individual rights of persons.  The settler colonial states of Australia and 
the United States have throughout their history failed to respect the rights of indigenous 
peoples qua individuals.  There exists, then, a large amount of evidence suggesting that 
it would be reasonable for those peoples to not trusting those states.  And, in so far as it 
is reasonable for indigenous peoples of those states to not trust that their respective 
states are able and willing to create just laws for them, those states are illegitimate. 
Given both the size, severity, and consistency of the wrongs committed against 
indigenous peoples by their respective settler colonial states it is not enough for those 
states to simply cease in their wrongdoing.  The states in question must engage in a 
deliberate effort to generate the trust necessary for them to become legitimate.  Political 
reconciliation, aimed at addressing the unique historical wrongs committed against 
indigenous peoples, can begin to generate that trust.  However, political reconciliation 
alone will be insufficient.  Given the substantial amount of evidence against the settler 
colonial states, we would be wrong in assuming a priori following reconciliation that 
they would be capable of making just laws for their respective indigenous citizens or 
willing to make such laws.  
Moreover, reconciliation does not necessarily address the wrong of failing to 
respect indigenous sovereignty.  In order for that wrong to be addressed, indigenous 
peoples must be able to collectively secede.  By choosing not to secede following 
reconciliation, an indigenous people would signal that they do trust their settler colonial 
state to make just laws for them, and to that extent that it is legitimate.  
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The settler colonial states of Australia and the United States are illegitimate vis-
à-vis their Indigenous citizens.  The only way for them to become legitimate requires 
engaging in a process of political reconciliation with their indigenous citizens, and 
permitting secession by those citizens.    
The research underlying this thesis was an attempt to grapple with the following 
question:  why should indigenous peoples accept or even acknowledge moral 
obligations to the authority of states that have, throughout the entirety of their 
relationship, violently harmed them?  My short answer to that question is:  as things 
stand, they shouldn’t.  That answer is not one that I have come to idly.  It has come 
about through the course of my research into how to improve the conditions for 
indigenous peoples within the settler colonial states of Australia and the United States.  
And, ultimately, like most answers its usefulness comes in the form of the follow-up 
questions:  what does it mean that those states are illegitimate?  And, what would it take 
for those states become legitimate? 
I began my research with the intention of finding ways to improve the situation 
of indigenous peoples within the settler colonial states of Australia and the US.  Within 
both states outcomes for indigenous peoples are, on average, the worst among any 
demographic.  Indigenous peoples, on average, suffer from rates of incarceration, youth 
suicide, drug abuse, domestic violence, alcoholism, unemployment, and so on.  That 
bed is not one that indigenous peoples have made for themselves.  Through extremely 
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violent and generally despicable actions, the states in question ought to shoulder much, 
if not all of the blame.   
States or even individual governments screw over lots of peoples, though.  Why 
should we care about the situation of indigenous peoples when much larger 
demographics are getting the shaft every day?  In Australia, for example, a recent 
Senate Committee report, Commonwealth Contribution to Former Forced Adoption 
Policies and Practices1, acknowledged the governments fault in forcibly removing 
children from single mothers between the late 1940s and early 1980s.  During roughly 
the same time period in the US (1932-1972), the US Public Health Service conducted 
the following study:  Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis in the Negro Male.  The 
study, as the name suggests, informed African-American males that they would be 
receiving treatment for syphilis, when, in fact, they were not being treated at all.2  And 
today, through centuries of government endorsed racism and chauvinism, virtually all 
non-white or non-males in the US earn less than their white male counterparts for the 
same jobs with similar education and work histories.  If the question above about the 
existence of moral obligations to the authority of those states is answered negatively on 
account of a pattern of wrongdoing, then it would seem that lots of peoples can answer 
similarly.  In that case, what makes indigenous peoples worth talking about? 
 What we need from an answer to that question, clearly, is some feature that 
importantly distinguishes the claims that indigenous peoples have.  There is a limited 
pool of resources for addressing the claims of wrongdoing against the state (including, 
but not limited to, public attention and public support).  In so far as the everyday citizen 
is concerned, the claims that indigenous peoples have are no different than the claims 
that any other minority group has.   
One way to make the distinction is by degree.  For example, an indigenous 
person might say to a member of another minority group, “Yeah, what happened to you 
was terrible, but what happened to me was so much worse!”  One worry with a 
distinction of harms by degree, though, is that it can be very difficult to weigh the 
harms.  There are roughly 2.5 million Native American citizens in the US.  These 
citizens are the descendants of victims (and sometimes the victims themselves) of 
1 “Commonwealth Contribution to Former Forced Adoption Policies and Practices,” The Senate, 
Community Affairs References Committee, (2012). 
2 “US Public Health Service Syphilis Study at Tuskegee,” US Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/tuskegee/timeline.htm, Retrieved 16 June 2017.  
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forced relocation, forced child removal policies, land theft, and so on.  Now, consider 
the case of African-Americans, who number about 38 million today, many of whom are 
the descendants of victims of slavery, forced segregation, and a host of other wrongs.  
In both cases, the actions of the state against their ancestors, recent relatives, and selves 
has dramatically affected their current place in society, but how should we weigh their 
claims against each other?  Are the things that happened to Native Americans 
objectively worse than the things that have happened to African-Americans?  How 
much should it matter that there are today more descendants from victimized African 
Americans than Native Americans?  Or that there are currently more African American 
victims today?  I don’t know.  Ideally, states would address all of the claims from all of 
the people.  The sad fact of the matter, though, is that these claims must inevitably 
compete in the political sphere; the public can only care so much about issues they see 
as racially motivated.  That is not say that these groups should not nor that they do not 
work together–they should and they certainly do. 
Perhaps, then, we should just lump their claims together?  In both cases, some 
resolution is needed to address the historical injustices that both minority groups have 
suffered.  At the very least, both groups have claims against being treated wrongly on 
the basic of their race.  By lumping the claims together, though, we are denying that 
there is any distinguishing feature to the claims that indigenous peoples have.  That is 
all well and good if their claims are not importantly distinguishable than the claims of 
other wronged minority groups within their state.  However, that is not the case.   
One way to distinguish claims of indigenous peoples is looking at what is sought 
by addressing injustices.  For African Americans and other victimized minority groups, 
what is often sought is equality taken as equal opportunities and equal treatment 
compared to other citizens.  For indigenous peoples, it is a return to sovereignty, or right 
to self-govern over their lands and people.   
Indigenous Australians have never ceded sovereignty to the Commonwealth.  
Instead, the Commonwealth merely asserted its own sovereignty over them.  In the US, 
treaties made between the US and Native American tribes did transfer some aspects of 
governance from tribes to the US.  However, the ultimate claim of sovereignty by tribes 
was never ceded. That is what importantly distinguishes the claims that the indigenous 
peoples of Australia and the US have against their respective settler colonial states; 
equality is not enough, indigenous peoples ought to be respected as sovereigns. 
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Distinguishing the claims of indigenous peoples in this way can help us 
understand why previous attempts at addressing indigenous claims against the state 
have failed.  In the United States, Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act (1968) 
guaranteeing Native Americans most of the same rights afforded to other citizens under 
the Bill of Rights.  In Australia, there have been several attempts to address inequalities:  
the 1962 amendment to the Commonwealth Electoral Act federally enfranchising 
Indigenous Australians and 1967 constitutional referendum allowing them to be counted 
in the national census, the Bringing Them Home Report and the subsequent national 
apology by Prime Minister Kevin Rudd in response.  These are important moments and 
should be celebrated as instances of progress made in addressing indigenous rights.  
None of them, however, address the claim of indigenous sovereignty; instead, they seek 
to incorporate indigenous peoples into the larger state. 
To the credit of those states, however, some progress has been made in that area 
of indigenous sovereignty.  In 1975 the US Congress passed the Indian Self-
determination and Education Act, which gave tribes, among other things, greater 
control over how to redistribute funds from the government; and in 1992, the Australian 
High Court in Mabo v Queensland acknowledged the existence of Native Title as 
distinct and prior to the Commonwealth, paving the way for Indigenous Australians to 
reclaim and protect their traditional lands.  Unfortunately, the US Congress, at the same 
time, drastically reduced federal funding for tribes by nearly half, a trend that has 
continued to day.  The effect of which made it more difficult for tribes to take advantage 
of self-determination policies.  And, in Australia, subsequent decisions made by the 
government regarding Native Title have made it difficult for Indigenous Australians to 
make effective use of the landmark decision. 
Taking the distinction between sovereignty and equality seriously, a number of 
interesting questions arise for political philosophers.  Namely the question of how 
settler colonial states can become legitimate over indigenous peoples?  Many of the 
answers to why a state is legitimate can be nipped and tucked to fit various groups.  
When it comes to indigenous peoples in these settler colonial states, however, that 
doesn’t work so well.  How do you claim moral obligations from a group that still 
retains sovereignty?  What should we do, then, in these cases? 
As the title of this thesis suggests, being honest, apologizing, and giving 
indigenous peoples their land back would go a long way towards resolving the issue of 
legitimacy.  It would not go all of the way, though.  For it to go all the way, I believe 
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indigenous sovereignty needs to be recognized; in other words, indigenous peoples 
ought to be able to secede and form fully sovereign states in order to be able to 
meaningfully consent and thereby confer legitimacy on the settler colonial state.  None 
of that is to say that those states should cease in their attempts to improve the civil rights 
of indigenous citizens nor that they are off the hook for addressing the historical 
injustices they have committed.  It is to say that what is needed is a process which 
attends to past injustices while also giving indigenous peoples a choice about their 
future.  In other words, the settler colonial states ought to try and reconcile and the 
indigenous peoples ought to be able to decide whether they want to secede. 
That answer, of course, is very extreme.  It is unlikely to find practical support 
amongst most indigenous peoples, let alone the settler colonial states and their non-
indigenous citizens.  And, in general, it’s usually a bad strategy to jump to the most 
extreme course of action, which secession most certainly is.  Are there options short of 
secession that would resolve the issue of legitimacy? 
My first pass at the question of legitimacy involved looking into the role that 
deliberation can play in changing social norms.  That research was guided by the 
assumption that non-indigenous citizens in those states held false and damaging norms 
regarding both indigenous peoples and indigenous cultures.  I thought if the larger 
populations in those states recognized both that indigenous peoples are capable of being 
self-determining–just like everyone else–and that indigenous cultures are valuable for 
contemporary societies, that eventually less paternalistic, and harmful, policies would 
follow.  And, after a while, those states would come to be legitimate for their 
indigenous citizens.3  
The attitudes that individuals in these societies hold is important:  reconciliation, 
as I will discuss in later chapters, will fail unless those attitudes change.  And, 
regardless of any potential instrumental effects on policy, addressing bad norms is a 
good thing.  That said, I doubt changing peoples’ attitudes would result in changing 
public policy.   
People have problems of their own.  As horrible as these governments have 
historically treated (and currently treat) their respective indigenous populations, they 
3 This is distinct from the take that Duncan Ivison, Postcolonial Liberalism, (Oxford:  Oxford University 
Press, 2002) provides.  He is primarily interested in whether deliberation over policies with policymakers 
could eventually lead to a legitimate state.  I was interested in whether engaging in deliberation with 
citizens could lead to policy changes. 
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have a similar history of mistreating lots of people.  Simply changing the attitudes most 
citizens have towards indigenous peoples and cultures would certainly elevate the 
discourse on indigenous issues, but that would not change the fact that those issues 
would have to compete with issues more salient to the general populations of those 
countries.  And, given the relatively small size of indigenous populations within those 
states (roughly 2%), that competition isn’t really much of a competition.  I abandoned 
this route, then, in favor of the strategy of lobbying politicians and making deliberate 
yet subtle changes to the law.4 
Australia, more so than the US, has recently been enamored with ruthlessly 
paternalistic policies.  In the last decade alone, the Australian government has launched 
a full-scale military intervention into the Northern Territory on the premise of 
eradicating high rates of child sexual assault and abuse through, among other 
mechanisms, removing children from their parent’s custody.5  A worthy cause if there 
ever was one, for sure.  Unfortunately, studies conducted both prior to6 and after7 the 
intervention found that very little was effectively done to improve child welfare, and 
that the levels of sexual assault and abuse may have been drastically overblown. 8 
Also, in the last decade, Australia has declared a policy of “Closing the Gap” 
between Indigenous Australian and non-Indigenous Australian health and education 
outcomes.  Australia identified seven areas in which the gap needed closing:  life 
expectancy, child mortality, employment, reading and writing, school attendance, early 
education, and year 12 attainment.9  Some of these goals were to be met by 2013 and 
others not until 2030.  As of 2017, only two of the goals is on track to be met (year 12 
attainment and infant mortality rate).10 
4 In other words, I adopted Dale Turner’s strategy from, Dale Turner, This is not a peace pipe:  toward a 
critical indigenous philosophy, (Toronto:  University of Toronto Press, 2006). 
5 “Northern Territory National Emergency Response Legislation,” Australian Human Rights 
Commission, (2007), http://www.humanrights.gov.au/northern-territory-national-emergency-response-
legislation, Retrieved 14 June 2017.   
6 Ibid. See, for example, Summary Point (29) regarding the compulsory acquisition of property held by 
Indigenous Australians. 
7 James Anaya, “Report by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of indigenous people, James Anaya:  situation of indigenous peoples in Australia,” United 
Nations Human Rights Council, 15, (2010), pp. 1-41, see pp. 25-41. 
8 Ampe Akelyernemane and Meke Mekarle, “Little Children are Sacred Report,” Northern Territory 
Board of Inquiry Into the Protection of Aboriginal Children from Sexual Abuse, Department of the Chief 
Minister, (2007).  
9 “National Indigenous Reform Agreement,” Council of Australian Governments, (2008). 
10 “Prime Minister’s Closing the Gap Report 2017,” Australian Government, Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet, (2017). 
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In both cases, mentioned above, Australia has failed to act on, or even consider, 
recommendations on how to address these issues by indigenous leaders.11  That is a 
disturbing fact; and one that gives me pause to suggest the strategy of lobbying directly 
at politicians.  The other potential candidate, winning legal battles, is similarly 
frustrating, as illustrated by the ultimate outcome of the McArthur River Mine’s 
proposal to expand to an open-cut mine.  In Lansen & Ors v NT Minister for Mines and 
Energy & Ors12, the Northern Territory Supreme Court heard arguments for and against 
expanding the McArthur River Mine to an open-cut mine.  Those against argued that 
doing so violated the Mining Management Act of 2001 because the proposal failed to 
address the potential environmental issues associated with the move to an open-cut 
mine.  The Supreme Court agreed with that argument and decided to not authorize the 
change.  Two days later, special legislation was introduced to the Northern Territory 
Parliament to make moot the Supreme Court’s ruling.  That legislation was passed and 
the McArthur River Mine is now an open-cut mine.13 
Whether through parliament or through courts, or through public opinion, the 
prospects for making positive changes to Indigenous Australian policy seem dim.  At 
this point, my research turned from utilizing the current mechanisms available to 
investigating the possibility of new mechanisms.  I began examining alternative forms 
of democracy, such as lottocracies, to see if they could improve the amount of political 
influence indigenous peoples had within these states.  Lottocracies, or democratic 
decision-making by lottery, fail because there are simply not enough indigenous 
peoples.  In both Australia and the US, indigenous peoples make up around 2% of the 
overall population (and less than a majority within any individual state).  It would, of 
course, be possible to have a weighted lottery, but once you start moving in that 
direction, the democratic justification of lotteries (opportunity for equal influence over 
political decisions) begins to vanish, and an already unlikely project is made all the 
more unlikely. 
Another solution for resolving the deficit of political influence is something like 
what Australia had in the 1990’s.  The Australian and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission (ATSIC) formed in 1990 was a committee of Indigenous Australian leaders 
11 James Anaya, (2010), pp. 10-14. 
12 Lansen & Ors v NT Minister for Mines and Energy & Ors, Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, 
28, (2007). 
13 Kirsty Ruddock, “Justice in the Northern Territory?” Indigenous Law Bulletin, 6, (2008). 
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with near decisive say in the administration of government programs for Indigenous 
Australians and with substantial influence over the creation of those programs.   
In 2005, ATSIC was abolished amid charges of corruption and negligence by its 
Chairman, Geoff Clark.14  This outcome was in contrast to the 2003 review of ATISIC, 
in which the reviewers recommended a more devolved ATSIC.15  There were no solid 
grounds for abolishing ATSIC.  Had ATSIC remained, albeit under different leadership 
and with procedures in place to prevent corruption, it would have been dismantled 
eventually.  The reason being is that so long as the government had the capacity to 
abolish it, they would do so.   
My pessimism here, I believe, is justified.  The Australian government has a 
long history of taking away or outright destroying the nice things that Indigenous 
Australians have (or could have).  Some recent events include removing any claims of 
justice from Australia’s reconciliation effort in the 1990’s16, amendments made to the 
Native Title Act in 1996 diminishing the bargaining power of Indigenous Australians 
over Native Title lands17, voting against the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (something the US also did) in 2007, and making changes to the law 
in order to circumvent a Supreme Court ruling as seen in the McArthur River Mine 
controversy above18 to name a few.  Most recently are changes made to the Community 
Development Project (CDP), which imposes more severe work-for-the-dole 
requirements–longer hours, less pay, and less days off per year–for Indigenous 
Australians in rural areas.19 
With the destructive tendencies of the Australian government in mind, I moved 
to consider whether protection of something like ATSIC through the constitution would 
be sufficient to protect it from political tampering or destruction.  More explicitly, the 
idea was that if ATSIC were defined within and made part of the constitution, then, 
perhaps, its powers could exist, to a greater degree, independently from the government, 
14 Megan Shaw, “Howard puts ATSIC to death,” The Age, (16 April 2004),  
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/04/15/1081998300704.html, retrieved 6 June 2017. 
15 Hannaford, John, Jackie Huggins, and Bob Collins. "In the hands of the regions–A new 
ATSIC." Report of the review of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission. Canberra, 
Commonwealth of Australia, (2003). 
16 Andrew Gunstone, “The formal Australian reconciliation process:  1991-2000,” National 
Reconciliation Planning Workshop, (2005). 
17 Jeff Kildea, “Native Title: A Simple Guide for those who wish to understand Mabo, the Native Title 
Act, Wik and the Ten Point Plan,” Human Rights Council of Australia, (1998).  
18 Lansen & Ors v NT Minister for Mines and Energy & Ors, (2007). 
19 Indigenous peoples from the Ngaanyaatjarraku Shire have filed a lawsuit against the Australian state on 
charges of racial discrimination, and will be making their case before a judge in July 2017. 
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and thus not be subject to the normal political rigmarole.  As it turned out, that is the 
solution that Indigenous Australians agreed upon recently at the National Constitutional 
Convention taking place at Uluru.  Their statement, in part, reads: 
We seek constitutional reforms to empower our people and take a rightful place 
in our own country. When we have power over our destiny our children will 
flourish. They will walk in two worlds and their culture will be a gift to their 
country.  
We call for the establishment of a First Nations Voice enshrined in the 
Constitution. Makarrata is the culmination of our agenda: the coming together 
after a struggle. It captures our aspirations for a fair and truthful relationship 
with the people of Australia and a better future for our children based on justice 
and self-determination.  
We seek a Makarrata Commission to supervise a process of agreement-making 
between governments and First Nations and truth-telling about our history.20 
While the statement is certainly a huge step in the right direction, and much better than 
mere recognition as Australia’s First Peoples, it is far from ideal.  The process by which 
the group would like the constitutional enshrinement to occur is through treaty-making, 
and that is worrisome. 
As required by international law at the time, European settlers arriving on the 
eastern shores of the US, made treaties with the Indigenous tribes.  The process of 
making treaties with tribes was continued by the American settlers.  However, at some 
point or another, virtually every treaty made with Native Americans was unilaterally 
violated by the US.  That isn’t to say though that those treaties are worthless today.  
Treaties today play a crucial legal role in disputes between tribes and the government as 
well as non-government agencies.  The point of bringing up treaty violations is because 
it encourages us to ask why those treaties were violated.  One vague but certainly true 
answer is because they granted too much power or too many resources to the tribes.  
When treaties were first made with tribes, they were done so out of necessity.  Tribes at 
that time were still militarized enough or had large enough numbers to pose a threat to 
US expansion.   
20 Uluru Statement from the Heart, (2017). 
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That fact does not bode well for treaty-making in the Australia.  The Australian 
government does not face strong enough pressure to make treaties of substance with 
Indigenous Australians.  Given the examples I’ve cited above, there is no reason to 
believe that the Australian government would grant favorable treaties to Indigenous 
Australians.  More likely, any treaties would serve as symbolic gestures.  That British 
colonists did not deem it necessary to make treaties with Indigenous Australians is an 
upsetting and disgraceful feature of Australian history, and making symbolic treaties 
today will do little to change that. Furthermore, even if they did make treaties, why 
would they honor them?  The US doesn’t honor its treaties with Native Americans and 
most citizens happily ignore that. 
Thus, nearly twelve months into my twenty-two month thesis, I decided that 
political reconciliation with the option to secede would be the only way to secure the 
future well-being of indigenous peoples in these settler colonial states; as well as the 
only way in which indigenous peoples could come to have moral obligations to the 
political authority of those settler states.  Taken together, those two statements– 
securing future well-being and legitimating these states through secession–is not 
paradoxical.  My suggestion is not that indigenous peoples should secede; it is that those 
states ought to accept their right to do so and that indigenous peoples ought to be able to 
act on that right.  Those states ought to engage in political reconciliation in order to, 
among other reasons, prove that they are committed to not being the types of monsters 
that will come in and take indigenous children away at night.  Indigenous peoples today 
have more reason to mistrust their settler colonial states than to trust them.  What 
reconciliation can provide is evidentiary reasons for trusting these states.  However, 
given the mountain of evidence against these states, there is a limit on how much trust 
reconciliation can reasonably generate.  Namely, it cannot generate sufficient trust such 
that indigenous peoples ought to accept moral obligations to that state.  That is where 
secession can play a role in legitimating these states.  Indigenous peoples ought to be 
able to decide for themselves which future looks better.  Following reconciliation, they 
would have two stacks of evidence:  the evidence of harm and the evidence for better 
future relations provided by the reconciliation effort.  Under those conditions, a decision 
to not secede would be sufficient, I believe, for establishing the legitimacy of those 
states vis-à-vis their respective indigenous citizens.  That is not to say that that is the 
only reason for supporting secession; it is only saying that acknowledging indigenous 
secession provides a path for those settler colonial states becoming legitimate. 
17 
 
It would be exceedingly unfair to not subject my own prescription to the same 
pessimism that I’ve exposed the other alternatives to.  If neither the settler colonial 
states nor their general citizens can be motivated to address the injustices committed 
against indigenous peoples, then why would they support a lengthy reconciliation 
process, let alone giving indigenous peoples the option to secede?  We shouldn’t expect 
them to; they won’t.  Instead, what I am going to argue is that given all that has 
transpired, political reconciliation including the option to secede is the best way forward 
(and perhaps the only way forward) for legitimating the settler colonial states vis-à-vis 
their respective indigenous citizens. 
History has shown us that neither Australia nor the US should be trusted with 
the well-being or rights of their respective indigenous citizens.  Barring reconciliation 
and the option to secede, I believe it would be exceedingly irrational for indigenous 
peoples to accept any arguments suggesting those states are legitimate.  That issue of 
the legitimacy of those states and how reconciliation and the option to secede resolve it 
will be the topics of this thesis. 
This thesis will proceed as follows:  following this introduction, the first chapter 
will argue that contemporary liberal theories of legitimacy cannot justify the legitimacy 
of the settler colonial states over their respective indigenous citizens.  In this chapter, I 
will bracket indigenous claims to sovereignty and instead focus on what grounds we 
might appeal to in order to legitimate the settler colonial states.  I will review two 
general accounts of legitimacy:  instrumentalist theories of legitimacy and consent 
theories of legitimacy.  In typical cases, I believe that the satisfaction of either type of 
theory would be sufficient for legitimating the state.  However, in the atypical case of 
indigenous peoples, neither type of theory can be satisfied given the history of the 
relationship between indigenous peoples and the settler colonial states.  We should use 
history as a guide to future action; and the history of the relationship in question has 
been wrought with severe and widespread violence and harm.  Because of that 
indigenous peoples should be reasonably wary of carrying a great deal of unjustified 
risk in virtue of being citizens of those states.    
In the second chapter, I argue that settler colonial states have an obligation to 
pursue reconciliation with their indigenous citizens.  Reconciliation, I argue, does not 
legitimate these states, but does help toward that aim by attending to the historical 
injustices which have led to these states being illegitimate, thus giving indigenous 
peoples evidence to trust that they will be treated justly going forward.  The primary 
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philosophical literature on political reconciliation concerns reconciliation in post-
conflict states or in transition states, neither of those pertains to the current situation.  
However, many of the features of those reconciliation efforts are desirable in the case of 
indigenous peoples.  I will explore what, I think, are three critical features of those 
processes that will need to be employed in reconciliation processes between indigenous 
peoples and their settler colonial states:  truth commissions, political apologies, and 
reparations.  In addition, I will emphasize an additional proponent:  voluntariness.  I will 
also review an account of reconciliation which deals directly with the relationship at 
hand, and argue that it fails to fully resolve the issue of legitimacy. 
 Building off the previous two chapters, the third chapter argues that because 
reconciliation does not create legitimacy, whether it is successful or not entails that 
indigenous peoples still have a right to secede.  The argument for a right to secede is 
distinct from the argument of illegitimacy, however.  That a state is illegitimate vis-à-vis 
certain citizens, does not mean that those citizens have a claim to that state’s territory.  
Instead, under situations of harm, those citizens have a right to being aided in exiting 
that state, usually as refugees.  Thus, in order to make the argument for secession I will 
consider the various claims to territory that indigenous peoples possess and how they 
can be weighed against the claims of the settler colonial states.  Lastly, I will consider 
what the dominant theories of secession in the philosophical literature have to say on 
the topic.  I will argue those theories are unfairly demanding for individuals seeking to 
secede from violent states, and that, all things considered, we ought to accept 
indigenous peoples in these settler colonial states as having a right to secede.  That right 
is, of course, meaningless if it isn’t realistic, and in outlining why those theories of 
secession are overly demanding, I will explain what needs to happen for secession to be 
realistic. 
 The fourth chapter of this thesis will discuss the relationship between secession 
and legitimacy.  Following the claim from the first chapter that it would grossly unjust 
for settler colonial states to claim moral obligations from indigenous peoples, I will 
argue that given successful reconciliation and the realistic capacity to secede, a choice 
to not secede is analogous to giving the express consent to the settler colonial state, 
thereby legitimating it. 
 Lastly, in the conclusion of this thesis, I will summarize the main points of the 
thesis, and suggest some general takeaways from the thesis. 
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 A couple of notes before beginning, indigenous readers may find my strategy in 
this thesis disappointing.  There are at least two reasons for this (though probably 
more):  first, I utilize a near exclusive liberal moral framework to make my arguments; 
and second, by appealing to secession, I am acknowledging, to some extent, that the 
settler colonial states have recognizable and valid claims to the territories they possess.  
 I recognize the issue with using a primarily liberal framework for arguing:  it 
risks devaluing indigenous moral frameworks.  Despite that, my reason for moving 
forward with the liberal framework is to provide the broadest base for my arguments.  
There are hundreds of different indigenous peoples, each with their own valid and 
nuanced conception of what is good and bad, right and wrong.  In my experiences, 
though, I have not found indigenous moral frameworks to be anti-liberal or even non-
liberal.  Instead, I have found many of them to place a great deal of importance on the 
individual, in some cases much more so than any contemporary western society.  More 
often than not, though, the moral importance of individual persons is tempered by the 
moral importance of non-persons.  That there are sources of moral value that are not 
persons ought to be taken more seriously, and I believe that indigenous leaders and 
academics, much better suited than myself, will continue to make progress in that area.  
That said, my arguments are limited to the liberal framework because those arguments 
are ones that everyone, regardless of their moral framework, must be able to provide a 
response to.  Ultimately, though, the main reason for utilizing a liberal framework is 
because the dominate moral framework within settler colonial states is liberalism, and 
those are the people that need convincing.  
 In response to the second disappointment, concerning my use of secession, my 
only defense is that securing sovereignty over traditional lands or even securing proper 
reconciliation will require the support of the settler colonial states.  As such, the process 
will be highly political and highly legal.  As unfounded as their claims to territory might 
be, it would be a non-starter to not take those claims seriously. 
 Lastly, much of this thesis is focused on the situation in Australia, although the 
structure of the arguments work just as well in the US.  The reason that I’ve focused on 
Australia is that I’m writing this thesis in Australia, and, as such, have been fortunate to 
meet with many Indigenous Australian leaders and to hear their unfiltered opinions 
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about the state of things.  I have also been fortunate enough to be invited into several 
rural communities to see first hand the “torment of [their] powerlessness.”21 
 Another reason, though, that I’ve focused on Australia is that it has more 
potential for positive change than the US.  Much of this probably has to do with its 
smaller population size.  While Australia is a diverse place, it is nowhere near as diverse 
as the US.  And issues raised by Indigenous Australians are much more likely to appear 
on the nightly news or in the headlines than similar issues in the US.  Reconciliation, I 
believe, will fail unless the larger population buys-in; and in Australia, much more so 
than the US, getting that buy-in might be possible
21 Uluru Statement from the Heart, (2017), italics in original. 
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It is taken for granted that the settler colonial states of Australia and the United 
States are legitimate vis-à-vis their respective indigenous citizens.  While it is of course 
true that those states treat them as citizens1 it is not clear their respective indigenous 
citizens should have moral obligations to them as such.  And, in fact, in this chapter, I 
will argue that the respective indigenous citizens do not possess moral obligations as 
such.  There are two reasons for this:  first, the Indigenous peoples of Australia and of 
the United States have never ceded their right to be fully sovereign states.  What has 
happened is that the settler colonial states have diminished or outright destroyed their 
capacity to be sovereign states.  And it simply does not follow from that that those 
settler colonial states should be able to assume legitimacy.  Graciously, though, we 
might grant that in spite of the wrongful dismantling of indigenous states it would be 
possible for the settler colonial states to claim legitimacy.  In order for that to be 
possible, the settler colonial states would, at minimum, need to satisfy the requirements 
of legitimacy.  This brings me to the second reason for why indigenous peoples lack 
moral obligations to these states:  the settler colonial states do not meet the requirements 
for satisfying even the most basic liberal theories of legitimacy vis-à-vis their respective 
1 In Australia citizenship was effectively granted by the 1967 constitutional referendum, which made it 
possible for the Australian government to make laws for Indigenous Australians and to also count them in 
the national census.  And, in the United States, Congress passed the Indian Citizenship Act in 1924 which 
granted citizenship to all Native Americans born within the US. 
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indigenous citizens.  In this chapter, I will focus on the second reason and show and 
why it is the case. 
In the second section of this chapter, I will provide an overview of what 
legitimacy is and how it can be achieved.  In the third section, I will evaluate whether 
the settler colonial states can claim legitimacy through the provision of instrumental 
benefits of their citizenship.  In the fourth section of this chapter, I will consider 
whether consent theories can do the job.  The short answer is that it depends on what 
type of consent is achieved and how it comes about.  Ultimately, though, as things 
currently stand, we ought to reject consent based accounts as establishing the legitimacy 
of these states, as well.  In the fifth section, I will conclude.  The upshot of my 
conclusion is not that these states can never be legitimate vis-à-vis their indigenous 
citizens, but that, among other things, meaningful political reconciliation needs to 
happen first.  I will elaborate on the details of political reconciliation in the next chapter. 
Before beginning, I want to clarify two things:  some unfamiliar terminology 
(perhaps) and the scope of my arguments.  A settler colonial state is not the same as a 
colonized state nor is it referring to a postcolonial state.  Colonization is the imposition 
of laws and norms by an outside state, and it has one of two potential conclusions:  the 
first is decolonization, or the removal of those outside laws and norms; and the second 
is the complete assimilation or amalgamation of the original inhabitants into the 
colonizers society, or the outright destruction of the original inhabitants’ societies.  If it 
is the latter type of outcome, then the colonizers will then proceed to settle or make their 
home in the colonized land with nearly all meaningful traces of the original habitants 
gone.  Settler colonial states are those in which colonization has been incomplete but 
settlement has proceeded anyways.2  Because of this, colonial practices continue in the 
form of policies of termination, assimilation, or just plain old paternalism. 
Secondly, throughout this chapter, and the thesis as a whole, I will be referring 
to indigenous peoples.  And, unless otherwise specified, I mean that as both or either 
Indigenous Australians or Native Americans.  Now, the concept that I am interested in, 
legitimacy, is a political concept, and its satisfaction will be scrutinized by appeal to the 
wrongful actions of the settler colonial states.  Perhaps for that reason, the most obvious 
category of indigenous peoples for whom my thesis is relevant are those who have 
2 Lorenzo Veracini, “Introducing settler colonial studies,” Settler colonial studies, 2013. 
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residence in either rural areas or tribal land, because they are the ones who have been 
most affected by colonial style policies and actions. 
What about the so-called Urban Indians, though?  Nearly half of all indigenous 
peoples in either Australia or the US live in urban areas.  When Australia enforces 
racially discriminatory laws for Indigenous Australians in rural areas, does that have an 
important effect on an Indigenous Australian who has made her home in Canberra for 
the past 40 years?  Or when the Environmental Protection Agency authorizes the 
disposal of dangerous toxic waste into the water supply of the Navajo Nation, should a 
Navajo who grew up in Tucson, AZ (Tohono O’odham land) claim to be affected? 
I think the answer to those questions is yes.  The general tendency of action 
taken by the settler colonial states has not only been detrimental to the well-being of 
rural indigenous peoples (many of whom have families that live in urban areas), but also 
to indigenous culture as a whole.  And indigenous peoples, like all other peoples, have a 
claim to exercise their culture.  Destroying traditional lands and harming those in rural 
areas–often the best sources of traditional language and culture–are affronts on the 
ability of indigenous peoples to practice their culture.  Furthermore, those types of 
actions, like many others brought about by these settler colonial states, have not been 
specific to one group of indigenous people or another.  These settler colonial states have 
acted indiscriminately in wronging their respective indigenous populations.  For that, all 
indigenous peoples within those states, regardless of clan, tribal affiliation, or place of 
residence should view their culture (and, more basically, their well-being) at risk under 
those states.  Therefore, when I claim that the settler colonial states are illegitimate vis-
à-vis indigenous peoples within their territories, my assertion is one that any indigenous 
person in those states should be able to lay claim to. 
2. Legitimacy 
When a state is legitimate, its citizens possess a content-independent moral 
obligation to generally obey its directives–its laws, rulings, policies, etc.  It is important 
to stress the content-independent nature of legitimacy here.  For example, I might have 
reasons (even moral reasons) to obey the regime of a bloodthirsty dictatorial tyrant 
either because his directives, in some instance, match with what I ought to morally do; 
or because obeying his directives would be the most prudential course of action I could 
take.  However, we would not want to say that that tyrant’s dictatorial regime is 
legitimate vis-à-vis me or anyone else.  My reasons for obeying his directives have 
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everything to do with the expected outcomes associated with obeying his directives and 
nothing to do with the quality of his authority (which, being a bloodthirsty dictatorial 
tyrant, is poor). 
Ideally, a fully legitimate state generates content-independent moral obligations 
to be obeyed without question.  And, conversely, a completely illegitimate state cannot 
make any claims to content-independent moral obligations on behalf of its citizens.  It is 
unlikely that any state can meet the ideal of being fully legitimate.  All states certainly 
act wrongly and make poor decisions from time to time.  That, however, is not say that 
all states are illegitimate.  States which approximate the requirements of legitimacy can 
claim to be legitimate with respect to how well they approximate those requirements. 
The requirements of legitimacy vary from theory to theory.  My focus in this 
chapter is on liberal theories of legitimacy.  The requirements of liberal theories of 
legitimacy can be stated generally in one of two ways:  a state is legitimate vis-à-vis a 
group of citizens if and only if (1) it has provided its citizens with sufficient reasons to 
trust its ability and willingness to make just laws; or (2), its citizens have consented to 
its authority on agreement that it will make just laws for them.  The first way in which a 
state can be legitimate can be satisfied simply by the state creating just laws and 
establishing itself as the type of authority that makes just laws.  The second requires 
something more:  that its citizens consent to its authority to impose laws on them in 
exchange for its creating just laws for them.  It follows from these requirements that a 
state which absolutely fails to create just laws would fail in providing reasons for its 
citizens to trust it, and to that end, would be illegitimate; and, also, that a state which 
absolutely fails to create just laws would fail to keep its compact with its citizens, 
thereby morally voiding the consent it had been given, and making it illegitimate. 
Liberal theories of legitimacy must place a great deal of emphasis on the state 
proving itself trustworthy of making just laws for its citizens.  The way in which I wish 
to characterize trustworthiness in this thesis is in terms of risk of future wrongs.  Why 
should risk matter?  In general, I follow the assertion that citizens of a state have claims 
against the state increasing their risk to harmful or violent outcomes.3  Given the 
substantial history and the breadth of egregious wrongdoing, indigenous peoples are 
subject to an unjustly high amount of risk in virtue of being indigenous peoples under 
the authority of the settler colonial states.  In so far as they are subjected to this risk 
3 Seth Lazar, Sparing civilians, (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2015). 
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through the directives of those states, it would irrational for them to accept that they 
have content-independent reasons for obeying the directives of the state. 
How does a state prove itself trustworthy?  The most obvious way is through 
establishing a record of making just laws.  If citizens can look back on the history of 
their state and see that it usually makes just laws for its citizens, they have evidence to 
trust that their state will continue to make just laws.  Of course, that evidence in itself 
may be insufficient for proving a state to be trustworthy.  A state could have a mostly 
superb history of making just laws, but also randomly select several citizens to be 
sacrificed to the fire once every generation.  In that case, its citizens would have 
evidence to not trust that state–at least in so far as randomly selecting citizens to be 
sacrificed is not a morally just directive. 
No state has a perfect record of making or issuing just directives.  Most states 
have committed actions which can be pointed to as morally disturbing.  That can create 
a difficult situation:  how should those incidents be weighed against the morally good 
directives of the state?  For example, should we allow for a singular period of 
government sponsored genocide in a state’s past to outweigh the trust built through 
decades of universal suffrage and robust civil rights protections since?   
I believe not.  One way to make these comparisons, I think, is to ask the 
question:  does the recent history of the state show a commitment towards just 
lawmaking?  A state which has committed wrongs in the past can learn from its 
mistakes and prove itself to be the type of state trustworthy of making just laws, even 
vis-à-vis its victims. 
One reason to believe the above claim is true is that if we deny it, then we leave 
open the possibility that no state today is legitimate and also the possibility that no state 
today can become legitimate.  That would be a poor result, I think.  Claiming that a 
morally disturbing history is insurmountable would not provide the state with as much, 
or perhaps any, motivation for learning from and correcting its past.  What though does 
a state need to do to prove itself? 
Can states who have committed wrongs against its citizens and fail or refuse to 
learn from those actions still prove themselves trustworthy?  Logically the answer is 
yes.  A million years of consistently making just laws without blemish should count for 
something.  However, in actual practice the likelihood of such a situation emerging is 
vanishingly small.  For example, consider the wrongs committed by the Australian 
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government during the Stolen Generation, namely forcibly removing Indigenous 
Australian children from their families.  Forcibly removing children from their home is 
something that was recognized by the Australian government as wrong, but positive 
steps were not taken to prove a commitment against that happening again.  And during 
the Northern Territory Intervention Act, nearly 30 years later, it happened again. 
Even in instances where the general relationship has improved over time, there 
is reason to expect those past wrongs to resurface.  For one salient example, the US has 
historically violated all of its treaties with Native American tribes; and, to this day, 
continues to violate many of those treaties despite both legal and moral obligations 
created by those treaties (and recognized by the US).  Even with the continuing wrong 
of violating treaties, the US also provides tribes and their citizens with many benefits.  
And, while the US seems to have not learned from its wrongdoing of treaty violating, it 
is certainly the case that its relationship with tribes, and the outcomes tribes face as a 
result of US authority, has improved over time.  That would suggest that while the US 
has certainly acted wrongly against tribes and continues to act wrongly against tribes 
that it is trending in a positive direction.  Simply trending in the direction of making just 
laws, however, is insufficient for legitimacy.  That trend needs to show a commitment 
to making just laws and in so far as unjust laws are still being made, then despite 
progress in other areas, no such trend exists.   
More generally, we might think there is simply an important distinction between 
merely ceasing one’s wrongful actions and addressing one’s wrongful actions.  One 
common way to pump that intuition is by appeal to our interest in apologies.  It is not 
enough for us that wrongs simply cease, we want wrongdoers to apologize.  And one 
plausible reason for why is that an apology indicates an acknowledgment of the wrong 
done and a commitment to not committing those types of wrongs again.  Among other 
things, an apology can provide us with evidence to trust that the wrongdoer will not 
commit that wrong, or similar wrongs, again. 
Obviously, states can’t just address their wrongs with an apology.  The wrongs 
committed by states are much more severe, in most cases, than the wrongs individuals 
can commit interpersonally.  That said, states can take action to address their past 
wrongs; and in doing so they can provide evidence to their victims that they are 
committed to not committing those wrongs, or similar wrongs, again. 
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This brings me to the issue with liberal theories of legitimacy that I will be 
discussing in the sections below:  they do not require states to address historical wrongs; 
and in so far as they fail to do that, victims have reason to believe that future injustices, 
though not necessarily the same injustices, will occur.  That is not to say that past 
wrongs shouldn’t be addressed for their own sake, they should.  What it is to say, is that 
in so far as past wrongs go unaddressed, the victims of those actions will always have 
evidence against their state being trustworthy and thus the state will always have 
evidence against its claims of legitimacy vis-à-vis those victims.   
3. Instrumentalist accounts of legitimacy  
Instrumentalist accounts of legitimacy posit that a state is legitimate if it can be 
trusted to provide certain beneficial goods or outcomes to or for its citizens.  Under that 
general description, we can find a number of theories.   
Joseph Raz, for one, argues that a state is legitimate if it offers directives that 
individuals have reason to follow, independent of the authority being the source of those 
directives.  As he puts it, “authoritative directives should be based on reasons which 
already independently apply to the subjects of the directives and are relevant to their 
action in the circumstances covered by the directive. ”4  The directives of the state, for 
Raz, do not always need to be based on reasons that individuals would have 
independently, though.  It just needs to be the case that on average acting in-line with 
the state’s directives would be consistent with what one would have had reason to do 
had the state not been there.  That said, what gives us reason to obligate ourselves to the 
state is not merely that its directives are consistent with what we believe we have reason 
to do, but because it is better at securing those outcomes than we would be on our own.  
For example, we might believe we have duty of charity to others.  The process of 
finding those in need of our charity and then acting on the duty can be costly and act as 
impediments to the realization of that duty.  Through its abilities of taxation and 
redistribution, the state can minimize the costs associated with each individual 
attempting to discharge her duties to be charitable. 
Another contemporary philosopher who adopts this type of view is Allen 
Buchanan.  Buchanan claims that a state is legitimate if it reasonably protects the basic 
human rights of its citizens, where the standard for those rights is determined by their 
4 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 47. 
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current understanding within international legal moral theory.5  States who do a good 
job at protecting these rights are, on this account, more legitimate than those who do a 
poor job.  The view is attractive because it focuses only on protection of basic rights–
rights to property, non-domination, freedom of consciousness, etc.–which all 
individuals require to live a decent life. 
Those are just a small sample of instrumentalist theories of legitimacy.  The 
intuition behind all of them is easy enough–regardless of other reasons individuals 
might have, they have reason to be obligated to states which, on average, meet certain 
requirements for securing goods or outcomes to or for them.  Assuming the settler 
colonial states were able to meet the requirements of some instrumentalist theory, would 
it then be the case that indigenous peoples within them would have a moral reason to 
obey the authorities of those states?   
3.2 Instrumental to our demise 
First, I want to reiterate once again that as things currently stand, it would be a 
terrible lie to suggest that the settler colonial states have sufficiently met even the most 
minimalistic requirements for securing legitimacy through the provision of goods or 
outcomes to or for indigenous peoples.  These states have endorsed or directly 
committed acts of slavery, relocation, genocide, theft of land, theft of children, and so 
on against the indigenous peoples of their territories.  It would, in fact, be more 
reasonable to say that these states have been instrumental to the demise of indigenous 
peoples.   
In the US, treaties were made and systematically broken.  And in Australia, the 
early colonizers declared the land terra nullius or nobody’s land.  This was because the 
colonizers did not recognize the land rights of the Aboriginal inhabitants as valid.  In 
both states, this led to the unjustified colonization of indigenous peoples and the settling 
of their lands.  As a result, many indigenous peoples were relocated to places that were 
often far from their traditional land and were often located in remote, inhospitable areas. 
In the late 1800s, both the US and the largely autonomous Australian colonies 
begun the process of assimilating indigenous children into the mainstream culture.  This 
process primarily took the form of forcibly or coercively removing indigenous children 
from home and placing them into boarding schools.  These policies were enacted 
5 Allen Buchanan, Justice, legitimacy, and self-determination: moral foundations for international law.  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 235. 
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through more the more generally affable policy of “compulsory schooling for children.”  
However, given that many indigenous children were living in remote areas, Australia 
opted to remove them and place them in areas where schooling was accessible; and the 
US opted to fund religious boarding schools on or around reservations.  In Australia, 
this practice continued until the 1960s and is known as The Stolen Generation; and in 
the US, this practice continued into the 1970s.  In addition to be separated from their 
families, children in these schools were often physically assaulted and mistreated for 
any expression of their indigenous culture.6  And today both the US and Australian 
governments dramatically underfund health and education services for their respective 
indigenous populations, and continue to subject them to coercive and unjust laws, such 
as the Northern Territory Intervention mentioned in the Introduction, or the continued 
violation of Native American lands and treaty agreements, through permitting the North 
Dakota Pipeline, dumping toxic waste into a tribe’s water supply, and so on. 
From those three distinctive periods of interaction, the initial periods of 
interaction and some of the more recent, it should be clear that when it comes to 
indigenous peoples the settler colonial states have a terrible history of producing unjust 
laws.   
3.3 Buchanan’s instrumentalist theory 
What would it require for Buchanan’s account to be met?  And what would 
meeting its requirements mean?  Conceivably, I think, it would require both Australia 
and the United States to ratify the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples7 (DRIP).  This is because Buchanan calls for the list of human 
rights protections to come from international moral legal theory, which is precisely 
where DRIP came from.  And, if the settler colonial states did ratify DRIP, then it 
would certainly count as evidence of them being more trustworthy. 
Thus far, Australia and the US have only signed off on DRIP.8  The difference 
between signing or endorsing DRIP and ratifying it is that ratifying it binds the state to 
make the contents of the international agreement part of its national law.  The move to 
ratify would make sense here for two reasons:  first, because DRIP is a document that 
6 The most famous of the US schools was the Carlisle Indian School, whose headmaster’s famous motto 
was “Kill the Indian, save the man.” 
7 “United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,” United Nations, (2008), 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf.  Retrieved June 6, 2017. 
8 Of interesting note is that only four countries–Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States–
voted against the document. 
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was developed by indigenous peoples from all over the world, it is document that 
reflects the interests, to some extent, of indigenous peoples; and second, because 
Buchanan’s account of which rights states ought to protect comes from those rights 
currently recognized at the international level.  
What value would ratifying DRIP have?  Given that the value of treaties in 
making sure agreements are kept is suspect, its value would primarily come in the form 
of signaling to indigenous peoples that the states are working to make things better.  
Even so, assuming that its benefits would be more than symbolic what would those 
benefits be? 
Rather than going through each article, some of the important takeaways are that 
discrimination against indigenous peoples qua indigenous peoples would be made 
illegal; the rights to self-determination and cultural revitalization would be recognized; 
and consent from the relevant indigenous peoples would be required for any attempt by 
the state to relocate them.   
If the settler colonial states met these demands to the satisfaction of their 
indigenous citizens would their authority be legitimate?  I think not.  It would count as a 
reason for thinking that those states are the types of states that are able and willing to 
make just laws for their indigenous citizens.  However, that evidence would still be 
outweighed by the overwhelming mountain of historical evidence against the state.  
There is nothing in DRIP that requires a state to explicitly address its past wrongs.  That 
matters.  The DRIP, with some exception, is very forward looking–its list of rights serve 
as a guide for how states ought to treat their indigenous citizens; it is not a guide for 
addressing the past.  These states need to address their troubled past as a necessity for 
showing they are in fact committed to not being the type of state they have been in the 
past.  Simply binding themselves to a legal document is insufficient, especially given 
their proclivity for violating such documents. 
3.4 Raz’s account 
Before considering Raz’s account, I want to acknowledge some of the issues that 
have been taken with his account.  The most vexing issue people have is that in large 
diverse societies, who benefits and how they benefit will be unclear, and without a state 
being able to show individuals that they will in fact benefit it will be unable to provide a 
reason for its legitimacy.  And if individuals have to reason over the state’s directives to 
determine whether they are aligned with their own reasons, then that would defeat the 
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benefits of efficiency that the state would provide.  For my purposes, I believe we can 
bracket these worries.  I will also, for the sake of argument, assume that whatever 
reasons indigenous peoples would have for following directives are reasons that 
individuals from a Western culture would also have.  Ultimately, I am interested in 
whether the historical facts of the matter should bear on the legitimacy of a state that 
does satisfy Raz’s requirements for indigenous peoples. 
 Imagine, for a moment, that a new government came into power in Australia and 
reinstated the Australian and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), re-amended 
the Native Title Act restoring the right of indigenous peoples to veto mining projects on 
their traditional lands; changed the direction of the Community Development Program 
(CDP) so that its focus were once again on local development, instead of assimilating 
indigenous peoples into urban cities; extended and increased the funding on the 
Aboriginal Ranger Program; rallied the Australia people to recognize the Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islanders as the first people of this land; created treaty agreements with 
the many different indigenous peoples within Australia; ratified DRIP; etc.  Essentially, 
imagine if the directives of the Australian government were directives that secured 
outcomes that had nearly unanimous support from the indigenous peoples of Australia.  
In that case, would there be sufficient evidence to think that the state’s authority were 
legitimate? 
To some extent this has already been proposed.  Will Kymlicka and Chandras 
Kukathas both seem to have in mind a millet style of rule where each individual 
minority group is able to govern by their own rules, while still remaining under the 
general authority of the settler states.  The term millet comes from the Arabic word, 
millah, meaning “nation.”  Its most famous usage was a system of governance was as a 
description for the system of governance once used by the Ottoman Empire, through 
which different religious groups could live under the Empire while still being governed 
by their own laws.  As a description of the actual system of governance employed by 
the Ottoman Empire, the concept is stretched.  However, as a concept, it does have 
attractive features especially for minorities whose religious conceptions or conceptions 
of justice conflict with the laws of the state in which they live. 
In the current settings, the US currently comes closest to meeting this ideal, 
allowing for tribes to utilize traditional forms of governance, including norms, for 
making decisions.  The only restriction being that the tribe’s actions not conflict with 
Federal law.  For example, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court and the elected officials 
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of the Nation are required to provide justifications for their decisions grounded in 
traditional Navajo law.  This, in effect, means that the tribe is able to give reasons to its 
citizens for its laws based on reasons that those citizens as Navajo can accept.  Studies 
done on other tribes by the Harvard Project for Indigenous Economic Development 
have shown that tribes who utilize this ability enjoy greater democratic participation and 
law abidance from their citizens.   
If the key characteristic of the millet view is that it allows for individuals to be 
ruled by directives they have, then the millet view would fail to justify the federal laws.  
The reasons provided at the federal level would not be the reasons of the minority, at 
least not entirely.  At best, the federal level could justify itself through permitting one to 
live under her minority groups laws.  There is nothing in that justification, then, to 
explain why it is that the state should have that power to begin with.  Even so, would 
something like that provide enough instrumental benefits to prove the state as 
trustworthy? 
No.  Given everything else that has occurred there is not sufficient evidence to 
show that the next government would not revert on important issues.  Take for example, 
the recent controversy surrounding the Dakota Access Pipeline.  Under the Obama 
administration, construction of the pipeline was halted; under the Trump administration, 
it was streamlined.  If past behavior is evidence of future behavior, then we have a 
tremendous mountain of evidence suggesting that policy reversion would occur. 
In virtue of their actions, settler colonial states would need to do more than make 
a few changes in order to be recognized as trustworthy; they would need to prove that 
they are the types of states committed to securing beneficial goods or outcomes for their 
indigenous citizens.  That process would undoubtedly take a long time, and during that 
time indigenous peoples would continue to reasonably regard themselves as being at 
risk of future harm by the state. 
4. This was not consensual and that matters 
The strategy for showing why consent theories of legitimacy fail is somewhat 
similar to the strategy of showing why instrumentalist theories fail.  In regards to 
instrumentalist theories, as things stand, the instrumental benefits of citizenship in the 
settler colonial states is insufficient for meeting the demands of the theories.  However, 
even under ideal conditions, the settler colonial states would not be able provide 
sufficient evidence proving themselves trustworthy in making just laws for their 
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respective indigenous citizens.  Part of the reason why is that those theories do not 
necessarily require past injustices to be corrected.  For those theories considered, a state 
is justified in so far as it adequately protects an accepted understanding of basic human 
rights or gives its citizens reasons to comply that those citizens already have.  In so far 
as those theories remain focused on what immediate changes it needs to make or on 
what it needs to do in the future, they will be insufficient in establishing that those states 
are able and willing to not be the monsters they have been in the past. 
Consent is probably most intuitive way to show that a state’s authority is 
legitimate.  Consent, by itself, though, is not normatively interesting.  For consent to do 
the work of legitimating a state, it needs be spelled out a bit more.  Typically, these 
conditions are that consent be given voluntarily and that the individual giving it is 
reasonably informed about she is consenting to.  That, however, is not the entirety of the 
story for consent.  When individuals consent to the state, they are consenting to a type 
of agreement between them and the state.  Both sides are agreeing to certain things.  
Individuals are agreeing to being under the authority of the states; and the states are 
agreeing to take on the responsibility of providing certain benefits for those individuals.  
There are different accounts of how these conditions can be met, but those general 
conditions are sufficient for understanding when we should take consent seriously. 
I will begin by considering whether the conditions for express consent are met.  I 
will then turn to tacit consent, whereby individuals do not need to directly express their 
consent but rather give it indirectly, typically through compliance or positive 
engagement with the state.  I will argue that in the first case satisfaction of the 
conditions have not been met and in the second that given other facts about the situation 
that we cannot treat it as expressing anything normatively interesting.  Lastly, I will 
consider another strain of consent, hypothetical consent, whereby the claim is that 
consent would be given if the individual were properly situated.   
4.1 Express Consent 
In its most forceful form actual consent requires that the state receive the 
voluntary, express, and informed consent of each of its citizens on each of its laws in 
order for it to be legitimate.9  Aside from this being virtually impossible to accomplish, 
there are few outside of the philosophical anarchists that would endorse it.10  A less 
9 What Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism, (University of California:  University of California 
Press, 1970) calls “Instant direct democracy,” p. 34.   
10 Ibid. 
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forceful version requires only that free (voluntary) and informed individuals give 
consent to being governed by a state, as opposed to having to give consent to each of its 
laws.  As Harry Beran puts it, “Consent consists in acceptance of membership in a state 
by each person who is under political obligation.”11 And while few would hold that 
requirement as necessary for legitimacy, for the same reasons as the more forceful form, 
it is plausible to think that something like that where achieved would certainly signify 
that individuals are acknowledging and accepting the moral authority of the state.   
Within the context at hand, the closest approximation of that requirement was 
made possible by two distinctive political decisions made in Australia during the 1960s.  
The first was the 1962 amendment to the Commonwealth Electoral Act which gave 
Indigenous Australians the right to voluntarily enroll and vote in federal elections.12  
This amendment not only made it possible for Indigenous peoples to participate as 
equals in the election process but also made doing so voluntary.13  The second is the 
1967 constitutional referendum which, in passing, formally included Indigenous 
Australians as Australian citizens in the national census and allowed the Australian 
government to make laws separately for them.  Taken together, these landmark events 
in Australian history made it possible for its Indigenous peoples to take part in deciding 
whether to become members of the Australian state.  In other words, it provided an 
opportunity for them to formally give their consent to the Australian state.  First by 
giving them the right to vote and second by giving them the opportunity to use that right 
to influence whether they should be counted as citizens. 
The first problem with treating these successive decisions as constituting express 
consent is that the 1967 referendum itself was a farce.  The referenda were voted on by 
all of Australia, of which Indigenous peoples make up roughly 2% of the total 
population and much less than a majority in any state.  And so, even if every Indigenous 
person in Australia voted against citizenship, it would have passed anyways.14   
Instead, then, of looking at the two decision as constituting consent, we might 
just look at the 1962 amendment.  We might say, for example, that by choosing to enroll 
11 Harry Beran, “In defense of the the consent theory of obligation,” Ethics, 87 (1977), pp. 260-271 at p. 
262.  In the quote above, a “person” who can consent is no longer a “political minor” and is a naturalized 
citizen of that state. 
12  And in 1965 that right was fully extended to state and local elections as well.   
13 For non-Indigenous Australians voting is compulsory.  It is also compulsory for Indigenous Australians 
who enrol to vote. 
14 This was the most successful referendum in the history of Australia, with nearly 91% of the vote being 
in favour of including Indigenous peoples as citizens in the constitution. 
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and to vote in elections Indigenous peoples are consenting to, and thus legitimating, the 
state’s moral authority.  It is impossible, of course, to glean the reasons for why 
individuals would choose to participate in the electoral process, and so for the sake of 
argument I will assume that by voting individuals were expressing their consent to the 
settler colonial state’s authority over them.  Ultimately, that intention does not matter, 
though, because the choice to consent did not matter; it was not a real choice.  And even 
if it were a real choice, it would have been made under coercive circumstances. 
The first way in which the choice was not real is that the choice they were 
making did not matter, and for that reason should not count as a choice.  The structure 
of a choice requires that different options lead to different outcomes.  The choice to 
consent was not a choice because whether they consented or not, the Australian 
government was going to impose its authority on them.  That is, the different options 
available led to the same outcome.  In regards to the imposition of Australian authority, 
there was no difference between an Indigenous Australian who consented to that 
authority and one who did not.   
The second way in which the choice was not real is that it was made under 
wrongfully coercive circumstances.  Namely, the right to vote was given while the 
Australian government was still engaged in forcibly removing children from their 
homes and relocating them to provide them with a Western education.15  Which itself 
was taking place on the heels of many other acts of cultural genocide, including also 
dispossession and forced relocation.  Given the extent of the violence these peoples had 
already faced, and the fact that they possessed little if any direct influence in preventing 
further harm, it is reasonable to believe that the choice between consenting or not was 
really a choice between assimilation or the outright extinction of their culture.  As such, 
that choice would have been highly coerced because it was made under immoral 
circumstances.  For example, imagine that a madman has trapped you in a puzzle room 
and the only way out requires you to cut off your hand; and that not cutting off your 
hand will result in your eventual death in the puzzle room.  And, that once out of that 
room, you will be subjected to a similar room.16  By cutting off your hand, and moving 
to the next room, you are not consenting to the madman’s capturing you nor to being 
exposed to the truly horrific choice of losing a hand or dying; instead, you are playing 
his game in the hopes that eventually your situation will improve.  That the madman 
15 This is, of course, known as The Stolen Generation. 
16 Or imagine a scene from the Saw movie series. 
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should use the wrongfully coercive situation to extract your consent does nothing to 
make the situation morally permissible.  Similarly, if the government says, “Consent or 
not,” and not consenting means that an incompetent or downright immoral state will 
continue to have sole discretion over your well-being, then the fact that you are 
consenting should not count as creating moral obligations to whatever directives the 
state issues next; instead, you are playing their game in hopes that one day your 
situation will improve.  We should view the choice to enroll and to vote, if it can even 
be called a choice, as coercive, and thus as not a valid act of expressing consent.  
In general, the problem with express consent is that the choice to consent was 
never actually available.  And even if it was, it was only available under coercive 
circumstances.  Switching to the US, the state never sought anything resembling initial 
consent.  Congress simply declared that Native Americans were citizens in 1924, 
though the right to vote was not permitted in all states until 1948.  We should, I think, 
reject any story which claims that indigenous peoples have given their express consent 
to the moral authority of these states.  
4.2 Tacit Consent 
The second version of actual consent is tacit consent.  Its satisfaction requires 
only that individuals choose to remain within the state.  For example, in both Australia 
and the US individuals are free to emigrate.  Thus, any individual who chooses to 
remain in either of those states is indirectly choosing or consenting to being under the 
moral authority of that state.  This view is attractive because it does not require 
individual state governments to seek the consent of each new individual.  It   merely 
requires that state’s make it reasonably achievable for its citizens to emigrate.  And 
given the large number of respectable liberal democratic states in the world, individuals 
choosing to emigrate can do so without fear that their basic rights will be diminished in 
any important way.   
Emigrating, for much of the world’s population, is an insurmountable financial 
obstacle.  For many indigenous peoples, whose communities often suffer from high 
rates of poverty, that is surely the case.  In addition, indigenous peoples have different 
claims to land.  Namely that their identity is fundamentally tied to their traditional 
lands.  Making it easy for them to emigrate by providing compensation for the monetary 
costs of doing so does not necessarily make emigration an option.  And, if that is the 
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case, then we should not take their remaining on or near their traditional lands as them 
tacitly consenting to the state. 
Nonetheless, merely staying in a state is only one version of tacit consent.  
Another version of tacit consent argues that when individuals not only remain in the 
state but also engage with it beneficially that they are consenting to its moral authority.  
Indigenous peoples could remain in the states without necessarily engaging directly 
with the state through the benefits it makes possible–employment opportunities, 
education programs, and so on. 
There are, of course, any number of reasons for why an individual would remain 
and actively participate in a state which they found illegitimate.  Individuals might 
simply be trying to make the best of a bad situation.  In that case, their staying does 
nothing to justify the bad situation.  For instance, if a kidnapper offers his victim the 
choice between a Coke and a Pepsi and she chooses Coke, the kidnapping does not 
become magically become justified. 
In any case, participation in civil society appears much lower for indigenous 
peoples than for the general population.  Unemployment rates for Indigenous 
Australians in major cities are nearly three times higher than the rest of the population.17  
In the US, unemployment has recently been almost twice as high for Native Americans 
compared to the rest of the population.18   
It looks as if any version of consent where actual consent is given by individuals 
is going to be off the table for serving as the story of why the settler colonial states are 
legitimate vis-à-vis their indigenous citizens.  The main reasons why having to do with 
the historical fact that expressive consent, where attempted, was meaningless; and that 
claiming tacit consent through informal participation ignores important aspects of 
Indigenous culture, including the strong ties that indigenous peoples have to their 
traditional land; and because participation in society does not tell us anything morally 
relevant about the legitimacy of a state.  I will now turn to hypothetical consent to see 
what support for legitimating the state it can provide. 
17 “Australian and Torres Strait Islander Peoples’ Labour Force Outcomes,” Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, (2013), 
http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/4102.0Main+Features20Nov+2013#EMPLOYMENTO
UTCOMESCHANGE.  Retrieved 10 December 2016. 
18 Algernon Austin, “High Unemployment Means Native Americans Are Still Waiting for an Economic 
Recovery,” Economic Policy Institute, (2013), http://www.epi.org/publication/high-unemployment-
means-native-americans/.  Retrieved 10 December 2016. 
                                                          
38 
 
4.3 Hypothetical consent through public reason 
Two problems with consent so far have been that it was either coercive (in the 
case of express consent) or that it assumed too much (in the case of tacit consent).  
Theories of hypothetical consent overcome these worries by specifying certain 
conditions which must be satisfied for consent and thus for legitimacy.  While the 
details of the conditions vary from one version to another, they all share a common 
description and a common underlying ideal.  Descriptively, theories of hypothetical 
consent all claim something like this:  a state is legitimate if a reasonable individual 
would consent to the moral obligations demanded by the state in question.19  The ideal 
is simply that a state’s authority ought to be justifiable to all of its citizens in order for it 
to be legitimate. 
One of the most famous contemporary accounts of hypothetical consent is John 
Rawls’ public reason theory of legitimacy.  He argues that a state is legitimate if the 
basic structure of its government (its institutions, organizational structure, and processes 
i.e. its constitution) are based on a liberal conception of justice, because reasonable 
citizens would, upon reflection, recognize that the only way a stable society can exist is 
if it is based on a liberal conception of justice. 
For Rawls, reasonable citizens are those that are normatively idealized to the 
extent that they realize their own epistemic limitations and are willing to act in 
accordance with that knowledge.  These citizens accept the burdens of judgment, the 
idea that we should expect and accept the fact of intractable yet reasonable 
disagreement over a wide array of issues ranging from the empirical to the abstract; and 
also the fact of reasonable pluralism, the idea that those disagreements will exist within 
a society of free and equal individuals.20  Because of the limitations imposed by the 
burdens of judgment and reasonable pluralism, the best a society could hope to do is be 
neutral amongst competing comprehensive doctrines (hereafter, doctrines), or beliefs 
about what is good and bad or right and wrong, and work toward an overlapping 
consensus, a unanimous agreement, over how we should go about establishing the 
constitutional essentials of a society.   
In order for a society to be neutral over competing doctrines and reach an 
overlapping consensus, Rawls believes that reasonable citizens would offer reasons to 
19 Other things can be inserted for reasonable, but the general point is that citizens are idealized to accept 
certain conditions as legitimate, where the conditions are, for a lack of better word, reasonable. 
20 John Rawls, Political liberalism. (Columbia:  Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 54-56 
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each other in terms “addressed to citizens as citizens.”21  By addressing “citizens as 
citizens,” Rawls means that those individuals should try, as best as they can, to offer 
reasons from their own doctrines, which they believe free and equal people with 
different doctrines, could accept.  Citizens would be willing to do this for two reasons.  
First, because doing so helps further along the goal of generating a stable society given 
their epistemic limitations; and second, because they have an assurance, based on the 
unanimous acceptance of those limitations by all, that others will engage with them 
similarly.  As Rawls puts it, citizens are “ready to propose principles and standards as 
fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance that others 
will likewise do so.”22  Given that citizens are so motivated, and have assurances that 
the fair terms of cooperation will be met, a state which instantiated these idealizations 
would, according to Rawls, be legitimate. 
If such a state exists, it would be reasonable for citizens to accept that state as 
legitimate as reasons coming from the state justifying its various coercive actions would 
be reasons that citizens could accept as just liberal reasons.  We know, however, that the 
states in question have not taken seriously the doctrines of indigenous peoples.  Those 
states have explicitly sought to undermine and destroy the cultures of their indigenous 
citizens for generations.  And while that is certainly of the upmost importance, it is a 
separate issue than what the Rawlsian is concerned with.  The hypothetical nature of the 
Rawlsian story of legitimacy is concerned primarily with what a state needs to do to be 
hypothetically justifiable to all, not necessarily with what it has done.  Thus, in order for 
the state to be legitimate over its indigenous citizens it just needs to be able to provide 
reasons for them to consent to it from the same conception of justice it uses to 
legitimate itself to its other members.  
There are a number of issues that have be raised against Rawls’ theory, I want to 
focus on two.  First, the requirement that the abstract agreement which the Rawlsian 
“overlapping consensus” aims at is not an empty set.  It is an exclusively liberal 
conception of justice.  A number of critics have argued that point against Rawls’ theory 
over the years.  I will review some of those points below and, for the sake of argument, 
conclude that it is not necessarily a concern for the theory.  The second issue is the 
idealization away from the past injustices of the state and the failure to provide any 
21 John Rawls, Law of peoples: with the idea of public reason revisited. (Harvard:  Harvard University 
Press, 2001), p. 132. 
22 Rawls, (2005), p. 49 
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guidance for how a justifiable state could emerge given those injustices.  In particular, 
Rawls’ ignorance of those past injustices makes it unclear as to why indigenous peoples 
should expect to be treated under the fair terms of cooperation.  
4.3.2 Justifying a liberal conception of justice, fair terms of cooperation and stability 
Indigenous academics such as Dale Turner23 and Taiaiake Alfred24 have argued 
that indigenous peoples do not endorse purely liberal conceptions of justice.  For them 
liberal conceptions of justice all share the same basic normative structure:  only the 
interests of individual persons, as opposed to groups of individuals or non-person 
entities, are morally relevant.  Where this can differ in the case of some indigenous 
conceptions of justice is when things such as land, animals, and spirits are possessors of 
rights or have claims alongside individual persons.25  Thus, for some indigenous 
conceptions of justice, the moral obligations demanded by the state must also include a 
space for the rights and interests of non-person entities. 
If it is true that liberal conceptions of justice are inherently disrespectful toward 
non-person entities qua rights holders, then it would not be clear how the two moral 
frameworks–liberal and indigenous–could be made compatible.  As things stand, 
however, it is not clear that liberal conceptions are inherently disrespectful toward those 
other conceptions.  Individuals in a liberal society are afforded a vast amount of liberty 
to pursue their own ends.  While others within those societies may not agree with their 
practices, so long as those practices are not causing wrongful harm to them or others, 
they have no normative claim against those practices.  And it would be absurd to claim 
that the practices of indigenous peoples expose wrongful harm onto their members or to 
others.  Thus, while the Rawlsian liberal conception of justice does not endorse the 
rights of non-persons, it does not necessarily prevent others from engaging in practices 
which do, and for that reason it cannot be said that it is entirely disrespectful toward 
those non-liberal conceptions. 
The problem with using the Rawlsian version of hypothetical consent is not that 
its content is discriminatory against certain outcomes, it is with its inability to deal with 
historical injustices.  While this is not necessarily a problem with the theory, as that was 
23 Dale Turner, This is not a peace pipe: towards a critical indigenous philosophy. (Toronto:  Toronto 
University Press, 2006).  
24 Taiaiake Alfred and Jeff Corntassel. "Being indigenous: resurgences against contemporary 
colonialism." Government and Opposition, 40, (2005), pp. 597-614. 
25 That is that they have moral worth unrelated to utility we derive from them. 
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never its end, it is a problem with using it to legitimate settler colonial states.  One way 
in which these historical wrongs affect the theory is by eroding the unanimous belief by 
members of society that the fair terms of cooperation are assured.  Given the wrongs 
which have consistently taken place, it is reasonable for indigenous peoples to mistrust 
that the state’s institutions are adequate for providing incentives for individuals to take 
their interests seriously, and thus for the state to take their interests seriously.  If 
indigenous peoples cannot be properly assured that their claims will be taken equally, 
then how can it be claimed that they should accept the state as legitimate? 
Without directly addressing the problems mistrust caused by patterned and 
widespread historical injustices, the Rawlsian might appeal to the desirability of a stable 
liberal society in order to show that the state is legitimate.  Namely, he might appeal to 
the fact that individuals would have an incentive to not prevent or discourage 
indigenous peoples from engaging with their culture, which, in turn, would provide an 
assurance that the more particular interests of those peoples would be respected.  The 
incentive which would motivate cooperation is that the failure to cooperate fairly would 
lead to disobedience by indigenous peoples toward the state, which would, in turn, 
cause instability.  
I doubt that would be a strong enough for motivating the fair terms of 
cooperation where it is not already the norm.  That is because indigenous peoples make 
up a very small percentage of the population in either Australia or the US, and so would 
find it difficult to gain traction for their causes in these societies.  And in addition to the 
small number of Indigenous peoples, there is also a large diversity of indigenous 
peoples with distinctive claims, over 500 different indigenous groups within the US and 
as many within Australia.  And lastly, even if all of those groups came together they 
would likely lack the financial resources to effectively lobby their views as indigenous 
peoples.  As in either settler colonial state, indigenous citizens are, on average, the 
poorest.  In other words, it is doubtful that the stability of either liberal state could be 
upended by disobedience from its indigenous members.  And therefore, the desirability 
of stability is unlikely going to be enough to motivate non-indigenous citizens to engage 
in fair terms of cooperation with indigenous citizens.26  
The Rawlsian, however, might take that appeal to stability a different way.  He 
could claim that despite the lack of assurances over their particular interests being 
26 This is especially true considering that governments in which these citizens inhabit have consistently 
failed to do so. 
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protected that indigenous peoples would still be assured that their basic liberal rights are 
secured.  Everyone must give something up in order to participate in a society of 
peoples with reasonably plural views and limitations over the quality of judgments 
regarding those views, and there is agreement over basic principles of justice which 
secure a basic set of liberal rights for all individuals.  And so long as the state can 
ensure conditions through which that arrangement can be maintained, individuals 
should view that state as legitimate.  
The desideratum of stability only makes sense given that we are trying to 
construct a society given the burdens of judgment, reasonable pluralism, and, I believe, 
a strong interest in living together.  Absent that last condition our impetus to solve the 
problems of the burdens of judgment and reasonable disagreement disappear.  If 
stability is what we are after, then it would be best reached through constructing a 
society that is homogenous over more than abstract principles; it would be homogenous 
over those and also as many particulars as possible, so much so that would not have to 
worry about any disagreement.  Thus, if stability is the end, then indigenous peoples 
would hypothetically be better off in their own communities.  What motivates 
individuals to live together then is not just stability but “stability” plus “the value of 
living in a diverse society.”   
Assuming there is something valuable about living with those whom we have 
deep disagreements with, that value is only necessarily manifest when individuals are 
treated equally.  For example, a slave living in a first world democratic country is still a 
slave.  In other words, the value in living together in a wealthy society is not enough to 
legitimate the state under which we all live unless both the institutions of that state as 
well as its members interact with all members under the fair terms of cooperation.  
Thus, we have returned to the problem of the fair terms of cooperation.  The Rawlsian 
story of hypothetical consent, it seems, does not have the resources to assure indigenous 
peoples that the fair terms of cooperation will be satisfied.  And because it is unable to 
do that, it cannot overcome the mistrust that indigenous peoples are justified in holding 
toward their respective settler colonial states.     
As in the case of actual consent, it is not necessarily the case that hypothetical 
consent is useless in legitimating these settler colonial states for their indigenous 
populations.  The problem is that there is a prior process of resolving past injustices that 
needs to be done to allow these theories to be applied.   
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have tried show how liberal theories of legitimacy fail in 
regards to their application to the indigenous peoples within the settler colonial states.  
The primary issue for those theories of legitimacy discussed here is how they address 
the historical relationships between indigenous peoples and their settler states.  
Historically, the relationships include forced relocation, genocide, treaty-breaking, 
forced assimilation, and so on.  If any of those theories is to work in generating 
legitimacy for these states, then those horrible injustices need to be addressed.  Until 
they are addressed, the settler colonial states will not be able to lay any claims to 
legitimacy vis-à-vis their indigenous citizens.  The reason for this, I argued, is that 
history is the best guide we have for future actions; and what that guide looks like in 
these settler colonial states is future substantial harms committed against their 
indigenous peoples.  The first step, then, in becoming legitimate will require states to 
prove to their indigenous citizens that they can be trusted to make just laws for them. 
In the next section, I will discuss the concept of reconciliation and the important 
role that it plays in providing evidence that a state is both able and willing to make just 
laws for its citizens. 


  
 
Chapter 2:  Political reconciliation between settler colonial 
states and indigenous peoples 
No government policy toward Indians can be fully effective unless there is a relationship of trust 
and confidence between the Federal government and the Indian people. Such a relationship 
cannot be completed overnight; it is inevitably the product of a long series of words and 
actions. But we can contribute significantly to such a relationship by responding to just 
grievances which are especially important to the Indian people. 
- President Richard M. Nixon, 19701 
In the previous chapter, I diagnosed one issue with the relationship between the 
settler states of Australia and the US and their indigenous citizens:  that those states are 
illegitimate vis-à-vis their respective indigenous citizens.  Their illegitimacy stems, 
minimally, from a relationship of systemic and patterned violence and harm, including 
the theft of land, forced relocation, ethnic genocide, forced acculturation, as well as 
many other wrongs.  Because of that history, indigenous citizens of those states have 
significant evidence to against trusting these states to make just laws for them.     
In this chapter, I will outline what first steps the settler colonial states must take 
in order to prove themselves as trustworthy for their indigenous citizens.  However, 
regardless of what the state does to prove itself as trustworthy of making just laws for 
its indigenous peoples, the evidence against it will likely always stack higher.2  
Therefore, by working to prove itself as trustworthy the settler colonial states do not 
make themselves legitimate; instead, what they do is present evidence for indigenous 
peoples to accept them as such. 
This chapter will proceed as follows:  following the introduction, the second 
section will clarify the relationship between reconciliation and a state’s authority, 
understood as authority that can reasonably be trusted to make just laws for the groups 
thus reconciled.  The third section will address the question of what reconciliation does 
1 Richard Nixon: "Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs.," July 8, 1970. Online by Gerhard 
Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2573.  Retrieved 20 June 2017. 
2 One does not simply undo centuries of gross abuse. 
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to the claims that victims have against their wrongdoers.  The fourth section will 
distinguish political reconciliation in the case of indigenous peoples and their settler 
colonial states from political reconciliation typically found in the literature.  The fifth 
section will put forth what I think are necessary components to the reconciliation 
process:  truth commissions, apologies, and reparations.  The sixth section will argue 
what the requirements for participation are in the process, both for indigenous peoples 
and for the settler colonial states.  The seventh section will consider an account of 
reconciliation aimed at the question of legitimacy for settler colonial states vis-à-vis 
their indigenous citizens.  Finally, I will conclude. 
2. Reconciliation, what are we even talking about? 
Before beginning, I want to clarify what the concept at play is.  The category of 
reconciliation that I am interested in here treats reconciliation as (1) a set of processes 
for restoring or improving a relationship damaged by the wrongdoing of at least one of 
the parties; and (2), as the outcome in which individuals can move forward with their 
relationship.  It is being employed here as a process by which the settler colonial states 
can best prove their authority trustworthy to their indigenous citizens; and it is a 
necessary (though not sufficient) condition for both sides to move forward together with 
their relationship. 
What is the relationship between reconciliation and authority, though?  Very 
simply, the answer has to do with improving trust.  The best way for a state to show its 
authority is just is to show that it has a record of being able and willing to produce and 
enforce just laws for its citizens.  If a state has a record of doing that, then its citizens 
have a strong reason to trust that those things will continue to be done.  However, when 
a state’s record indicates that it is committed to making unjust laws for its citizens, 
those citizens have strong reasons to trust that those unjust laws will continue.  By 
engaging in reconciliation, a state is attempting to improve the relationship of trust with 
its citizens.      
 What does successful reconciliation entail, then?  Only that the state has done, 
within the scope of what is reasonable, what it can do to prove itself as both able and 
willing to make just laws for its citizens.  That is, it has done what it can to give those 
wronged citizens reasons to trust it by showing it is committed to not being the type of 
state it has historically been and that it is committed to being a state worthy of their 
trust.  It is important to make it clear, however, that reconciliation does not create any 
obligations to the state’s authority.  Reconciliation certainly provides evidentiary 
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reasons for individuals to obligate themselves to that authority.  But, given the impetus 
for reconciliation in the first place, barring a process of reconciliation which spanned 
several generations, it should not be taken as sufficient evidence to obligate oneself to 
the state nor for the state to assume that such obligations exist.  And, even in instances 
where reconciliation were prolonged over multiple generations, indigenous peoples 
would still be owed a story as to why they should continue to be subject to the high risk 
of further wrongdoing while that process continued.   
 That answer might strike some as misguided.  It places the emphasis of 
reconciliation on the process of improving the state’s status as an authority and not on 
its responsibility to the victims qua victims; in other words, it appears to paint the story 
as being concerned with its status, rather than a story of making amends to its victims.  
As far as an interest in status is what drives reconciliation, and not justice for the 
victims, the process might be perceived as misguided.  Stephen Winter presents a 
similar concern regarding state apologies, “A state does not apologise in order to 
improve its civic identity.  A state apologises because it owes it to survivors.”3  
Moreover, when we put it the other way around, we are “[G]etting the normative 
structure backwards.”4  Thus, when reconciling, if the state is reconciling because it 
wants to justify its authority first and not because it owes the process to its victims, then 
we have probably gotten something wrong. 
 To some extent, I think the worry is correct in suggesting that focusing on the 
status of the state as opposed to the victims is objectionable.  That said, as far as both 
sides care about improving the relationship, attempting to improve its status is the best 
positive course of action the state can take.  I will leave the question of what happens 
when at least one of the sides does not want reconciliation for the final section of this 
chapter. 
3. What does reconciliation do? 
In regards to reconciliation, there is another very important question worth 
discussing:  how does successful reconciliation change the claims of wrongdoing the 
victims have brought forth?  Put slightly differently, how ought we to consider the 
claims of those who have been wronged, following successful reconciliation?  For 
example, it’s been argued that when a wrongdoer apologizes to her victim that her 
3 Stephen Winter, "Theorising the political apology." Journal of Political Philosophy, 23, (2015), pp. 261-
281 at p. 272. 
4 Ibid. 
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victim ought to forgive her.  The apology is sufficient for forgiveness and causally leads 
to forgiveness, where forgiveness is taken as the foreswearing of resentful attitudes 
towards the wrongdoer.  Therefore, the victim’s claim to justifiable resentment towards 
the wrongdoer evaporates in virtue of receiving an apology from her wrongdoer.  Does 
something resembling that sort of relationship exist for reconciliation?  That is to ask, 
what happens to a victim’s claims when she reconciles with her wrongdoer?   
There are three potential answers that I want to consider:  the view that 
successful reconciliation requires that the victims (and society) “move on” from the 
wrongdoing; that all legal claims against the state have been exhausted; or that it 
requires forgiveness of the wrongdoer (and hence the foreswearing of resentment).  I 
intend to show that reconciliation should not entail any of these features, beginning with 
the claim that victims ought to move on.  Instead, I believe reconciliation only provides 
evidentiary reasons for wronged individuals to trust that the future relationship will be 
just.  It should not require individuals to “move on,” it should not, unless directly 
addressed, affect the claims that individuals might bring against the state through the 
courts, and it should not require that individuals forgive the state. 
3.2 Move on, mate! 
Moving on, as I am using it here, means something like pretending as if nothing 
bad happened.  As the story might go, it would be shameful to look upon the past and 
potentially harmful as it would bring up old wounds.  Once the wrongdoer, the state in 
this instance, has taken all the necessary steps to reconcile, the victims ought to simply 
pretend as if nothing happened and move on.  This is most attractive in situations where 
forgiveness would be impossible and the ruminating on the past would be counter-
productive to future relationships or simply to the victims themselves.  This was offered 
as a reason for why reparations ought not to be paid to victims of the Stolen Generation 
in Australia.  In the process of determining what reparations victims were owed those 
victims would be required to recount their story, which would impose great hardship 
upon them.   
That sentiment, that individuals ought to move on, is noticeable amongst the 
general population in both Australia and the US.  In fact, its prevalence is one of the 
leading reasons for why there was such a fervent debate amongst Indigenous 
Australians on whether to seek a referendum on constitutional recognition or to seek 
treaties.  Obviously, in theory, those two goals are not mutually exclusive.  However, 
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individuals who seek treaty-making express concern that, like the 1967 referendum, 
Australian citizens would vote yes on recognition and then see the issue of Indigenous 
rights as fully resolved.  And once the public adopts that stance, indigenous peoples 
should, as they say, “Move on, mate!” 
The view that victims ought to move on following reconciliation is wrong.  In 
most cases of systemic state violence, the victims come to identify themselves through 
their victimization and non-victim members through the wrongdoing.  Improving the 
relationship between states, victims, and non-victims requires, in part, creating a new 
identity that all can move forward with.  In order to do that successfully, though, 
individuals cannot forget what has happened.  The past must play a crucial role in 
defining the moral community.  Furthermore, this view can become quite dangerous, I 
believe.  Telling victims that they ought to move on from what has transpired following 
successful reconciliation assumes that all of the wrongs done to them can be sufficiently 
dealt with through some form of institutionalized justice.  That should strike everyone 
as clearly wrong.  For, a perhaps more intuitive example as to why that is clearly wrong, 
imagine telling a victim of rape that she should move on simply because her rapist was 
in prison.  Victims need to be able to share their narratives; it is an important aspect in 
the process of healing.  Given the trauma of what has transpired, we ought to encourage, 
not discourage them from sharing their stories.  More to the point of this thesis, 
however, is that failing to address wrongs and simply telling people to move on does 
nothing to provide evidence that those wrongs will not reappear in the future. 
3.3 No more legal claims 
The second claim, that reconciliation requires individuals to drop their claims of 
justice against the state because those claims have been satisfied is more interesting.5  It 
prescribes that once reconciliation has been achieved that the victims no longer have 
claims against the state, and that bringing up the past and attempting to use it against the 
state would be unfair.  This claim is similar to the one I expressed above, except it 
involves only legal claims.  It would certainly not preclude victims from speaking out 
and sharing their stories and could even include venues and support for victims to share 
5 Andrew Woolford has expressed a concern similar to this.  He believes that adopting a framework of 
reconciliation eliminates any possibility for minority groups to secede.  Andrew Woolford, “The limits of 
justice: certainty, affirmative Repair, and Aboriginality,” Journal of Human Rights, 3, (2004), pp. 429–
444. 
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their stories, including memorials and National Sorry Days.6  It only assumes that 
whatever institutional justice needed meting out has been mete out, and that claiming 
for more justice on top of that would be unfair.  To take a simple, but roughly analogous 
example, if I accidently spill your beer on the ground, apologize and immediately get 
you a new one, under most circumstances, it would be unfair for you to demand that I 
keep getting you beers throughout the night.  That, I think, is the intuition behind the 
idea that once reconciliation is completed, that individuals ought to cease in making 
claims of justice against the state. 
Even in instances where what is being reconciled covers a large swathe of 
historical wrongs it is very unlikely that reconciliation will be able to address all of the 
wrongs that have occurred.  It is also unlikely that reconciliation, as a tangible state 
process with a beginning and end, will get it right the first time.  More likely, following 
reconciliation, both sides would need to be in positions to continue to work together to 
address the issues unresolved and root out those issues undiscovered the first time 
around.  That is to say, even when reconciliation addresses certain injustices, it will 
likely not do so in a manner sufficient with discharging justice.  More work will need to 
be done following reconciliation to do that.   
3.4 Forgiveness 
Lastly, some hold that reconciliation is synonymous with forgiveness.7  
Forgiveness is distinct from both moving on and ceasing in making justice claims in 
that it pertains directly to the attitudes held by the victims.  In doing so, forgiveness 
necessarily excludes the notion that victims ought to move on, while at the same time 
not necessarily making any claims regarding institutional justice.8  Forgiveness, within 
the philosophical literature, is canonically taken as the forswearing of attitudes of 
resentment toward the wrongdoer by the victim.9  There are two ways in which we can 
conceive of that idea:  the first is as an entirely subjective process; and second, as being 
validated only when the wrongdoer makes sufficient amends.  The former is called 
6 Australia really has a National Sorry Day for people to apologize to victims of the Stolen Generation.  
I’m not making that up.  https://www.reconciliation.org.au/news/national-sorry-day-an-important-part-of-
healing/.  I reckon it’s similar to take your child to work day, but instead you find an indigenous person 
and say sorry to them. 
7 Desmond Tutu, No future without forgiveness, (New York:  Image/Doubleday, 1999); and, Jeffrie 
Murphy and Jean Hampton, Forgiveness and mercy, (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
8 J. Angelo Corlett, “Forgiveness, apology, and retributive punishment,” American Philosophical 
Quarterly, (2006), pp. 25-42. 
9 Joseph Butler, Fifteen sermons preached at Rolls Chapel, in the works of the Right Reverend Father in 
God, Joseph Butler, D.C.L., Late Bishop of Durham, ed. by Samuel Halifax, (New York:  Carter, 1846). 
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forgiving, while the latter is called forgiveness.10  I am concerned with forgiveness.  The 
idea here is that victims ought to forswear any negative attitudes toward the state (in 
relation to its wrongdoing) following reconciliation. 
The problem with this interpretation is that it is too demanding.  Forgiveness, the 
forswearing of attitudes of resentment, is not something we can demand from others.  A 
rapist cannot apologize and then demand that the victim should forgive him.  Similarly, 
a state cannot reconcile and then demand that its victims forgive it.   
Yet another reason for thinking forgiveness is too strong as an aim of 
reconciliation is that there may be some acts that individuals are justified in being 
unwilling or unable to forgive.  In those cases, the best a wrongdoer can do is attempt to 
persuade the victim that the wrongdoing will cease and that he is sorry for his past 
actions.  Requiring forgiveness makes reconciliation too demanding.  If not forgiveness, 
not abandoning legal claims, and not moving on, then what changes in the victims 
claims such that reconciliation is possible?   
3.5 Trust 
Ultimately, the best a settler colonial state can do is provide evidence that its 
indigenous citizens could trust it going forward.  To have reconciliation play any other 
role would be wrong or outright inappropriate.  Putting it lightly, these settler colonial 
states have made a complete mess of things.  Their indigenous citizens have every 
reason to expect that they will continue to make a complete mess of things.  Those 
states need to provide evidence to their indigenous citizens that they will not, in fact, 
continue to make a complete mess of things.  That evidence can be provided through a 
process committed to improving its relationship, which can only be achieved by 
working directly with indigenous communities to learn what wrongs have occurred and 
how best to address them. 
4. Conceptions of political reconciliation  
Much of the conceptual literature on political reconciliation has to do with 
transitional justice.11  In the transitional context, political reconciliation is a process for 
dealing with the past in order to allow all parties to transition into a new (usually 
10 Tutu, (1999). 
11 See, for example, the recent philosophical treatment of the subject by Colleen Murphy, A moral theory 
of political reconciliation, (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
                                                          
53 
 
democratic) state.12  In these instances, the wrongdoer is not the new state (obviously) 
but individual members of a previous state.  For that reason, there is no question of the 
new state needing to prove its citizens can trust it, beyond ensuring that those previous 
atrocities “Never [happen] Again.”13  In other words, the new state does not need to 
address what the old state did in the same way; it only needs to make sure those wrongs 
don’t get repeated.   
There is also the more general type of reconciliation, post-conflict reconciliation.  
That literature is focused primarily on the actions of particular regimes, for example the 
truth and reconciliation commission which took place in Chile focused on the actions of 
Pinochet’s regime.  It did not involve the authority of the Chilean state, only issues 
surrounding that particular regime. 
Aside from being focused on the actions of individuals, another shared hallmark 
of reconciliation in the transitional context or the post-conflict context is that the 
wrongdoers will not necessarily remain in power.  That is, of course, not the case in the 
settler colonial states.  The wrongdoers, taken primarily as the state, will remain in 
power following reconciliation.  The systemic pattern of wrongdoing, against which the 
claims of illegitimacy emerge, belongs to the states, and not to any individual 
government.  That does not mean that individual governments or individual officials 
should not be blamed, only that their wrongdoing is insufficient for making the claim of 
illegitimacy in the way that I have done so in this thesis.   
One final point, reconciliation processes–though not necessarily their outcomes–
have enjoyed near unanimous support by the citizens of states in transitional or post-
conflict settings.  That assumption is not one that can be made here.  
Given these differences, how should we conceive of political reconciliation 
between indigenous peoples and their settler colonial states?  Yes and no.  It should still 
be conceived of, generally, as a process for improving a relationship following 
wrongdoing, and it will still contain the structure of reconciliation processes as they’ve 
occurred all over the world (something I will discuss next).  Some of the differences 
will include how the processes of reconciliation are satisfied in a non-interpersonal 
relationship and how support for the process can be gained and sustained.  Perhaps the 
most salient difference, though, will come in making sure the process is voluntary for 
12 Martha Minnow, Between vengeance and forgiveness: facing history after genocide and mass violence, 
(Boston:  Beacon Press, 1998). 
13 The slogan of South Africa’s TRC 
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indigenous peoples.  The states in question are guilty of a patterned history of 
wrongdoing and violence against their indigenous citizens.  It would be just as absurd to 
require indigenous peoples to engage in reconciliation with those states as it would be to 
require the victim of some severe wrongdoing to engage in reconciliation with her 
wrongdoer.   
5. Pieces of reconciliation: be honest, apologize, and give us our land back 
In this section, I am going to discuss three necessary features for political 
reconciliation:  truth telling, apology, and reparations.  None of these features are 
without controversy.  Getting the truth from those who know they have done terrible 
things is not easy.  In the case of the TRC amnesty was baited as an incentive for 
individuals to tell the truth, and there was dissent among victims as to whether that was 
fair.  And apologies are appropriate for individuals, not for abstract entities, right?  So, 
how should we conceive of a political apology between the state and individuals?  
Finally, reparations between indigenous peoples and settler colonial states is going to 
have to involve the transfer of lands.  For some individuals, that is a no-no.  I will 
discuss these features in turn, highlighting their necessity and how they have been 
criticized.  I do not mean for these features to be exhaustive, and will, in the section 
following this, discuss additional features that have been proposed as necessary to the 
process of political reconciliation between indigenous peoples and the settler colonial 
states. 
5.2 Let’s get real here 
The general aim of truth telling is getting the facts of the matter straight, 
however damming those facts might be.  In countries like South Africa14, Chile15, and 
Guatemala16 truth commissions have been established to piece together the facts 
through use of, among other things, victim testimony, public records, and the testimony 
of the perpetrators of the crimes. 
Virtually no one in the literature argues that truth telling is unimportant to the 
success of reconciliation.  Among other things truth commissions are helpful in 
14 South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report, South Africa, (1998). 
15 The National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation Report, Chile, (1991). 
16 Memory of Silence, Guatemala, (1999). 
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improving are:  the self-worth of victims17, creating a more unified moral community18, 
and generating support for the lengthy reconciliation process.  Truth commissions take 
seriously the testimonies of victims, and for some of those victims, it is the first time 
they will have been asked to share their story with others; and for many, it will be the 
first time that anyone has taken their stories seriously. For the victims who decide to 
share their stories, this process can help restore their sense of self-worth, whereas 
previously they may have kept their stories pent up as a source of self-shame.  It can 
also help the rest of society understand and empathize with their claims, which is 
especially important when officials have denied or attempted to mitigate the severity of 
wrongdoing that has occurred.  The importance of empathy here is twofold:  first, it can 
help integrate the victims into the moral community; and second, within settler colonial 
states, a long process of reconciliation will need public support, and the best way to 
achieve that is to begin with a truth commission so that the public can see and hear the 
atrocities and thus better understand the need for reconciliation.   
In terms of the role it plays alongside the other processes of reconciliation, 
perhaps, the most important benefit to truth commissions is the establishment of the 
facts through rigorous and careful research.  These facts will play an important role in 
understanding how it is that the rest of the process of reconciliation will proceed.  
Without knowing the facts of what has transpired, apologies and reparations are less 
likely to hit their marks, and thus less likely to be viewed as successful. 
 Truth commissions are not without controversy, however.  The primary 
criticism from individuals involved in the process is that the means by which truth 
commissions gain testimony from the wrongdoers, the potential for amnesty from legal 
and civil prosecution.  In South Africa, where perpetrators of genocide testified to 
murdering innocent peoples, the idea that some of them would be able to walk free (and 
did) was startling to the moral community, especially to the victims who felt their 
claims to justice had been devalued.  Other criticisms include claims that victim 
testimony does not necessarily provide any type of catharsis for the victim; that truth 
commission push victims to forgive; that truth commissions are too restricted to 
17 Andre du Toit, “The moral foundations of the South African TRC: truth as acknowledgement and 
justice as recognition,” Truth v. Justice: the morality of truth commissions, ed. by Robert Rotberg and 
Dennis Thompson, (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 2010), pp. 122–140. 
18 Colleen Murphy, 2010; Ernesto Verdeja, Unchopping a tree: reconciliation in the aftermath of political 
violence, (Philadelphia: Temple, 2009). 
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producing a single narrative of events and thus leave many truths in the dark19; and that 
the value of truth commissions is suspect barring action taken on the information 
uncovered.20 
 Some of the criticisms levied above do not concern the concept of political 
reconciliation but rather instantiations of it.  For example, there is nothing conceptually 
connecting testimony from either victims or perpetrators (or the truth for that matter) to 
an obligation to forgive.  Forgiveness, in so far as it is a necessary prerequisite to 
reconciliation, only behaves as such when Christianity, or some other religious virtue, is 
injected into the process of reconciliation.21  That is not to say that there is no 
relationship between the truth and forgiveness.  It is more than plausible to think that 
truth and forgiveness are necessarily connected – forgiveness can’t come about unless 
you know what you’re forgiving. 
What about the focus of truth commissions on producing one version of the 
truth?  As a matter of practical necessity, I think one version of the truth is necessary for 
gaining as much widespread buy-in into the process.  However, to do that, truth 
commissions should not limit the perspectives to those of victims and perpetrators but to 
also the perspective of those other members of society who have their own 
understanding of events.  This is especially important in settler colonial states where the 
dominant understanding of events seems to still resemble that of white saviors rescuing 
savages from some harsh, brutish, uncivilized state of being.   
The general public is far too sensitive to accept that their way of seeing the 
world is false, and so simply presenting the truth as being only that which comes from 
the victims and repentant perpetrators will not be persuasive, regardless of its validity.22  
In the end, that big picture narrative will require some simplifying and will almost 
certainly have to pay attention to the beliefs held by the general public.  These 
concessions are out of a matter of practical necessity for conveying a digestible 
narrative to the public that can gain widespread support. 
19 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, “The moral foundations of truth commissions,” Truth v. Justice: 
the morality of truth commissions, ed. by Robert Rotberg and Dennis Thompson, (Princeton:  Princeton 
University Press, 2010), pp. 22–44. 
20 Brandon Hamber, Transforming societies after political violence, truth, reconciliation, and mental 
health, (Dordrecht:  Springer, 2009). 
21 Tutu, 1999.  
22 For a recent example in Australia, look no further than the public furor caused by claims that Australia 
was invaded, not settled, by the British.   
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 What about the other criticisms?  Does it matter if testimony fails as a type of 
catharsis for victims?  Not necessarily.  The truth commissions need the testimony of 
victims in order to understand what has happened.  And most victims would, I believe, 
like for their stories to be known to the public, and as such would participate in some 
form (not necessarily through public testimony, but also through written testimony or 
through having others tell their stories for them).  Whether the process of sharing their 
stories is beneficial (or even harmful) for the victims, they should be given the 
opportunity.  If victims want to share their stories and the commission takes proper 
steps to ensure the victims know and have access to proper mental health resources, 
then the victims ought to be able to make that choice for themselves. 
 It is certainly true that many truth commissions have been ineffective in leading 
to substantive changes in the society.  For example, the conclusion of the Truth and 
Justice Commission in Mauritius in 2011, which dealt with the island nation’s history of 
slavery, yielded over 300 recommendations on how to address the facts unearthed.23  
However, since delivering those recommendations to government committees nearly no 
investigations have occurred into how or whether to implement them, leaving many to 
believe that the government has no intention of ever doing so. 
 What this failure to act on or even consider recommendations points to, I 
believe, is a further need to get the public involved in the process.  At the end of the 
day, when the public has an interest in a particular matter, politicians will have to 
respond to that interest.  That said, politicians (and other interest groups) will certainly 
try to sway public opinion, and often times they will do so by attempting to undermine 
the validity of those with whom they disagree.  It is in those instances that truth 
commissions in are likely to struggle.  Truth commissions will need the full support of 
government if they are to be successful, but in the age of “alternative facts,” it is 
unlikely that that support will be readily available. 
 The typical way in which the truth has been coaxed from public officials in truth 
commissions is through amnesty from legal or civil persecution.  But what force does 
amnesty offer when reconciliation is with the state and not particular individuals?  Or 
when individuals can simply deny the claims of the commission as leftist?  The answer 
is that amnesty is not something that will be of interest in political reconciliation cases 
between settler colonial states and indigenous peoples.  Instead, what will be of interest 
23 Truth and Justice Commission, Mauritius, (2011) 
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is the process by which the truth commission operates.  Out of a matter of practical 
necessity, the truth in these instances will get politicized.  In some cases, the truth will 
get unrecognizably transformed through over-politicizing.  It will then take the form of 
some watered down version that fails to address many of the wrongs or outright 
dismissal wrongs.  That is not to say that a watered down truth is worthless–it’s 
certainly preferable to pretending as if nothing bad had occurred at all; and it might be 
politically expedient to make some concessions to the truth in order to get the larger 
narrative out there. 
 If reconciliation is to occur within settler colonial states, the questions of how to 
proceed with establishing a truth commission and how to ensure its recommendations 
enjoy enough endorsement to lead to positive changes will need to be addressed.  It is 
my opinion that the best way to proceed would be to provide a publicly accessible, 
transparent, and openly deliberative truth commission with the resources to frequently 
update the public and make known their deliberations, such that any major criticism can 
be engaged with.  What truths get watered down and what an acceptable narrative looks 
like for indigenous peoples, though, will ultimately be something that indigenous 
groups will need to decide.24 
5.3 Apologies, what are they good for? 
Reconciliation simpliciter is a process of improving or restoring a relationship 
damaged by the moral wrongdoing of one or more parties.  One of the necessary aspects 
of reconciliation is an apology by the wrongdoer.  Apologizing, in general, is 
considered a moral requirement for wrongdoers.  The general justification given for this 
requirement stems from the value of respect.  An apology conveys to the victim that the 
wrongdoer does respect her as a moral agent, despite his wrongful actions. 
Apologies have a wide range of conditions.  What conditions an apology has 
depend on the theorist and what they see apologies as doing.  For some, the fact that 
apologies are paradigmatically interpersonal does not present a roadblock for political 
apologies (apologies by states); for others, it provides a substantial roadblock for 
understanding political apologies.  For those who argue that no roadblocks exists claim 
24 For a recent example of this, look to the meeting of Indigenous Australian leaders at Uluru, where they 
made the decision to stop pandering to the constitutional recognition movement in favour of pushing 
treaty-making.  This was a rejection of the narrative that Indigenous Australians ought to be included in 
the constitution in favour of the narrative that Australia wronged its Indigenous peoples by not making 
treaties with them and has an obligation to make treaties with them today. 
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that the difference is superficial because, at the end of the day, political apologies must 
still adhere to the same set of conditions that interpersonal apologies do.  On the other 
hand, those who believe roadblocks do exist claim that there is a deep difference:  
namely, in how interpersonal apologies relate to forgiveness.  In what follows, I am 
going to consider two very different accounts of political apologies, one that argues that 
political apologies are entirely distinct from interpersonal apologies.  The other argues 
that interpersonal apologies can apply directly to states.  Ultimately, I conclude that 
there is no real difference in terms of outcomes.  If that conclusion is true, then 
regardless of where we place political apologies on the spectrum between (and 
including) those views, we have reason to think that states are situated to apologize.  As 
such, we should not reject their inclusion in process of political reconciliation between 
settler colonial states and indigenous peoples.  Before getting to those accounts, I want 
to discuss what apologies do and why they are desirable for reconciliation. 
Why should we think that apologies are necessary for reconciliation?  The 
general aim of an apology, I believe, is to convey respect for the victim.  This 
conveyance of respect, however, is of a particular type.  For example, abstaining from 
harming others out of a belief that doing so is wrong can implicitly convey a sense of 
respect for others as individuals possessing some sort of value.  Other examples, might 
include saying “Please” and “Thank you” to strangers.  The type of respect that I am 
concerned with emerges when one has explicitly disrespected another and that the 
victim of that disrespect has reason to believe that the actor in question believes the 
victim to be unworthy of the respect owed to him as an individual with moral value.  
For example, calling someone by a member of a particular racial group by a racial slur 
associated with that group is, among other things, disrespectful in this sense as it 
attributes lesser value to an individual based on a morally arbitrary feature of that 
person.  What an apology does, very simply, in that situation, is signal to the victim that 
the wrongdoer recognizes and communicates to the victim that it was wrong of them to 
issue that slur.  In other words, it conveys to the victim that they are deserving of the 
same respect owed to all others; and, thus, that the wrongs committed against them 
were, at least to that extent, wrong. 
 There are, of course, other views on what an apology does.  Some claim that an 
apology attempts to “make amends” for wrongful action; and other, more 
controversially claim, that an apology seeks to gain forgiveness.  On the view that an 
apology is aimed at “making amends,” I think it is reasonable to suspect that what those 
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authors have in mind is a type of conveyance of respect.  If amends meant something 
less morally loaded, such as only monetary compensation, then the apology in that sense 
is more akin to “paying off” or “buying off” the victims, which declares nothing in 
regards to the moral wrongness of the action. 
 In a very convoluted way, it could be stated that apologies seeking forgiveness 
are also related to conveying respect.  It is a reciprocal conveyance of respect:  the 
apologizer in apologizing is conveying respect for the victim in light of her wrongdoing; 
and the victim is recognizing the apologizer as deserving of forgiveness out of a sense 
of love for humanity. Marguarite La Caze has argued that forgiveness is an imperfect 
duty based upon love for others.25  One interpretation of that is that it is virtuous to have 
a general sentiment of love for humanity, which, I believe, can be spelled out under 
some interpretation of respect.  In that case, though, the duty would be perfect, not 
imperfect.  On the other hand, if we interpret La Caze’s claim as a deeper sense of love, 
then it would be far too demanding.   
A more plausible idea, I think, to conceive of forgiveness is as social construct 
not grounded in any moral principles or virtues.  Instead, we forgive because we find 
doing so useful for social life,26 and apologies, in addition to being owed, provide 
evidence that forgiving could lead to productive future relations.  That is not to say that 
some forgiveness is not better than others.  As I suggested above, there is something 
more desirable about forgiveness assisted in coming about by an apology as opposed to 
merely forgiving by changing one’s attitude or heart.  That is because forgiveness, as 
opposed to forgiving, is less likely to relapse given that it has the additional support of 
an apology; whereas, forgiving has only the support of love or some other potentially 
fleeting attitude.   
 That, I believe, is also the extent of the relationship between apology and 
forgiveness.  That of course is not without controversy.  As Joseph Beatty wrote in the 
1970s, “[T]here seem to be both transitive and intransitive dimensions to forgiveness.  
The very appeal to the other to forgive one, which presupposes that one can influence 
the other to forgive, suggests that there is a very real transitive aspect to forgiveness.27”  
On the other hand, that appeal (an apology) makes the victim feel guilty, which makes 
25 Marguerite La Caze, “Asymmetry between forgiveness and apology,” Contemporary Political 
Philosophy, 5, 2005, pp. 447-468. 
26 Aaron Lazare, On apology, (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2005); Nicholas Tavuchis, Mea culpa: a 
sociology of apology and reconciliation, (Stanford:  Stanford University Press, 1991). 
27 Joseph Beatty, “Forgiveness,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 7 (1970), pp. 246-252 at p. 246.  
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the forgiveness given non-voluntary and therefore not really forgiveness, thus making 
the relationship between apology and forgiveness intransitive.28  In so far as we are 
concerned with the relationship between apology and forgiveness, his analysis provides 
us with the conclusion that forgiveness must come about unilaterally or else it is not 
forgiveness.  In other words, if a wrongdoer apologizes prior to forgiveness being given 
to her, then forgiveness can no longer be given.  This conclusion is contrary to our 
intuitions on forgiveness which suggest that an apology can help to bring about 
forgiveness.  It also has the odd result of apologies being antithetical to conveying 
respect for the victim as they would seek instead to coerce the victim. 
 At the end of the day, apologies convey respect for the victim and provide the 
victim with evidence that future beneficial relations might be possible.  This is desirable 
in reconciliation processes where the victims have suffered discriminatory and 
inhumane violence at the hands of their states.  Apologies in reconciliation cases are 
important for the same reason that they are important in everyday instances:  they aid 
the victim in reclaiming or establishing her sense of self-respect.  In cases of 
reconciliation, however, they also serve an additional function:  apologies given by 
representatives of the state establish culpability for the events.  That is important for 
future legal proceedings between indigenous peoples and settler states. 
5.4 What makes an apology? 
 When we reflect on what we might consider to be a valid apology, it is 
reasonable to suspect that it could be achieved by a mere look.  For example, consider a 
child who has realized a grievous error in her judgment led to her act wrongly.  Having 
this realization the child looks to her parents, utterly devastated by having exercised 
such poor judgment.  Her parents can read the guilt on the child’s face and knows that 
the child knows what she has done is wrong and has learned her lesson.  The parent 
might also intuit a number of other things from the look of her child which signal that 
the child is truly apologetic for her actions.  It would, of course, be a slap in the face of 
victims if the leader of a wrongfully acting state offered a “devastated” look as an 
apology for genocide or wrongfully and through the use of force taking one’s children.  
Does that mean that what we accept as interpersonal apologies should not be accepted 
as political apologies?  Not necessarily.  I believe that what is important about our 
interpersonal apologies is precisely what is of importance for our political apologies:  
28 Ibid. at p. 247. 
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conveying a sense of respect for those we have wronged.  Where the two types of 
apology differ is in what the normative conditions for their satisfaction requires. 
 First, the state is not the close friend of its citizens nor is it their parent.  The 
relationship is at best distant and abstract, albeit immensely important.  Therefore, we 
cannot intuit at a glance the apologetic nature of the state.  The state has only two ways 
of communicating to its citizens, through the speech acts (including written) of its 
representatives and through its laws.  Given the wily political nature of states, as well as 
the conditions that most philosophers require for apologies, the value of speech acts is 
insufficient for apologizing.  That is to not to say that the speech act of an apology is 
unnecessary, though.  It is only to say that the words must be backed up by legislative 
action. 
5.4.2 Griswold on apology 
I will start with Charles Griswold’s account of apology, and then discuss his 
views it in relation to political apologies.  It is important to note that Griswold, 
following Wittgenstein, views apologies as a sibling to the cluster of concepts under the 
heading of forgiveness.  As Griswold claims, “What else is an apology if not a request 
for forgiveness?”  His conditions for being deserving of forgiveness i.e. for giving an 
apology are as follows: 
1. acknowledge that she was the responsible agent 
2. repudiate her deeds (by acknowledging their wrongness) and herself 
as their author 
3. express regret to the injured at having caused this particular injury 
to her 
4. commit to becoming the sort of person who does not inflict injury; 
and show this commitment through deeds as well as words 
5. show that she understands, from the injured person’s perspective, 
the damage done by the injury (this requires Smithean “sympathy”) 
6. offer a narrative accounting for how she came to do wrong, how 
that wrongdoing does not express the totality of her person, and 
how she is becoming worthy of approbation.29 
29 Charles Griswold, Forgiveness: a philosophical exploration, (Cambridge:  Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), pp. 149-150. 
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 Griswold is in the camp that believes that apologies provide both evidentiary 
reasons to forgive as well as a virtuous reason to forgive.  According to Griswold only 
the first four conditions can be met by political apologies.  The first condition can be 
met by proxy, the state in giving an apology is acknowledging responsibility for the 
wrongdoing; the second is met by the speech act or other performative act signaling 
apology; the third is also met by proxy, as apologies must contain remorse or regret at 
having caused the action.  An apology that did not contain those types of attitudes 
would not be an apology, it would be more like a justification for one’s actions.  The 
fourth can be met by backing the apology up with substantive policy changes, 
memorials, reparations, etc. 
Griswold argues, though, that the fifth and sixth conditions cannot be met by the 
state.  The fifth condition cannot be met because the state as an abstract entity, or non-
person, does not possess moral sentiments and as such is unable to show that it 
understands the full extent of the damage done by the wrongdoing.  Griswold’s claim is 
that the moral sentiments are necessary because they signal that the apologizer is worthy 
of being forgiven.  To be worthy of forgiveness, the apologizer must fully recognize and 
appreciate the full moral wrongness of her actions.  If an apologizer could not do that, it 
is not clear that the apologizer would be apologizing for the wrongdoing or apologizing 
for getting caught.30   
The sixth condition cannot be met because the state is unable to create a 
narrative of interpersonal harm.  Instead, the narrative that the state offers will be much 
more complex given its political nature; it will be public not personal.  The public 
nature of the state’s narrative, says Griswold, lends itself more towards seeking a 
“public record” than seeking to show itself “worthy of approbation.”  Whereby “public 
record” Griswold has in mind something like the report made by a truth commission 
sans any recommendations. 
Because the state does not fully meet the conditions necessary for being able to 
apologize it is not something that can apologize, at least not in the interpersonal sense, 
according to Griswold.  Instead, what the state can do, and what it should do, he says, is 
issue what he refers to as “political apologies.”  Political apologies are similar to normal 
30 It is also not clear that the apologizer would be apologizing for the actual wrong committed, as opposed 
to what it (the state) in its limited capacity, views as the wrong committed.  This hearkens back to the 
relationship between the truth and forgiveness stated above:  you simply cannot forgive if you don’t know 
what you’re forgiveness is for; and similarly, you simply cannot apologize if you don’t know what you’re 
apologizing for. 
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apologies in form, but lack moral sentiments and interpersonal narratives.  The first 
implication of this is that political apologies are not deserving of forgiveness.  Just as it 
would be inappropriate to forgive the rock that smashes into your windshield, it would 
be inappropriate to forgive the state that wrongfully took your land.  Instead of 
forgiving, he argues that victims ought only to accept that they were given a political 
apology.   
The second implication is that when a state commits a wrong it commits it 
against an entire moral community and not necessarily against any particular individual.  
Hence, the public nature of political apologies.  Because of that, political apologies are 
not given only to the primary victims, they are apologies given to the moral community.  
That is to say, when the apologizer goes to meet the second condition – repudiating the 
wrongs –  that there is nothing to distinguish the wrong she did to the primary, or direct, 
victim from the wrong a practically unaffected fellow citizen suffered.  And, in fact, it is 
the wrong as it is felt by the moral community, not the primary victim, that is 
repudiated.  Therefore, an apology for wrongly taking one’s land is not addressed to that 
individual or group of individuals who had their land wrongfully taken; instead it is 
addressed to all as an unfortunate occurrence of a rights violation.  This has the effect of 
downgrading the first four requirements of the apology.  Because it is addressed to the 
moral community, Griswold’s political apologies are unlikely to serve any useful 
purpose for victims nor are they likely to aid the reconciliation process in general. 
In so far as apologies do seek forgiveness and are necessary for forgiveness to be 
virtuous, I think Griswold is correct in his assertion that states qua abstract entities 
cannot satisfy his fifth condition.  There are two things that are likely to follow from 
striking that requirement for states.  First, what Griswold claims, it would not be 
virtuous to forgive the state; second, that the state may have difficulty in meeting the 
demands of the fourth condition – showing itself as committed changing its ways.  That 
difficulty in meeting the fourth condition, however, is merely in the quality of the 
apology; it does not affect the fact that an apology had still been given; it would only 
affect how thorough it is and thus how it is received and subsequently accepted or 
denied. 
As far as the narrative structure of the state’s apology being primarily between 
the state and the broader moral community, I think Griswold is clearly incorrect.  The 
upshot of his claim was that political apologies are better suited for creating a public 
record, not for promoting forgiveness.  Even if we accept that there is no normative 
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relationship between political apologies and forgiveness, it is not clear why political 
apologies should be aimed first and foremost at the moral community, and not at the 
direct victims.  Griswold’s argument that political narratives are bound up in more 
complex normative structures – namely the relationship between the state and moral 
community – as opposed to person to person sounds plausible at first, but there is no 
reason to think that the state would need to give such a narrative in order to apologize 
for what it had done to any specific individual or group of individual; and even if such a 
narrative was needed to satisfy the moral demands of being a state that demand does not 
exclude or conflict with a demand to apologize to the primary victims as well. 
If I am correct and the state can possess multiple narrative structures, then we 
can accept that the state possesses a unique structure which requires it to apologize for 
its actions to the broader moral community, while not denying that it also required to 
apologize separately for its actions to its victims.  This would require multiple apologies 
but there is no reason for why the state should not be required to issue multiple 
apologies if it has committed distinct wrongdoings at distinct levels. 
In summary of this view, I think it is reasonable to state that even if political 
apologies are distinct from interpersonal apologies, in that they are not aimed at 
forgiveness, that they can still be effective by meeting the first four conditions that 
Griswold holds for the paradigmatic interpersonal apology.  And in doing so, it is 
possible for them to achieve all of the typical functions that we would desire of an 
apology as a political trust-building exercise. 
5.4.3 Minimalist apologies 
On the other side of the spectrum we have views which permit that political 
apologies are nothing more than direct applications of interpersonal apologies, just 
given in a different context.  Stephen Winter argues that apologies possess three 
features:  the verdictive, attributive, and participatory features.  The verdictive feature is 
nothing more than giving a clear account of the wrongs and why they were wrong; the 
attributive feature is the act of accepting blameworthiness for the wrongful action; and 
the participatory feature merely requires that the agents accepting responsibility or 
being apologized to have standing to perform those functions.31 
31 Winter, 2015. 
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Where political apologies differ from normal person-to-person apologies is 
largely in the participatory feature.  Who has the standing to apologize and what is their 
relation to the victim?  A plausible answer is that the elected leaders of those states qua 
representatives of those institutions have standing to apologize on behalf of those states. 
For example, when Kevin Rudd apologized for the Stolen Generation he was not 
apologizing for his role in the wrongdoing, he couldn’t have done that.  Could he have 
apologized on behalf of all Australians?  Also unlikely.  Doing so would entail that 
citizens who opposed the forced removal of children and even those children themselves 
were in some sense responsible for the actions of the government.  Instead, he argues 
that political apologies are given on behalf of the institutions which require legitimacy.  
Wrongdoing by the state, says Winter, calls the authority of those institutions into 
question and gives reasons for citizens to not obligate themselves to them.  In so far as 
an individual in the capacity and moral standing of Rudd (Prime Minister and not 
perpetrator) provides an apology, that apology should be considered as on behalf of the 
state.  Interpreting the participatory feature of an apology in this way does nothing to 
bar the other features from being realized.  Rudd could clearly satisfy the verdictive 
conditions by providing an account of the wrongdoing as well as judgments for why 
they were wrong; and the act of apologizing on behalf of the state tacitly accepts that the 
state’s actions were blameworthy.      
5.3.4 Victims and the standing to be apologized to 
Even if we accept that representatives apologizing on behalf of the state is both 
desirable and appropriate, there is still the question of whether current generations 
deserve apologies for historical wrongs done to their deceased relatives.  The typical 
way of asking this question is to ask when is it appropriate to apologize to those who 
were not victims.  I think that question, however, would be inappropriate here.  The 
reason being is that we know current generations of indigenous citizens have wrongly 
suffered from the historical wrongdoing of the settler colonial states; in addition, we 
also know that current government actions also produce wrongs against indigenous 
peoples.  
5.4 This land is your land (maybe), and this land is my land 
 Reparations, or compensation for stolen, damaged, or lost property, is going to 
have to involve land if reconciliation is going to be something indigenous peoples will 
participate in.  Any discussion of reconciliation without the transfer of land is a non-
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starter.  This claim has been made most forcefully by political scientists at the 
University of Victoria.  One paper in particular, “Who's Sorry Now? Government 
Apologies, Truth Commissions, and indigenous Self-Determination in Australia, 
Canada, Guatemala, and Peru” by Jeffery Corntassel and Cindy Holder32 offer a nice 
summary of the position through the following parable: 
There were two friends, Peter and John. One day Peter steals John’s bicycle. 
Then, after a period of some months, he goes up to John with outstretched hand and 
says ‘Let’s talk about reconciliation.’ 
John says, ‘No, let’s talk about my bicycle.’ 
‘Forget about the bicycle for now,’ says Peter. ‘Let’s talk about reconciliation.’ 
‘No,’ says John. ‘We cannot talk about reconciliation until you return my bicycle.’33 
The point of the story is obvious enough.  Of the many injustices committed against 
indigenous peoples again and again has been the stealing of their land by these settler 
colonial states.  Virtually none of the land acquired by treaty can be said to have been 
acquired fairly, as the terms of treaties between the US and its indigenous peoples have 
been unilaterally violated by the US; and many treaties in the US featured indigenous 
signatories that were either grossly misled as to what they were signing, lacked the 
authority to sign a treaty, or both.  
 Without reparations taking the form of lands being returned, any attempt at 
reconciliation is likely to be perceived as insincere, and, as the story above articulates, 
insulting.  Land, however, is not the only form reparations must take.  Changes to 
federal policy allowing for even greater autonomy for indigenous peoples will also need 
to occur – what good is land if you’re not able to do anything with it?  
 Bashir Bashir argues that policy-making, in so far as it requires deliberation, 
should not be included within the scope of reconciliation.  He says, “deliberation and 
reconciliation fulfil different yet crucial tasks. Deliberation is universal, distributive, 
and prospective in its orientation and reconciliation is historical, reparative, and 
32 Jeff Corntassel and Cindy Holder, “Who's sorry now? Government apologies, truth commissions, and 
indigenous self-determination in Australia, Canada, Guatemala, and Peru,” Human Rights Review, 9, 
2008, pp. 465–489. 
33 Ibid. at p. 467. 
                                                          
68 
 
retrospective.34”  I think that is wrong.  Reconciliation, in so far as it promotes the 
prospect of better relationships must look to the future.  And, on the topic of policy, is 
must include discussions about the distribution of goods and resources within the 
society.  The case could certainly be made that deliberation in regards to social norms 
within the society is outside the scope of political reconciliation as that is something 
that occurs between individuals and involves the changing of attitudes and beliefs. 
What ultimately makes reparations important, and necessary, is that it can 
involve the transfer of lands and resources for developing institutions of self-
governance and independent economies on that land.  Regardless of how successful the 
other aspects of reconciliation are, the process would be a massive failure if the settler 
colonial states failed to provide measures for increased self-governance and land rights 
for its indigenous peoples. 
One feature which distinguishes these aspects of political reconciliation is that 
they are all actions which can only be completed through the assistance of the state 
government.  Truth commissions will fail if politicians are denying the validity of their 
outcomes as leftish nonsense; political apologies can only be given by representatives of 
the state; and reparations can only be made through government action.  That feature is 
why attempts at reconciliation in Australia have largely failed.  Starting as a government 
initiative in the 1990s, Reconciliation Australia very quickly found itself under the same 
political rigmarole as any other political initiative.  Its initial attempts at defining 
reconciliation were to create a justice and reconciliation process to address the Stolen 
Generation, however, the government decided that using justice in relation to the 
process would be unhelpful and removed it.  That is not to say that the reconciliation 
process was a complete wash.  The Bringing Them Home Report, which came out of a 
part of reconciliation in 1997 yielded an accurate account of what had transpired and 
that led, eventually, to the aforementioned apology by Prime Minister Rudd in 2007.  
However, the recommendations of that commission were dismissed by the federal 
government the time.  Instead of making reparations in the form of monetary payments 
to the victims, the government decided instead to create a fund to be used for reuniting 
families, Link Up, while dismissing individual compensation as not being “the most 
appropriate way of dealing with family separation.”  In addition, the process of deciding 
compensation could not be done in “a practical and equitable manner,” and any tribunal 
34 Bashir Bashir, "Reconciling historical injustices: deliberative democracy and the politics of 
reconciliation." Res Publica, 18, (2012), pp. 127-143 at p. 128. 
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attempting to discern compensation would “not avoid the trauma of revisiting past 
events.”35  Ultimately, it took until 2016 and the actions of state governments, not the 
federal government, to compensate victims of the Stolen Generation. 
 Deliberative truth commissions, political apologies, and reparations do not 
encompass the necessary procedural components of the political reconciliation process 
between indigenous peoples and their respective settler colonial states.  However, they 
do cover conditions that virtually every proponent of reconciliation can get behind, 
albeit not necessarily in the way that I have suggested they be implemented.   
 In order for successful reconciliation to be successful between indigenous 
peoples and the settler colonial states, reconciliation must be collaborative.  While the 
components above must be present, the form that they take must be determined in 
partnership between indigenous peoples and these states.  If only for pragmatic 
purposes, it cannot be indigenous peoples simply making a list of demands that the 
states ought to meet entirely.  Furthermore, it is not conceptually required as a matter of 
trust-building that states should have to meet such a list of demands.  States through 
engaging in the process in good faith–in taking seriously the claims of their indigenous 
citizens, working with them, going through the different components of reconciliation, 
and so on–can provide solid evidence that they ought to be trusted.  That said, as a 
matter of practicality, certain demands will have to be met by the settler colonial states 
in order for the trust accrued through good faith reconciliation to be decent enough to 
build sufficient confidence for indigenous peoples to be able to reasonably trust that 
those states will not commit the sort of wrongs they’re been guilty of again. 
6. Participation and reconciliation 
There is one last little bit that I want to explore in the process of reconciliation.  
What obligations do either side have to participate?  And what do those obligations 
entail?  In addition to its procedural requirements, reconciliation also contain an 
important participatory requirement.  This is entailed by, the existence of the procedural 
requirements – you can’t have deliberative truth commissions if no one participates, for 
example.  However, the way in which I want to distinguish this requirement is in terms 
of obligations that parties have to participate in the overall process.  In virtue of the 
claims of legitimacy either taken or assumed by the settler colonial states, I believe they 
35 Phillip Ruddock, “Reparations for the Stolen Generation – government responds,” The Department of 
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, https://www.humanrights.gov.au/reparations-stolen-generations-
government-responds-philip-ruddock, Retrieved 15 June 2017. 
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have an obligation to engage in the process of reconciliation.  On the other hand, in 
virtue of those states not being legitimate, participating in the process ought to be 
entirely voluntary for indigenous peoples.  While both of these claims seem intuitively 
obvious, their respective entailments are worth exploring.  Starting with the 
participatory obligations of the state, I will touch on these topics now. 
States have a duty to their citizens to create just laws.  Under typical 
circumstances, liberal constitutional democracies are able to accomplish that goal 
through simply being decent liberal constitutional democracies.  However, when those 
states behave violently and maliciously against their citizens, they have a duty to either 
rectify the situation or to abandon their claims when rectification is either impossible or 
unsuccessful.  However, that is not to say that choosing to abandon one’s claims of 
authority is the same as getting off the hook for wrongdoing.  For example, if the US 
abandoned any claim to governing its indigenous citizens that decision would do 
nothing to discharge its other moral duties owed to those peoples.  In short, the claim is 
simply that while state’s have as duties to their citizens, it possesses a more general duty 
to make amends to those whom it has wronged. 
On the other hand, reconciliation for indigenous peoples in these states must be 
voluntary.  For it to be anything other than voluntary would presuppose that they owed 
it to the settler colonial states to participate.  As no such claim exists, it is not clear what 
could obligate them to participate the process.  That is especially true given the 
circumstances surrounding the relationship.  The systemic and egregious acts of 
wrongdoing of the states are such that these states could not provide reasonable 
assurances that participating in reconciliation would ensure a better future for their 
respective indigenous citizens.  That is not to say that indigenous peoples would be 
disinterested in participating in the process.36  Only that there is no obligation for them 
to do so.  What does it mean for the process to be voluntary for indigenous peoples, 
though? 
There are two parts of the process of reconciliation in which voluntariness is 
going to be important.  First, in consenting to the process of reconciliation itself; and, 
second, is in being able to exit the process.  I will first discuss what needs to happen for 
36 Although, to be fair, absent any coercion, it is not clear why indigenous peoples would want to 
reconcile.  As one person working on indigenous rights in Australia often tells me, “Reconciliation is a 
White man’s thing.  We don’t want that crap.” 
                                                          
71 
 
indigenous peoples to be able to consent to the process, and then discuss what needs to 
be the case for them to be able to exit that process. 
In so far as reconciliation is aimed at improving relationships in light of 
wrongdoing, making it non-voluntary would force the victims of wrongdoing to work 
toward improving their relationship with the wrongdoer.  This is similar, I believe, to 
requiring victims to forgive their perpetrators; it creates an additional wrong done to the 
victim.  To require that victims engage in reconciliation, would be to force them to 
continue to engage with their wrongdoers and thus to continue to expose them to the 
risk of wrongdoing by that wrongdoer. 
If that is true, then what does a choice to “not reconcile” need to mean?  The 
choice to “not reconcile” must be functionally equivalent to the claim that “the state is 
illegitimate.”  Because reconciliation is aimed at providing evidence to trust an 
untrustworthy state, “not reconciliation” must entail that indigenous peoples are 
unwilling or unable to trust the state in light of its past actions or in light of its failure to 
reconcile in good faith i.e. by not being honest, apologizing, giving land back, etc.  And 
where being trustworthy of making just laws is a necessary condition for the legitimacy 
of states, untrustworthy states are not legitimate. 
In that case, indigenous peoples ought to be able to exit the state.  This outcome 
is similar but distinct from the outcome of successful reconciliation.  Following 
successful reconciliation, the settler colonial states would still be illegitimate–
reconciliation provides evidence in favour of trusting the state, it cannot outweigh 
generations upon generations of distrust built through severe wrongdoing.  However, in 
the case of successful reconciliation legitimacy would not be off the table.  Whereas a 
case where reconciliation fails or indigenous peoples do not want to reconcile, 
legitimacy would be off the table.  In the next chapter, I will justify the right of 
indigenous peoples to exit as interpreted as a right to secede; and, then, in the chapter 
following that, show how a decision to “not secede” following successful reconciliation 
legitimates the state vis-à-vis its indigenous citizens. 
Assuming indigenous peoples want to reconcile, what obligations do they have, 
then?  Once they have agreed to participate, they do have an obligation to see it through.  
That obligation is not absolute, of course.  It could be that the settler colonial states fail 
to reconcile in good faith, for example.  If that were to occur, indigenous peoples would 
be justified in ending the process.  What, though, would need to occur for indigenous 
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peoples to end the process prematurely?  Likewise, should the settler colonial states 
possess a symmetric power to end the process?  The answer to that second question has 
to be yes in order to avoid the possibility of indigenous peoples making unfair demands.  
What justifies either party ending the process early? 
We might think that there are a number of disagreements between indigenous 
peoples and the settler colonial states which would justify either party abandoning the 
process.  In general, I think there are two sets of potential conflicts that might cause 
concern.  The first one is disagreement over the legal status of non-persons as rights 
bearers.  I briefly touched on this in the previous chapter, but will elaborate on it further 
here.  The second has to do with land.  Settler colonial states fear proposals which 
would lead to increasing the lands owned by indigenous peoples as well as increasing 
protections that indigenous peoples have in regard to those lands.  It is important to note 
that these types of disagreements, if they are to pose a real concern to reconciliation, 
require that the groups be unwilling to budge. 
6.2 Non-persons as rights bearers 
 On the first of those worries, there is recent evidence suggesting that 
contemporary liberal states may not be inimical to the rights of non-human entities.  As 
a recent court decision in New Zealand has declared, the river, Te Awa Tupua, “will 
have its own legal identity with all the corresponding rights, duties and liabilities of a 
legal person.”37  Shortly thereafter, a similar decision was made by Uttarakhand High 
Court in India stating that both “[T]he Rivers Ganga and Yamuna, all their tributaries, 
streams, every natural water flowing with flow continuously or intermittently of these 
rivers, are declared as juristic/legal persons/living entities having the status of a legal 
person with all corresponding rights, duties and liabilities of a living person in order to 
preserve and conserve river Ganga and Yamuna.”38   
These decisions are the first of their kind anywhere in the world and illustrate 
progress in recognizing non-persons as rights bearers within contemporary liberal 
systems of government.  While the reasons behind these decisions are unique to the 
countries in which they were made, I do believe some optimism can be drawn from 
them if only in regards to a willingness for individuals on both sides to work together to 
37 Eleanor Ainge Roy, “New Zealand river granted same legal rights as human being,” The Guardian (16 
March 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/16/new-zealand-river-granted-same-legal-
rights-as-human-being.  Retrieved June 6, 2017. 
38 Salim v. State of Uttarkhand, the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital, (2014).  
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make laws which reflect the diversity of beliefs within these societies.  What remains to 
be seen, though, is what the upshot of these decisions will be in terms of protecting 
these areas.  I granted in the first chapter that indigenous conceptions of rights – 
including rights to non-human entities – could be captured within a liberal framework.  
The primary reason being that, in terms of outcomes, there may not appear to be a 
significant difference between having a robust set of protections for an important land 
area – such as a river or forest – grounded in human rights interests (in culture, for 
example) to that land having the same set of protections grounded in non-human rights 
interests but represented by individuals.  If there is in fact no difference in outcome, 
then the most severe objection settler colonial states would have would be in terms of 
upsetting foundational legal norms of their societies.  On the other hand, it is very likely 
that permitting indigenous conceptions of justice to play a role in shaping the legal 
norms they live under would provide strong positive evidence for indigenous peoples to 
reconcile.   
I do not think that the question of how states should weigh that sort of decision 
is only political, though.  Certainly, it will depend upon their constituencies.  But, I 
believe, it is a point that indigenous peoples could press as a normative requirement for 
the settler colonial states.  The reason being is that indigenous peoples could plausibly 
claim that violations to their traditional lands as well as their claims to that land have 
been justified by the settler colonial states through the denial of indigenous moral 
frameworks.  For example, the declaration of terra nullius in Australia, later overturned 
in Mabo v Queensland, was made out of the false belief that Indigenous Australians had 
no system of law or governance related to land ownership.  That of course was false.  
Given that injustices committed against indigenous peoples have sometimes stemmed 
from the exclusion of indigenous moral frameworks, the best way to address those 
injustices is through acknowledging the validity of indigenous moral frameworks for (at 
least) legal purposes.   If the settler states were unwilling to budge on acknowledging or 
in at least engaging in serious deliberations on the topic, then indigenous peoples would 
be justified in exiting the process prematurely. 
6.3 DRIP and fear mongering 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the settler colonial states in question have 
yet to ratify the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(DRIP).  Their reasons for doing so have primarily had to do with fears that doing so 
would limit their authority over their territories.  Australia, despite being assured in no 
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equivocal terms by an article in DRIP, feared that DRIP would support secessionist 
claims by Indigenous Australians; and the US expressed fear that DRIP would require 
reversion of private property to Native Americans. 
Considering the second fear, as the first has been adequately debunked by the 
words contained with DRIP, it is not as damming as these states make it out to be.  
Assuming that reversion of private property would occur, there is nothing to suggest 
that it would need to occur immediately.  For example, a non-indigenous family could 
continue to own the land until the death of their oldest child or grandchild before 
ownership would revert back; or, the settler colonial states could use their powers of 
eminent domain to reclaim the property at a fair price; or the states could make changes 
to federal law which would permit indigenous peoples to issue land titles to non-
indigenous citizens, thus allowing those families to repurchase the land from an 
indigenous government.  There are an endless number of way in which those fears can 
be addressed. 
Is there a general way to characterize over what issues ending the process is 
justified?  I believe justifications for ending the process are related to issues concerning 
the authority of the state.  It is limited to these issues because the indigenous peoples 
would not be justified in making claims above or beyond what is necessary to address 
the historical injustices they have faced.  That is not to say, though, that the state should 
limits its reconciliation efforts to only addressing those injustices.  These states, if they 
ultimately want to become legitimate, need to prove to their indigenous citizens that 
they are fully committed to being a just state for their indigenous peoples.  I now want 
to turn to an influential account of reconciliation within the literature and see how it 
measures up. 
7. Deliberative modus vivendi 
Duncan Ivison proposes, what he terms as, a “deliberative modus vivendi” 
between indigenous peoples39 and their settler states.40  The deliberative aspect requires 
that settler states enter into good faith deliberation with their indigenous citizens over 
how to best incorporate their views into the norms of the state.  The fact that this 
process would take place as a modus vivendi simply means that these deliberations 
would be ongoing.  Ivison is aware that one-off deliberations are not likely to create the 
39 Ivison is concerned with First Nations peoples and Native Americans. 
40 Duncan Ivison, Postcolonial liberalism, (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
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drastic changes necessary for indigenous people to “feel at home” as citizens of these 
states.  In fact, it may even be harmful to have drastic changes from the get-go as you 
would then risk alienating other members of society.  By allowing for these 
deliberations to be ongoing, they can constantly be updated according to the best 
available evidence on what works.  For Ivison, it is not necessarily the emergence of 
drastic changes to the laws or norms of the state which allow indigenous peoples to 
“feel at home” within these states.  Instead, it is that they have the opportunity to shape 
the norms of the state which accomplishes that.  This view is desirable in that it 
provides the answer to how the settler colonial states could eventually become 
legitimate. 
As Ivison puts it, reconciliation is something that is occurring all throughout this 
process.  In effect, he argues, that by the state participating in good faith in these 
deliberations they are providing evidence of not just their status as justified political 
authorities but also for why it would not be risky for indigenous peoples to accept them 
as legitimate. 
Ivison’s view is attractive if indigenous people have a choice as to whether they 
will participate in the process.  As I discussed above, not being able to make that choice 
would presuppose the legitimacy of the state and thus defeat the primary purpose of 
reconciliation.  I do not mean to say that a non-voluntary process of reconciliation 
would necessarily fail to provide benefits to the indigenous peoples.  Truth 
commissions, apologies, reparations, policy changes, and a stream of other important 
benefits might follow from a non-voluntary process of reconciliation.  Those are 
important benefits and it would be a great thing if they came about.  However, in so far 
as we care about legitimacy, we should not be satisfied with those benefits as their 
appearance, as well as continuance, is contingent upon the political will of states who 
have systematically violated nearly every agreement they have ever made with their 
indigenous citizens.   
Nonetheless, it could be argued that Ivison’s deliberative modus vivendi is a 
good second-best strategy.  If states are unwilling to acknowledge and support 
indigenous rights to secede and no viable secession strategies exist, then it would, 
perhaps, be in the best interests of indigenous peoples to work with the state to reshape 
its norms and laws so that they might someday be able to feel at home within it.  That 
said, the costs of having to wait around to feel at home within these states is likely to be 
very high–cultural assimilation, for example, is not stopping anytime soon.  On the 
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other hand, secession probably isn’t happening anytime soon.  It may turn out that 
Ivison’s view is not the second-best but rather the best route.  Determining its priority 
might depend on the costs associated with each option. 
Conclusion 
 While there exists a substantial amount of literature regarding political 
reconciliation processes, much of that literature is focused on transitional states and 
interpersonal reconciliation.  In the literature that does focus on reconciliation between a 
state and its citizens, many important questions have been left unanswered.  What I have 
attempted to do in this chapter is to start to answer some of those questions, such as 
what role truth commissions, what role political apologies will play, and what 
obligations each party has to participate in the process.   
The key issue facing political reconciliation within the Australia and the US is 
public support.  In many instances of political reconciliation following severe conflicts 
or during the transitioning to a new state, a majority of those populations want to 
reconcile, and even a larger majority recognize why it reconciling would be desirable.  
Within the settler colonial states, however, most citizens simply do not care; and those 
that do care, do not see reconciliation as something that needs to address the authority 
of their states.  Indigenous peoples will have to make some concessions on what the 
process of political reconciliation entails if they are going to get that public support.  
That said, there is a limit to what they should accept, namely those limits described 
above.  To complicate matters even more, in the next chapter, I will continue to address 
that topic of what reconciliation requires arguing that indigenous peoples ought to be 
able to secede as a result of the settler colonial state’s illegitimacy.  That assertion holds 
true regardless of whether the only components of reconciliation have been satisfied.
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In this chapter, I will justify the right of indigenous peoples to secede.  The right 
of indigenous peoples to secede, and their reasonable ability to do so, are necessary 
conditions for the legitimacy of the settler colonial states.  Secession, I believe, should 
be conceived of as separate from the process of reconciliation.  Political reconciliation, 
discussed in the previous chapter, focuses on building the foundations for indigenous 
peoples to be able to reasonably trust their respective states; and, given its political 
nature, it is grounded in the obligation states have to create and reasonably maintain a 
system of just laws for its citizens.  Secession, though it also helps to achieve the end of 
building trust, is justified differently.  Precisely what that justification is will be the 
topic of this chapter. 
The chapter before this one argued that political reconciliation is necessary to 
build trust into the relationship between indigenous peoples and their settler colonial 
states.  Successful reconciliation provides evidence to indigenous peoples that those 
states are committed to making just laws for them.  The process of reconciliation, for 
indigenous peoples, I claimed, is entirely voluntary.  They are under no morally 
defensible obligation to engage in reconciliation nor are they obligated to remain under 
the authority of a state who has so grievously wronged them throughout its entire 
history, even following successful reconciliation.  What these claims entail is that 
indigenous peoples ought to have the option to exit the authority of the state.  And what 
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I will argue in this chapter is that their option to exit ought to be conceived of as a right 
to secede.   
This chapter will proceed as follows:  the first section is this introduction.  In the 
second section, I will distinguish the right to exit, conceived as a right to refugee status, 
and the right to secede.  In the third section, I will argue that while illegitimacy under 
the circumstances described entails a right to individually exit, for indigenous peoples 
within these states it entails a right to collectively secede.  In the fourth section, I will 
consider what popular theories of secession within the liberal framework have had to 
say about secession.  Lastly, I will conclude. 
2.1 The right to exit 
One important upshot of the previous chapter is that following a successful 
process of reconciliation, the settler colonial state would still be illegitimate; 
reconciliation only helps to build trust, it cannot make it so that one should trust.  What 
follows from that?  In circumstances similar to the ones described throughout this 
thesis, we would think it right that we should assist those individuals in exiting the state 
through refugee programs or through amnesty programs.  However, due to 
circumstances of this situation, I think we should support the idea that the right to exit 
for individual indigenous peoples, ought to entail a right to collectively secede from 
their respective settler colonial states. 
In the next part of this section, I will distinguish the right to exit, conceived of as 
either becoming a refugee or as voluntarily emigrating from collectively seceding.  
Following that, in the next part, I will argue for why we ought to interpret this right to 
exit as a right to collectively secede in circumstances involving indigenous peoples 
within the settler colonial states of Australia and the US. 
2.2 Relocation, emigration and secession, similarities and a huge difference 
To exit, or emigrate, is to voluntarily leave one’s country or state of residence in 
order to settler in another state.  When one is forced to exit due to wrongful persecution 
by their state or risk of wrongful persecution by their state, they often do so by 
becoming refugees or by seeking asylum.  Secession, on the other hand, is similar in 
only some senses to these forms of exit.  It does involve permanently settling in a 
different state.  However, it very importantly (and differently) requires the state from 
which one is exiting to relinquish some of its territory so that those exiting can form a 
new state or reform a previous state.  There is, of course, some grey area between 
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forming a new state and reforming an old one.  Scotland’s 2014 referendum on 
secession, if successful, would have restored exclusive rule over Scotland’s territory to 
the Scottish people, but it would not have reformed the most recent independent 
Scottish state, the Kingdom of Scotland, whose parliament, in tandem with the 
parliament of the Kingdom of England, passed an Act of Union to form the Kingdom of 
Great Britain in 1707.1 
If things are as bad as I’ve claimed they are for the future of indigenous peoples 
within the settler colonial states, then why not just leave?  Sure, indigenous peoples 
have ties to their communities making voluntary emigration a difficult decision, but 
surely, one might think, the option should at least be considered?  Perhaps, you might 
think emigration is infeasible due to financial constraints.  But what about becoming 
refugees?  Again, given the projected future of indigenous peoples under the settler 
colonial states is dismal, there may be a case that indigenous peoples could make to 
become refugees.   
The international standard for defining a refugee, the Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, reads as follows:  a person who owing to a well-founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable 
to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.2  
Following that definition, in order to become a refugee one must be at risk of 
persecution for those same reasons above by the country of his or her nationality.  As of 
2013, the convention has enjoyed widespread ratification with over 140 countries 
having ratified it and several others observing its practices.   
Given the requirements of becoming a refugee and the support available in the 
international community for refugees, becoming a refugee looks like a less extreme 
solution to the issue of indigenous peoples qua indigenous peoples being wronged and 
facing a reasonable future of continued wrongs at the hands of the settler colonial states.  
Becoming a refugee, then, does seem like a valid legal remedy.  And given the 
requirements for becoming a refugee, the shoe certainly seems to fit.  That said, 
becoming a refugee (or voluntarily emigrating) is not the right course of action for 
indigenous peoples nor is it even a valid one. 
1 Acts of Union, 1707 
2 Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, United Nations Refugee Agency, (1951). 
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2.3 Secession, not emigration 
As far as I can tell, no one has made that suggestion that indigenous peoples in 
the US or Australia should emigrate, either voluntarily or as refugees.  That isn’t to say 
that it hasn’t happened nor that it isn’t a solution worth exploring.  If the settler colonial 
states were to reinstate policies permitting citizens to murder indigenous peoples 
without any real fear of legal punishment, then those indigenous peoples should very 
quickly flee those states through any means necessary.3 
But why would becoming a refugee be so bad?  The answer lies in the terms I’ve 
been using, “indigenous,” “Settler,” “Colonial,” and so on.  Indigenous peoples are, for 
lack of better term, indigenous to the lands upon which the settler colonial states have 
settled and colonized.  The Diné, for example, are indigenous to what we consider the 
Southwest United States, not, for instance, Norway.  Their culture, their beliefs, their 
histories, traditions, identities are connected to the Southwest.  The same sort of story 
goes for all of the indigenous peoples within these settler colonial states.  If those things 
did not matter (or mattered much less), then indigenous peoples likely would have 
pursued refugee status quite aggressively.  Instead, they have fought and resisted against 
the extreme violence (including, at times, their attempted extinction) committed by 
these states. 
This is what makes secession the best way to interpret indigenous exit.  
Secession, unlike emigration, is all about taking land from the existing state.  Although 
it involves similar features to the act of emigrating, it is all about territory.  Secession, 
by definition, involves the transfer of a state’s territory.  On the other hand, refugees or 
emigrants take with them very little if any personal property when they relocate to a 
new state.  Moreover, a second reason to think of secession differently is that it is a right 
of collectives, not individuals as is the case of the right individuals have to voluntarily 
emigrate and the right to become a refugee or seek asylum.   
Given these features of secession, any theory or account of secession is going to 
have to answer the following questions:  first, why a collective has the right to take 
territory from an existing state; and, in addition, why that collective has a claim to self-
govern over that territory. 
3 For some tribes, emigrating across borders might be reasonable.  The traditional lands of the Pasqua 
Yaqui tribe, for example, extend across the US and into Mexico making immigration to Mexico not 
entirely unreasonable. 
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3. Justifying secession, claims to land 
Despite any claims indigenous peoples have against their respective settler 
colonial states, it would be reasonable to think that secession is all-things-considered 
unjustified.  One reason for thinking so is that there is no connection between the ability 
and willingness of states to make just laws and claims for that state to give up its 
territories.  And so, without further arguments, we might think that regardless of how 
terrible the state, the only courses of action would be voluntary emigration or 
emigration with the support of the international community.  That said, further 
arguments can be offered in support of indigenous peoples right to take, or take back, 
territory from their respective settler colonial states. 
  There are three arguments, I believe, that can be offered in support of the 
indigenous claim to the territories held by the settler colonial states:  the first has 
already been suggested above, their traditional lands are an essential feature of their 
identities.  I will develop the idea further below and consider some criticisms of it.  That 
idea, I believe, works best when considered alongside the second argument, the general 
well-being of indigenous peoples.  The last argument is a legal one.  It places its 
emphasis in two places:  first, on the existence of treaties and Supreme Court decisions, 
which acknowledge the validity of claims to the territory of the settler states by their 
indigenous citizens; and second, on the fact that no tribe in either Australia or the US 
has ever ceded sovereignty over the entirety of its land.   
Virtually any discourse on claims to land within the liberal framework has to 
begin with John Locke’s assertions on the limits of property ownership and its 
acquisition.  The limits, according to Locke, are:  first, that one cannot acquire more 
than what she can make productive use of; and second, that one must leave as much and 
as good for others.  On the topic of acquisition, one can acquire property through 
mixing her labor with it or through paying other individuals to mix their labor with it for 
her, and so on.  Locke’s assertions are not just interesting for liberal purveyors of 
thought, though.  They were used to justify the terra nullius (nobody’s land) claim 
regarding the land that is now Australia.  British colonists claimed that Aboriginal 
peoples had not made productive use of the land and therefore had not mixed their labor 
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with it.4  As such, the land belonged to nobody and, as such, the Crown did not require 
its vassals to make treaties with its inhabitants. 
There is a great deal of debate over how to interpret Locke’s justification for 
these assertions.  On one interpretation he justifies these assertions from the following 
claims:  (1) the world belongs to all, and thus no one can claim all of what belongs to 
all, nor can one be justified in claiming more than his or her fair share; and (2) similar to 
how God has dominion over us in having been our creator, we have dominion (to a 
lesser extent) over the things that we produce with our labor. 
In terms of Locke’s justifications about the limits of property ownership and its 
acquisition, it’s not obvious that we should be attempting to make sense of it when 
understanding what these things mean under present moral and legal circumstances.  
That is not to say it’s impossible to tell a comprehensive story about how the US or 
Australia’s claims are unjust on Lockean grounds.  It is just to say that drawing concrete 
conclusions from it in today’s world might be more trouble than it’s worth.  Regardless 
of how unjust the colonization and settling of indigenous lands has been, it has 
happened and it has largely been accepted.  Furthermore, its acceptance has led to the 
formation of intricate laws and social norms.  Due to that intricacy, perhaps more than 
anything, it’s not clear how Locke’s justification for ownership, by itself, could make 
sense of competing claims in today’s world.    
For that reason, I will stick with more contemporary and nuanced arguments, 
such as the arguments concerning the importance of culture and well-being, as well as 
arguments based on the law.  These arguments, I believe, taken together, bolster 
indigenous claims to territory against competing claims. 
That said, it might be a bit unfair to use those as the criteria for whose claim to 
land is stronger.  For example, let’s accept for now that territory held by the US is 
essential to indigenous culture; that tribes would be better caretakers of that land than 
the US; and, that by virtue of treaties, some of that territory should still belong to Native 
American tribes.  Even then, there might still be reasons against reversion of that 
territory to tribes.  One consideration against it is the harm that such a transfer might 
have on the capacity of the US to perform its necessary functions.  Yet another 
consideration against it, is what Jeremy Waldron calls the supersession thesis, or the 
4 Because the colonists did not believe the Aboriginal peoples could ever make productive use of the land, 
it did not make sense to worry about leaving enough and as good for them, as they would never be in a 
position to own it. 
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idea that claims of justice emerging from historically wrong acts can be mitigated due to 
present circumstances.  I will look at those considerations and others in the sections 
which follow. 
3.2 A cultured approach to secession 
The first line of argument for grounding an indigenous right to secede as a 
condition of being able to voluntarily exit the process of reconciliation is that it is 
necessary for the continuance of their culture.  Over the years, Will Kymlicka has 
introduced two influential arguments justifying the importance of culture.  In 
Liberalism, Community, and Culture5 he argued, along Rawlsian lines, that culture is 
important as a primary good, or as a good essential for individuals to be able to pursue 
their conception of a good life.6  Culture is essential for what it means to be an 
individuals because it is essential for the exercise of individual autonomy.  This is 
because it provides individuals with a “context for choice.7”  Which is to say that it 
assists individuals in making sense of the choices they are confronted with.  Without 
having contexts, choice-options would appear similar to the decision-maker, thus 
making decision-making from their perspective as having a fixed outcome and therefore 
meaningless. 
While that claim is certainly true, it does not tell us why any culture in particular 
is valuable.  That is, if culture is important in virtue of providing a context for choice, 
then any old culture should do.  In Multicultural Citizenship, Kymlicka expanded on his 
previous claim.  Arguing that culture provides individuals with a way to identify 
themselves as moral agents.  Following the work of Charles Taylor on the relationship 
between respect and culture, Kymlicka argued that there is a causal connection between 
self-respect for oneself as a moral agent and how one’s own culture is respected.  This 
second justification was needed to help make sense of why not just any culture could 
do.   
How do we get from culture to secession, though?  I think in nearly any case, 
one’s culture takes its roots from some territory or has elements in some territory.  That 
said, it does not only come from territory.  For example, Texans in the United States 
take pride in being Texans (people who identify Texas being home).  However, they 
5 Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, community, and culture, (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1989). 
6 John Rawls, Theory of Justice, (Harvard:  Harvard University Press, 2009) at p. 62. 
7 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural citizenship: a liberal theory of minority rights, (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 
1995). 
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might also identify in important ways as being Cowboys fans; gun owners; Christians 
and so on.  Sure land matters but its importance to one’s identity can vary from person 
to person.   
Unlike most peoples, though, indigenous peoples often claim that their culture is 
inextricably tied to their traditional lands.  That is not to say that their identities do not 
consist of other components, such as being Cowboys fans, gun owners, Christians, etc., 
but that when it comes to identifying themselves and relating to the world their identity 
as a territorially rooted indigenous person matters. 
Even if we accept that an indigenous persons’ identity is strongly tied to their 
traditional lands that is a long way from the idea of reverting sovereignty over that land 
to them.  Conceptually, it is not clear that practicing one’s culture over a given territory 
requires ownership of that territory.  For example, Muslims are able to make 
pilgrimages to Mecca – and are even required to do so once in their lifetime by their 
religion, Islam.  In theory, individuals who visit and who practice Islam do not need to 
own the Mecca in order to enjoy the benefits of it.   
Of course, one could claim that it is Muslims who own the land upon which the 
Mecca sits and so visiting practitioners qua Muslim’s do own it.  Should that matter, 
though?  So long as Muslims had adequate access to the holy site and the site were 
properly maintained, they would not have a claim that their culture was being wrongly 
interfered with or prohibited.  The keys to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre are in the 
safekeeping of a Muslim family, and have been for hundreds of years, and that has not 
prevented or hindered Christians from worshiping at the holy site.8   
That seems to be the idea behind the agreement between tribes in the US and the 
US government.  The US government holds the land patents to the land (and thus has 
sovereignty over it) but tribes are able to own, legislate, and use their reserved lands in 
line with their traditional culture to the extent that their laws and usage do not conflict 
with US federal laws.  Thus, access to many important sites is readily available and it is 
within the rights of tribes to maintain the well-being of those sites.   
Unfortunately, actions taken by the US have shown neither a commitment to 
respecting tribes access to sacred sites nor towards ensuring those sacred sites are 
8 Oren Liebermann, “Two Muslim families entrusted with the care of holy site for centuries,” CNN, (27 
Marchi 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/26/middleeast/easter-muslim-keyholder/index.html. 
Retrieved 10 July 2017. 
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adequately protected.  For example, beginning in 2005, a series of court decisions 
determined that the use of reclaimed sewage to expand the ski resort in Arizona’s San 
Francisco Peaks was permissible as it did not violate tribal religious rights despite those 
Peaks being recognized as an important sacred site to 13 tribes in the region9, and being 
a part of the traditional Hopi land.   
3.3 Negative effects on well-being 
By permitting the use of reclaimed sewage water on the San Francisco Peaks, the 
courts placed the water supply of the Hopi tribe at substantial risk.  Something that is not 
just morally questionable but also legally questionable.  It is legally questionable because 
the courts in those instances above explicitly ignored the precedent set by Winters v. 
United States10, which requires the government to not diminish a tribe’s access to its water 
supply, which by reducing their potable water supply they are doing.  Other recent 
examples of violating that decision include the Environmental Protection Agencies 
approving the dumping of toxic waste into the water supply for the Navajo Nation, and 
the construction and operation of the Dakota Access Pipeline near the water supply for 
the Dakota Sioux tribe. 
It is reasonable to think that if the US government is willing to jeopardize a tribe’s 
access to safe drinking water, despite protests from the tribes and standing Supreme Court 
decisions, that it would also be willing to jeopardize a tribe’s ability to make use of its 
lands for the purposes of practicing its culture.  That is what makes the question of “Who 
should own the land?” important; and if we consider only the connections between culture 
and autonomy and between natural resources and survivability, then the answer to that 
question ought to, at least in some cases, be the indigenous peoples.  Those are not the 
only relevant criteria to land ownership, though.   
Land doesn’t just provide feel-good psychological benefits, though.  It has more 
tangible and readily visible benefits for indigenous peoples, as well. There are many cases 
of indigenous peoples becoming ill as a result of being separated from their traditional 
land, where separation is caused by distance or by the destruction of their traditional 
land.11  This claim is distinctive from the decision-making benefits of culture.  Our 
cultures shape our lives and help us make sense of our decisions; whereas this claim of 
9 For the Diné , it is called Dook’o’oosliid and is one of the four sacred mountains. 
10 Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, (1908). 
11 Cynthia Ganesharajah, “Indigenous Health and Wellbeing: The Importance of Country,” Australian 
Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, Native Title Research Report, (2009). 
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well-being is much more basic in the sense that its effects relate primarily to our most 
basic sense of physical well-being:  access to safe drinking water.   
Taken in conjunction, indigenous peoples could make a case that their claims to 
certain territories are stronger than that of either the government or other groups, since 
their claims are necessarily connected to their individual autonomy and well-being.  That, 
however, is not to say that ownership ought to be reverted back to the indigenous owners 
solely on those grounds.    
At best, it might appear that an argument from culture and well-being supports 
granting greater land rights, short of reversion, to indigenous peoples.  And, in fact, the 
primary proponent of this view, Will Kymlicka does not take it as supporting a case for 
secession.  Instead, he argues for a nation within a nation model in which indigenous 
peoples have greater autonomy over their affairs while remaining under the jurisdiction 
of their respective settler states.   
3.4 The law already recognizes that sovereignty once existed and the arguments for 
extinguishing it are poor 
The last claim lies within what has already been established within the courts of 
the states in question.  In the famous Mabo v Queensland case, the High Court of 
Australia acknowledged the existence of Aboriginal land title as existing previously – 
and independently – from Australian law; and in the United States, where hundreds of 
treaties have been made with the indigenous peoples, the US Constitution recognizes 
many tribal reservations as lands held in trust by the state governments for the tribes.  
And US Indian policy does regard its relationships with Native Americans tribes as 
relationships of sovereign to sovereign, despite the fact that tribes are treated more like 
states within the federal system. 
In addition, no tribe can be said to have formally ceded sovereignty in either the 
US or AU.  The closest known instance of a tribe ceding its sovereignty occurred in 
1999 between the Nisga’a people and the Canadian government.  It is important to note, 
however, that unlike the legal status of indigenous rights in the US and AU, the 
Canadian Supreme Court ruled in 1990 that Aboriginal rights which existed at the time 
of the 1982 Constitution Act are the only rights protected by Canadian law and are 
protected only as a matter of and in virtue of common law.  In other words, Aboriginal 
rights came into existence only with that act and exist only as Canadian common law.  
This feature of Canadian law has led many to protest the Nisga’a’s decision as coerced 
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on grounds that they were offered more strongly entrenched rights if they ceded their 
sovereignty.  In any case, despite the tenuous nature of indigenous peoples’ rights in 
AU and the US, there is at least some precedent for the acknowledgment of their right to 
land currently held by the state, which is independent of the claims of those states.  That 
their claims are independent, however, does mean that there will be some competition 
between them.  More often than not these competing claims go against the indigenous 
group.  In the case of the Australia, Wik v Queensland, determined, among other things, 
just that:  when there is a dispute between Native Title and Crown Title, the Crown 
wins. 
This distinctive set of land rights might also grant unique protection against 
eminent domain clauses.  Both AU and the US possess “takings” clauses, or the right of 
eminent domain, in their constitutions which justify the acquisition of privately held 
property by the state if it is for public use purposes and if the state provides just 
compensation for that property.  Non-indigenous citizens of these states were born into 
those constitutional laws and their practices of trading and acquiring property have 
evolved with full knowledge of those laws.  Because indigenous rights to land exist as 
separate and prior to the laws of these states, it is not immediately obvious that their 
property should be subject to the same laws, especially given that their rights to 
property were established before those constitutions took effect.  However, until that 
clause is evoked against a recognized piece of land held by an indigenous people, there 
is no sure way of saying how the courts would rule.  In Johnson v. M’Intoch, Chief 
Justice Marshall did not deny the wrongness of taking Indian land.  However, that 
comment came as obiter in regard to whether such takings violated international law, 
which did not form part of the binding Opinion in the case. 
Whether any of these three lines of argument are sufficient on their own is 
unclear.  The legal route is tenuous at best as they would ultimately rely on highly 
politicized courts, in the case of the US, or on courts lacking decisive power, in the case 
of AU.  Arguments from culture or well-being might be persuasive, but the empirical 
results suggesting the important link between land and the physical and psychological 
status of indigenous peoples is still in its infancy.  This is in large part due to the diverse 
conditions of indigenous territories and cultures, as well as the diverse facts surrounding 
colonization and settlement of individual tribes.  Taken together, however, I think these 
arguments generate a pro tanto case for indigenous territorial secession. 
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In summary, what I have argued in this section is that there are reasons for 
considering the collective right of indigenous peoples to secede.  Those reasons I have 
offered, though, are not the only relevant considerations.   
4. Secession and its justifications 
In this section, I will review what some of the popular liberal theories of 
secession have to say about its justification.  By the lights of any of these theories, 
secession would not be justified for indigenous peoples.  Rather than weigh the value of 
indigenous peoples’ right to secede as a requirement of political reconciliation, though, 
I will instead challenge the requirements held by those popular theories of secession.  In 
the section following, I will consider Jeremy Waldron’s popular supersession thesis as 
well as his argument claiming indigenous peoples are unfit, in today’s world, for 
governing. 
4.2 Primary rights theories and remedial rights only theories of secession 
The first type of theory I will discuss is commonly referred to as a primary 
rights theory of secession.  It posits that our right to secede does not come about due to 
the circumstances of the situation, but stems instead from our basic right to be self-
determining.  The second type of theory is called a remedial rights only theory of 
secession.  These theories claim that secession is only justified when it is a measure of 
last resort for remedying rights violations.   
Primary rights theorists of secession include Harry Beran as well as John 
Altman and Christopher Wellman.  Beran’s theory argues that groups must be able to 
secede in order for the authority of state’s to be legitimate.  He claims that, “liberal 
political philosophy requires that secession be permitted if it effectively desired by a 
territorially concentrated group within a state and is morally and practically possible.”12  
Generally speaking, he believes secession is morally possible when the seceding state 
does not harm the capacity of the rump state’s citizens to be self-determining; and it is 
practically possible when the seceding state is able to secure the basic rights of its own 
citizens.  Though an exhaustive list of what may justify secession is not something he 
aims to provide, he does provide a list of what may make secession unjustifiable:  (1) 
the group seceding is not large enough to form a state, (2) it does not permit secession 
within its ranks, (3) it exploits or oppresses minorities within it, (4) it surrounds the 
12 Harry Beran, “Liberal theory of secession.,” Political Studies, 32, (1984), pp. 21-31 at p. 23. 
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rump state, (6) its territory does occupies essential territory of the rump state, and (6) its 
territory does possesses a disproportionate amount of local resources.13  He justifies the 
claims that individuals have to secession, as opposed to just emigration, by assuming 
that all individuals have, “a moral right to a fair share of habitable territory of the earth 
and that a group of people who have traditionally occupied a territory have a moral right 
to continue to occupy it.”14 
Altman and Wellman offer a similar account of what justifies secession.  For 
them, groups are justified in seceding for essentially the same reason, group self-
determination.  The limits that Altman and Wellman place on secession are “that the 
[rump] state must be able to continue to perform its requisite functions.”15 In addition, 
the seceding group must be able to perform the requisite political functions.  What those 
functions are is not entirely clear.  Altman and Wellman tie those functions to the state’s 
capacity and willingness to secure an environment which allows individuals to have, “a 
decent human life in modern society.”16   
These theories of secession have been criticized for being too permissive.  They 
seemingly take the value of territorial integrity, so important to international law, and 
throw it to the wind.  On the other hand, remedial rights only theories place a much 
larger emphasis on territorial integrity. 
 Remedial rights only theorists argue that the right to secede can only come about 
due to the circumstances of the situation.  Namely, that there be some systemic 
individual rights violations suffered by the group wishing to secede, and that seceding 
would remedy those violations.  Allen Buchanan is probably the most well-known 
proponent of this view.  It has, however, been around for quite a while.  It was proposed 
by Johannes Althusius as a justified response to tyranny.17  Buchanan believes that we 
ought to institutionalize secession, rather than simply permit groups to secede.   
The chief reason for believing that the institutional question is the more urgent 
one is that secession crises tend to have international consequences that call for 
international responses.  If these international responses are to be consistent and morally 
progressive, they must build upon and contribute to the development of more effective 
13 Ibid. pp. 30-31 
14 Ibid. p. 24 
15 Andrew Altman and Christopher Wellman, A liberal theory of international justice, (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 2009), at p. 46. 
16 Ibid. at p. 1. 
17 Beran, (1984), at p. 22. 
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and morally defensible international institutions, including the most formal of these, the 
international legal system.18 
Buchanan’s claim, I should note, is in relation to unilateral secession.  That is, 
when one a group wants to secede and the rump state either does not permit it or goes 
out of its way to prevent it.  Those sorts of cases will inevitably require assistance from 
the international community.  However, due to the costliness of intervention, it is only 
justifiable when the secession is based on systemic rights based abuses. 
What sorts of abuses count?  Buchanan does not give a laundry list of what we 
ought to take as violations that justify secession, but he does suggest that that list should 
be determined by the international institutions through contemporary moral and legal 
theorizing.  That said, he does make it clear that one-off rights violations are insufficient 
for secession, as every state violates the rights of its citizens from time to time; nor 
should we wait until acts of genocide or the threat of genocide to say that secession is 
justified.19  
 Another restriction Buchanan places is that the new state must be superior to the 
rump state in protecting the basic rights of its citizens.  That is, the new state’s ability to 
protect the rights of its citizens must be as good as the rump state and be better at 
protecting the relevant rights (those which justified secession).  The international 
community can play a role in assisting in secession as well as in assisting the new states 
in achieving that goal. 
 Those are the two types of theories of secession most commonly found in the 
literature, primary rights theories and remedial rights theories.  On its face, it would 
appear as if indigenous peoples would satisfy the requirements for secession according 
to either.  As I will show in the next section, however, they do not satisfy the 
requirements; and thus, according to these theories, indigenous secession is unjustified.  
4.3 The case against indigenous secession 
On its face, it looks like indigenous peoples will satisfy the most basic primary 
rights theory and the most basic remedial rights only theory.  Indigenous peoples are 
certainly territorially and culturally concentrated groups, and they are groups who have 
faced systemic rights based violations (including genocide) at the hands of the settler 
18 Allen Buchanan, Justice, legitimacy, and self-determination: moral foundations for international law, 
(Oxford:  Oxford University Press On Demand, 2007), at pp. 32-33. 
19 Cf Michael Walzer, Just and unjust wars, (New York:  New York, 1977). 
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colonial states.  Given those two facts, the case for secession should be straightforward.  
The case, however, is not straightforward, there are still the following issues:  whether 
indigenous peoples could form states that are able to perform the requisite political 
functions; whether indigenous secession would negatively affect the rump state’s 
capacity to perform its requisite political functions; and whether the international 
community would support secession from within either Australia or the United States. 
The first two issues emerge mainly from the claims of primary rights theorists, 
who require that for secession to be justified the seceding group be able and willing to 
sufficiently perform the requisite political functions, and that the indigenous secession 
not harm that same capacity of the rump state. 
Would indigenous states be able to secede today and form states that meet the 
requirements prescribed by Altman and Wellman?  Not in most instances.  The question 
of economic viability must be addressed.  If there is a “hard” question to the issue of 
indigenous secessionist movements, most would consider it to be economic viability.  If 
an indigenous people has neither the resources nor the capital to create the necessary 
rights-protecting institutions and to adequately maintain those institutions, then their 
willingness to do so doesn’t mean much of anything.  And, as it stands, there is no 
reason to think that most tribes could be economically viable right now.  Large amounts 
of tax revenue are needed to provide health care, schools, government building and 
employers, etc.  The cost per citizen of some of those goods would be even higher in 
indigenous communities, and not just because the smaller scale.  Indigenous 
communities would be a substantial deficit when it comes to health-related issues, with 
indigenous peoples in the United States having much shortest average life 
expectancies20 and the highest rates of diabetes of any group21, as well as the highest 
rates of drug abuse and alcoholism.  Australia is no better in those regards.22  And those 
figures are not going to change overnight.  And so, an indigenous nation-state should 
expect to inherit a substantial financial burden in the health sector due to the status of 
their population as well as the inadequate funding that indigenous healthcare receives.23  
20 Vanessa Ho, “Native American death rates soar as most people are living longer,” Seattle PI, (11 
March 2009), http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Native-American-death-rates-soar-as-most-people-
1302192.php.  Retrieved June 6, 2017. 
21 “Statistics about diabetes,” American Diabetes Association, http://www.diabetes.org/diabetes-
basics/statistics. Retrieved June 6, 2017. 
22 “Closing the Gap,” Australian government, Office of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
http://closingthegap.pmc.gov.au/.  Retrieved June 6, 2017. 
23 “A Quiet Crisis:  Federal Funding and Unmet Needs In Indian Country,” U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights, (2003). 
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Similar deficits exist in education and law enforcement, as well.24  In addition, most 
tribes are likely to suffer from a lack of institutional know-how, as they have not had 
recent experience in governing and certainly not in governing within the type of 
framework that Beran or Altman and Wellman have in mind.  There are also a number 
of opportunity costs in relation to trade, namely friendly foreign trade agreements 
established by the settler colonial states’ respective positions in the global economic 
order.   
The only potential avenue of response to those concerns would be for 
reparations to include a substantial amount of resource rich lands.  Water, coal, nuclear, 
solar, and wind energies have the potential to be big business for tribes in the US.  In 
fact, tribes in the US have been able to settlements regarding the disregard of their water 
rights by the government.  In those cases, however, what is being ruled on is the 
violations of the terms of use according to treaty agreements.  Whether those treaties 
would be ripped up by secession is an interesting question; assuming that something 
like that would be possible, would the US permit for its access to valuable resources to 
be subject to a treaty that it cannot unilaterally enforce through its own court system?  If 
the current administration is anything to go by, the answer is a resounding no. 
But would an indigenous secession, in which resource rich lands were 
reclaimed, pose a threat to the capacity of settler colonial states to perform their 
requisite political functions?  Potentially.  According to a 2007 report, the United 
Nations Chairperson on the Permanent Indigenous Peoples Forum, Ms. Tauli-Corpuz 
claimed that a majority of the world’s remaining natural resources are found on 
indigenous territories.25  If that claim holds true for indigenous peoples in Australia and 
the United States, and if it is also true that indigenous secessionists would secure full 
ownership of those territories and resources when seceding, then the claim could be 
made that the capacity of those settler states to perform the requisite political functions 
would be diminished.  According to the primary rights theorists, that could be a 
sufficient reason to deny indigenous secession, as removing those resources from 
ownership of the settler colonial states would certainly have a negative effect on the 
rump states. 
24 Ibid. 
25 “Indigenous Peoples – Lands, Territories, and Natural Resources,” United Nations Permanent Forum 
on Indigenous Peoples, (2007), 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/6_session_factsheet1.pdf.  Retrieved June 6, 2017. 
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It is not far-fetched to think that a deal could be worked out to soften the blow of 
indigenous peoples reclaiming full ownership of their land. In general, it is just very 
unlikely that indigenous secession would, in practice, harm the settler states.  The most 
likely secessionist scenario is that indigenous secessionists would be unable to secure 
full ownership over resource rich lands.  However, in terms of theory, should the fact 
that reacquisition could greatly diminish the capacity of these states to perform the 
requisite political functions count as sufficient reason to prevent certain territories from 
being reacquired?  Here, the claim is interesting.  It is not necessarily questioning what 
claims to the land the state has over that land.  Rather, it is what claims do non-
indigenous citizens of that state have for their state to govern that territory?  And 
relatedly, what claims do indigenous peoples have that their state should govern that 
territory?  What makes these interesting questions is that it side-steps the question of 
what to do when a state is illegitimate and asks instead how we should weigh competing 
claims of individuals.   
As far as this thesis is concerned, the state, not its citizens, are the primary 
authors of the wrongdoings against indigenous peoples.  That is not to say citizens 
should be completely absolved of responsibility.  It is to say, though, that legitimacy is a 
property of states, not citizens.  It is outside the scope of this thesis to question the status 
and history of social relations between indigenous and non-indigenous individuals 
within these states.  Even if we accept that these states have exploited the land and that 
it is because of that that its citizens have been able to enjoy a modern quality of life, it 
isn’t clear that citizens ought to be held responsible or necessarily blameworthy for that.  
In that case, if Altman and Wellman want to comment on the status of indigenous 
secession, they need to tell a story about how we should weigh these competing claims.  
As it stands, their theory is indeterminate over that matter and thus incomplete.  One 
potential answer is that most of the benefits from these resources have, over a long 
period of time, gone to non-indigenous citizens to the great neglect of indigenous 
citizens within these states, and therefore, as a matter of reparations, indigenous peoples 
ought to be awarded some measure of resource rights to their lands.  That said, it is 
unlikely that any indigenous secession would lead to the reclamation of all or even most 
of a tribes traditional land, provided that land held valuable natural resources. 
 Even if indigenous peoples were able to secure sufficient resources for an 
economy able to perform the requisite political functions, most would lack the 
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institutional know-how necessary for actually performing those functions in a sufficient 
manner, and according to Jeremy Waldron, some would even shirk such a duty.26   
Waldron claims that indigenous peoples prefer and are dogmatic over familial 
forms of governance and other non-liberal traditional forms of governance.27  
Traditional forms of governance are indefensible for rule over societies such as 
Australia and the United States because contemporary citizens require much more 
complex institutions, he claims.  The traditional governance practices of indigenous 
peoples would not adequately emulate that role that these states currently play, and 
because of that they have no claim to governing over territory.  As he puts it: 
[S]overeignty, state, and law should be seen as less like a family firm, more like 
a fire brigade – a functional necessity, not a cultural patrimony.  We set up and 
fund a fire brigade to respond to the kinds of conflagrations we expect under 
modern conditions; we choose it on the basis of matching capacity to 
circumstances.  We don’t choose it on the basis of heritage – the traditional red 
fire engine, the ancestral jobs for firefighters grandfathered in from long ago.  If 
its services are made available to all, it doesn’t matter whose fire brigade it is, or 
whose traditions [it] matches, or who set it up or how; what matters is that we 
have it and it works.28 
And, he says, even if it were the case that indigenous peoples were willing to 
form adequate governments, an explanation for why citizens should have to wait for 
those governments to become effective is lacking.29  Without that explanation, we 
should not permit good-intentioned indigenous self-governance.  Taken together, 
Waldron’s argument is much more than an argument against what he calls indigenous 
“sovereignty” over territory – which is the exclusive and right to impose laws over a 
given territory – but also over forms of limited sovereignty, the likes of which already 
exist for Native American tribes.   
Does his argument work?  Briefly the claims are as follows:  starting with the 
background requirement that a state be practically appropriate (or be able and willing to 
perform the necessary political functions), the first claim is that indigenous peoples 
26 Jeremy Waldron, “Supersession and Sovereignty,” New York University Public Law and Legal Theory 
Working Papers, Paper 406, (2006), pp. 1-27. 
27 Ibid. at p. 18 
28 Ibid. at p. 24, italics in original. 
29 Ibid. at p. 18 
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would not be likely to form an appropriate state; and second, that even if they could, it 
would take too long and would not be superior to current states.   
There is substantial evidence showing that the moral, social, and political norms 
of all societies, regardless of race, evolve over time through interactions with other 
societies, increases in size, or the development of new ideas.  At best, Waldron’s first 
argument, then, denies that indigenous societies are incapable of evolving over time.  It 
is not clear where he draws that claim from, given that instances in which tribes have 
been permitted and able to self-govern have shown a remarkable capacity of tribes to 
utilize contemporary social, political, and moral norms alongside their traditional ones. 
 What about Waldon’s second claim?  Bracketing his explicit racism, he says it 
would take tribes too long to develop the norms and institutions necessary for 
contemporary governance, he claims.  And citizens would require justification for 
having to endure during that wait.  If the concern is something like, Sydney, New South 
Wales and all of its property is going to get reverted back to its traditional owners, then 
we should be worried.  However, the reason for why we should be worried is not 
because it is getting reverted back to its traditional owners, but because any massive 
overhaul of government officials is always risky.  That said, if the concern is simply 
time to develop, then the solution is simple:  provide indigenous communities with the 
support needed to develop the norms necessary for governing contemporary, urban 
environments prior to turning it over to them. 
 All in all, Waldron’s claims are perplexing.  Indigenous peoples can self-govern, 
and they can do it well.  One piece of evidence often pointed in favor of indigenous self-
governance are the beneficial outcomes coming from the Indian Self-Determination and 
Education Assistance Act.  According to the researchers at the University of Arizona’s 
Native Nations Institute as well Harvard’s Indigenous Economic Development Project, 
that piece of legislation has been the most successful piece of policy ever enacted by the 
US government in terms of improving the well-being of Native Americans because it 
allowed them to shape, within the laws of the constitution, the social and political norms 
which governed their reservations.30   
 There is a more general worry that someone could press in the ballpark of 
Waldron’s argument.  That indigenous peoples should not be subjected to an indigenous 
30 Stephen Cornell and Joseph P. Kalt. “Reloading the dice: improving the chances for economic 
development on American Indian reservations,” Malcolm Wiener Center for Social Policy, John F. 
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, (1992). 
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nation-state which they found to be illegitimate.  In response to this, I want to say two 
things.  First, barring some significant rights violations committed by the newly minted 
indigenous nation-state, the claims of illegitimacy via risk would be different.  Citizens 
would be at risk of their state, perhaps, not being able to provide a bundle of goods and 
services on par with what they may have had under the settler colonial states, for 
example.  But the risk imposed on them would not be risk of future violence or other 
types of harm.  Second, there is no reason to think that a treaty agreement between an 
indigenous nation-state and the settler colonial states establishing free movement across 
the borders, thus allowing indigenous peoples living on indigenous territories to 
continue to work and take part in the communities of the settler colonial states.  Like 
many issues discussed already, there are practically and readily available solutions. 
 The most likely solution is that tribes would not be granted sovereignty over 
places like Sydney.  Instead, what land they would receive would likely be land already 
established as a reservation or undeveloped land held by the rump state for public use. 
Even then, though, those lands can have valuable resources that the rump state 
would be unlikely to let go.  Without those resources could secession still be justified 
for indigenous peoples?  That is, is resource independence through territorially owned 
lands the only path to justified secession?  What about international assistance?  
Indigenous peoples would certainly have a better chance of getting non-resource rich 
lands back from the state.  Given that, couldn’t they then just appeal to international 
assistance for developing?  Maybe. 
 First, the question of whether the international community would endorse 
indigenous secession and the question of whether the international community would 
provide assistance to a newly reformed indigenous nation-state are clearly separate 
questions.  If secession requires the endorsement of the international community to be 
justified, as Buchanan seems to think, it is difficult to imagine it ever getting that 
justification.  Aside from the settler colonial states I am concerned with many other 
non-settler colonial states have indigenous populations who can make similar claims to 
being systemically wronged and being coerced into continuing to live under substantial 
risk of future wrongs.  And though the experiences of the Sami people in the 
Scandinavian region or Canada’s First Nations peoples are certainly different they are 
close enough that supporting secession in the US or Australia might be taken as a, 
“Why not us?” cry in their respective countries.  In addition to the gross historical 
injustices they have suffered at the hands of their states, they continue to deal with 
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diminished rights to land and culture and suffer from outcomes much worse than their 
non-indigenous countrymen.  Moreover, indigenous peoples across the world can make 
similar claims.  For that reason, it is reasonable to think that no state has an interest in 
permitting secession within their own territory by their indigenous peoples and so no 
state would move to ever acknowledge secession for indigenous peoples as a morally 
justifiable outcome within international law.31   
 What about the question of assistance?  It certainly seems plausible that the 
international community would support a newly formed indigenous nation-state, as they 
could simply claim that the secessionist movement which led to its formation was sui 
generis.  That is the stance the United States took when considering Kosovo’s 
independence, with then Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice, issuing the following 
statement:  [W]e've been very clear that Kosovo is sui generis and that that is because of 
the special circumstances out of which the breakup of Yugoslavia came. The special 
circumstances of the aggression of the Milosevic forces against Kosovars, particularly 
Albanian Kosovars, and it’s a special circumstance.32 
 Whether the claim that an indigenous secession from the US or Australia could 
be labelled as sui generis remains to be seen.  Assuming though that indigenous 
secession would be impossible as a unilateral exercise, it is easy to imagine that the US 
or Australia would label it as such.  If, however, indigenous peoples tried to unilaterally 
secede, it would be unlikely that they would do so with the approval of the international 
community, whether because doing so would give rise to sentiments amongst other 
indigenous peoples or because of the risk of upsetting relations with either Australia or 
the US.  And for those reasons, it is not hard to imagine the international community 
failing to provide the necessary assistance for indigenous peoples to create and maintain 
the institutions necessary for performing the requisite political functions. 
 According to the two most popular theories of secession, indigenous peoples 
would not be justified in unilaterally seceding.  The primary reason being is that they 
would be unable to secure sufficient resources for establishing and maintaining the 
institutions necessary for performing the requisite political functions.  There are two 
reasons for this:  first, the settler colonial states are not likely to permit secession if it 
31 That is not to say that no state would permit secession; it is well within the rights of a state to permit its 
citizens to secede.  Just look to the recent referendum on secession by Scotland from the United Kingdom 
for an example.   
32 Condoleeza Rice, “Briefing en route to Brussels,” (5 March 2008), https://2001-
2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/03/101797.htm.  Retrieved 10 July 2017.  
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means indigenous peoples are going to gain exclusive control over the valuable 
resources within their reserves; and second, indigenous peoples should not expect 
assistance from the international community after unilaterally seceding. 
4.4 Bugger those requirements 
 Should indigenous peoples have to abide by those requirements?  Perhaps it 
would be the case that most indigenous states would have poor economies and would 
very much be developing states.  Why should that matter in regards to their claims to 
secede? 
 For the theories of secession above, harm played a large role in justifying 
secession.  For the primary rights theorists, secession should not harm the rump states 
capacity to perform its requisite political functions, including the securing of the basic 
rights of its citizens; and for the remedial rights only theorists, systemic wrongdoing or 
harm is what justifies a group’s right to secede.  This is important because it follows 
from the logic of those theories that such harm cannot continue or exist in the new state.  
On my analysis of why secession is justified, I claim that the long stream of wrongs 
committed against indigenous peoples by these states undermines any claim to justified 
authority the settler colonial states can make and also gives indigenous peoples strong 
reason to deny the legitimacy of those states.  What restrictions, then, would my claims 
place on a new state? 
 It would certainly mean that an indigenous state would be wrong if it continued 
the unjust practices of the settler colonial states:  forced assimilation, unjustified land 
takings, and racially discriminatory policies, among other things.  But my claims have 
nothing to do with the efficacy of the governments provisions of basic goods and 
services, but instead with their abilities and willingness to create just laws for 
indigenous peoples.  What the theories discussed above seem to be concerned about is 
the functionality of government in performing basic welfare functions for its citizens or 
in not violating the basic rights of citizens.  An indigenous state may struggle out of the 
gate and perform poorly in its provision of goods and services for its citizens, but that is 
not to say that it would actively seek to harm its citizens.  And, perhaps, most 
indigenous peoples would be happy to make the trade-off of the post-office being a little 
further away in order to secure their own state, free of the risks associated with being 
under the settler colonial states.    
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 This view is primarily motivated by an intuition that there is something absurd 
about claiming that a group of people subject to substantial wrongdoing should not be 
able to pursue secession as a form of relief simply because they lack the resources or 
assistance in forming contemporary institutions of governance.  This strikes me as 
especially absurd when we use that against people whose primary reason for not having 
those resources is because those resources were violently taken from them. 
What requirements, then, ought to be applied to indigenous secessionist claims?  
I agree here with Burke Hendrix.  He argues that Native Americans have a right to 
secede from the US, and that those tribes ought to be able to hold a double referendum 
on the topic of secession.33  His claim to secession is justified by the lack of authority 
the settler colonial states have over the territory which traditionally belonged to 
indigenous peoples.  His requirement of a double referendum by indigenous peoples is 
clever.34  Seceding is a messy business and so a group looking to secede ought to be 
careful when making that decision.  However careful they should be, though, the 
decision ought to be theirs; and nowhere is that truer than when they are forced to live 
under oppressive regimes. 
5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I argued that unlike other circumstances which involve state 
wrongdoing, indigenous peoples ought to able to pursue secession.  However unlikely it 
might be for indigenous peoples to get all of their land back, gaining full sovereignty 
over their current recognized land titles would, I think, still be progress.  Contemporary 
liberal theories of secession, for the most part, require unjust standards for groups 
seeking to secede from state’s who have subjugated them to violence and rampant acts 
of dispossession, and to that extent do not block indigenous claims to secede. 
Assuming secession is something the settler colonial states would support, what 
makes it a realistic option?  I think the answer to that question is simply that indigenous 
peoples be given the choice to secede.  Yes, early indigenous nation-states might 
struggle to find their footing, as any new state does, but it is certainly the right of 
indigenous peoples to have their own states.  That said, I will discuss in more detail 
what the choice to secede ought to look like. 
33 Burke Hendrix, Ownership, authority, and self-determination: moral principles and indigenous rights 
claims, (Penn State:  Penn State Press, 2010). 
34 Imagine how differently Britain’s referendum on exiting the European Union could have been had they 
had a double referendum. 
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This conclusion, I think, raises a number of interesting questions.  Of most 
importance, I think, is outlining how the jump from reconciliation to legitimacy can 
work.  I will argue in the next chapter that, following successful reconciliation, an 
indigenous group’s choice to “not secede” should be taken as their consent to the state 
thereby legitimating the settler colonial state.
  
Chapter 4:  Secession and legitimacy 
 
 
 
 
  
In this chapter, I argue that when both secession is a realistic alternative and 
when reconciliation has been successful, a decision to “not secede” is sufficient for 
establishing the consent of an indigenous people to the reconciled state.  I understand 
the form of consent conferred by a decision to “not secede” to be explicit, which I take 
to be the surest (and best) form of acceptance of a state’s legitimacy vis-à-vis the 
consenting group. 
To summarize where we stand, here is a brief review of the previous chapters.  
In the first chapter, I argued that the settler colonial states of Australia and the United 
States were illegitimate vis-à-vis their indigenous citizens.  The reason being, that the 
history of the relationship between these states and their indigenous citizens shows a 
record of the states being unable or unwilling to create just laws for those citizens.  As a 
result, indigenous citizens of those states do not have any reason to trust, going forward, 
that those states will create just laws for them.  The second chapter argued that through 
political reconciliation, the settler colonial states could seek to make itself more 
trustworthy for their indigenous citizens.  However, in light of the record of unjust laws 
and general wrongdoing, reconciliation would not make it the case that it would be 
reasonable for indigenous peoples to trust the offending states.  And, in the third 
chapter, I argued that indigenous peoples ought to be able to secede from the offending 
states.  
In this chapter, I will argue that the choice to secede can serve as a mechanism 
for a state being accepted as, and hence becoming, a legitimate source of obligation.  
This chapter will be brief and has only five sections:  the first section is this 
introduction.  The second will explore what it is that is so special about consent.  The 
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third will argue for the analogy between consent and not seceding.  The fourth will 
examine objections to consent based theories of legitimacy.  And lastly, the fifth will 
show how the objections to consent theories can be overcome under the circumstances 
at hand in this thesis. 
Before beginning, I want to specify the scope of my assertion.  In the first 
chapter, I stated that my assertion of settler colonial state illegitimacy was one that any 
indigenous person within those states should be able personally to lay claim to.  Is 
secession similar?  Can any indigenous person just up and secede?  No.  Secession 
ought to be taken as a group right; no single individual can claim sovereignty over 
territory.  What shape that group takes–whether as individual groups or confederacies 
including many groups–is something for indigenous peoples to decide for themselves.  
And as to how they should make the decision, I do think that Burke Hendrix’s 
suggestion of a double referendum on secession would be smart.  However, how tribes 
ultimately make that decision, should again, be entirely up to them.  It is certainly their 
right to make that decision; and there is no reason to believe them incapable of making 
that decision.1  
2. Consent, what’s so special?  
In the first chapter, I briefly touched on theories of consent, and how they relate 
to political obligation.  Traditionally, the gold standard for consent theories is express 
consent given voluntarily and with adequate information concerning its consequences.  
While some today do acknowledge that that form of consent is the ideal form (or at least 
a suitable form) of accepting and hence grounding one’s obligations to the state, 
virtually no one thinks that option to be possible in the real world.  The reason for their 
pessimism typically comes down to it being impossible to gain the consent of citizens, 
either because of the sheer number of citizens is too large or because the requirements 
for consent to be voluntary are not achievable.  As such, most contemporary political 
philosophers rely upon forms of acquiring obligation that do not require express 
1 Indigenous self-determination, or self-governing, has never truly existed under the Australian 
government and so it is difficult to show one way or the other that they would be capable of making such 
a decision under current circumstances.  That said, by any liberal account, the burden is on showing 
individuals or groups incapable of self-governing, not the other way around.  Furthermore, there is 
evidence that Indigenous Australian leaders have longed worked together towards common goals.  The 
most recent example is the joint statement released from a meeting of Indigenous Australian leaders from 
across the country, the Uluru Statement from the Heart, which enjoyed near unanimous support.  In the 
US, centuries of evidence exists showing how tribes have worked together, both before and after 
colonization.  Much of the recent evidence can be found in the annals of the Harvard Project for 
Indigenous Economic Development. 
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consent.  I will start by presenting what it is that makes express consent (hereafter:  
consent) so special and then move on to address some of the most popular criticisms 
against it. 
What makes consent so special, anyways?  The classical answer to that question 
starts with the assumption that individual autonomy is the primary source of moral 
value; and proceeds to argue that in so far as obligations to the state limit an 
individual’s autonomy, those obligations require justification.  The ideal form of 
justification is when those obligations to the state reflect one’s autonomous will; and the 
best way to assure that is the case is for individuals to express it as their will.  Consent 
to the state is nothing more than the expression of one’s will in favor of obligations 
towards it.  For proponents of this view, the state cannot claim obligations towards it 
from its non-consenting citizens and, to that extent, cannot be legitimate. 
I partially share the conclusion of the classical consent theorists.  However, I do 
not see (express) consent to the state as always being a necessity.  It should only be 
necessary for legitimacy when there is a reasonable doubt that a state is unable or 
unwilling to make just laws for its citizens.  In those cases, then, I share the conclusion 
of the classical consent theorists:  without the consent of those citizens, the state cannot 
claim legitimacy.  The reason being is that under normal circumstances where that 
doubt does not reasonably exist, I believe the state can be legitimate without consent 
being necessary.  It can do this, for example, through creating just laws and outcomes 
for its citizens.  In the next section, I will defend the analogy between consent and not 
seceding.  Following that, I will review some of the common criticism levied against 
consent theories and then show how they can mostly be relegated to minor concerns in 
the particular cases being discussed. 
3. The analogy between not seceding and consenting 
 How do we know that a decision to “not secede” from a state is the same as 
expressing consent and hence legitimating that state?  It is conceptually possible for a 
decision to “not secede” from a state to not bestow any legitimacy to that state.  For 
example, group could choose to “not secede” from its current state, while continuing to 
deny that it possesses any moral obligations to that state.  In the case of indigenous 
peoples, such an alternative might be attractive given the dearth of resources currently 
available to them for forming a state.  They might, for example, see themselves as, 
“Damned if we do and damned if we don’t.”  In which case, sticking to the “status quo,” 
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or continuing to be subject to the laws of an illegitimate state, could be the best course 
of action.2  Better the devil you know than the devil you don’t. 
 While the above alternative is possible, it is only possible if we allow unjust 
outcomes in the choice-set.  This thesis is concerned with how to get just outcomes for 
indigenous peoples.  If we exclude from the choice-set unjust alternatives–which the 
status quo certainly is–then we are left with two precise alternatives in the choice-set:  
“secession” (justified in the previous chapter) or “not secession” where “not secession” 
should be read as:  the settler colonial state has presented enough evidence to a group 
for that group to trust its ability and willingness to create just laws for them.   
  In order for the choice to “not secede” to be analogous to expressing consent, 
the choice-set that it is contained within must contain distinct and viable alternatives; it 
must be voluntary for the relevant chooser (in this case, an indigenous tribe, nation, 
community, group, clan, etc.) to decide which alternative to choose; and the relevant 
chooser must be informed (to some extent) about the consequences of the choice. 
 In so far as the alternatives “to secede” and “not secede” entail what their 
common usage suggests, and indigenous people are permitted to make the decision 
between those alternatives, and where choosing either alternative leads to its realization, 
the choice-set does contain distinct and viable alternatives, and is voluntary. 
  If indigenous peoples are able to make a choice between secession and that 
choice is voluntary (on their own terms) and informed (the alternatives are explained 
and the risks associated with each decision are made available for public knowledge), 
then there is no reason why we should not regard that decision as the same as consent. 
Before moving on to criticisms of consent, it might be helpful to buttress the 
argument that not seceding can be equivalent to virtually expressing consent with an 
example:  the recent Scottish referendum on secession.  The Scottish decision not to 
secede both morally and legally reaffirmed them as citizens of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain.  The circumstances of the situation required that a decision not to secede 
entailed remaining morally and legally obligated to the UK.  Under the circumstances of 
the vote, for a decision to not secede to mean anything else would have required an 
additional vote 
2 We might interpret this as:  the state is illegitimate, pending the fulfilment of future promises.  In that 
case, though, it wouldn’t make sense to hold a vote on secession.  The vote would simply be postponed 
until further notice.  
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The Scottish vote for secession came down to a “yes” or “no” question phrased 
as, “Should Scotland be an independent country.3”  It required only a simple majority 
either way and allowed citizens of the Commonwealth of at least 16 years of age to 
vote.  Nearly 85% of eligible voters participated making it the highest turnout for a 
referendum in Commonwealth history since the inception of universal suffrage.  
Ultimately, the choice to remain a part of the UK was made with roughly 55% of voters 
choosing to remain. 
4. Criticisms against consent 
Consent no longer finds favor with most political theorists, especially in its 
explicit form.  Here I want to examine two types of criticisms most frequently levied 
against consent as an ideal mechanism for the state’s acquisition of obligations.  Those 
criticisms are the numbers and institutions problem and the voluntariness problem.  
The first criticism is a numbers and institutions problem.  There are too many 
people and they are spread too wide, therefore, it would be impossible for the state to go 
to each individual and receive his or her consent.  Solutions to this worry have been 
proposed over the years.  One is that upon coming of a certain age that individuals 
would be given the opportunity to consent.4  That fails because that would still leave all 
those who were eighteen years of age or older at the time of that proposals enactment as 
needing to be tracked down.  To give this problem some meat, consider these 
demographic numbers from the United States:  according to the US Census Bureau, the 
total population of the US in 2015 was 321,418,820.  Of that, 22.9% or roughly 
73,604,909 were under the age of eighteen.  That leaves nearly 250 million individuals 
who would be unaccounted for. 
Assuming, though, that the state could provide a mechanism for acquiring 
consent from all of its citizens, perhaps through a tick-box on tax forms5, the second 
type of criticism still lingers:  it probably wouldn’t be voluntary.   
There are a couple of ways that we might express the voluntariness objection.  
First, there is the objection that the decision to morally obligate oneself to the authority 
3 Laura Smith-Spark, “Scotland’s vote on independence:  What you need to know,” CNN, (18 September 
2014), http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/09/world/europe/scottish-referendum-explainer/index.html, 
retrieved 17 June 2017. 
4 Harry Beran, “A liberal theory of secession,” Political Studies, 32, (1984), pp. 21-31. 
5 Of course, this would also not reach everyone.  However, no policy (or moral theory, for that matter) 
can work perfectly for those whom it is designed in every instance.   
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of the state is itself morally problematic, so much so that any instance of it would likely 
be wrongfully coercive; and second, that due to the circumstances of life that 
individuals cannot simply choose otherwise and for that reason the decision cannot be 
voluntary.  I will discuss the first objection to voluntariness first. 
On the face of it, the decision to consent—and thereby obligate oneself to the 
state’s authority—seems simple enough.  If you consent, then you accept having moral 
obligations to generally respect and abide by the laws and punishments of the state.6  
And if you choose not to consent, then you are rejecting that you have moral obligations 
to the state.  You might still have reasons to obey the state, fear of legal punishment or 
social ostracizing for example, but there is no contract between you and the state such 
that you have an obligation to its authority.   
One reason this difference matters is that individuals who believe they have 
moral obligations to do something will view those obligations as strong reasons in favor 
of doing that thing.  For example, if an individual believes that law A comes from a 
legitimate state, then she is more likely to not violate A even if she knows that she will 
not be punished (legally or socially) for violating it; even if violating it would make her 
better off; and even if she simply disagrees with it.  One way of thinking of legitimacy 
is that it establishes what Brennan, et al. refer to as a legal norm or the idea that obeying 
the law is just the done thing in that society, regardless of circumstances or other beliefs 
(with some reasonable exceptions, such as religious exemptions) regarding any 
particular law.7  In this case, it is the done thing because everyone knows that everyone 
else has consented to it and everyone knows that everyone knows that.  Another way of 
thinking of it is to understand it as H.L.A. Hart did as providing content-independent 
reasons for obeying the law.  In either case, the descriptive effect is roughly the same:  
despite what I would like to do or think would be better, I have a moral duty to 
generally obey the directives of a legitimate state. 
Why though would the above claim about the relationship between consenting to 
moral obligations and the generation of reasons in favor of obeying a state’s directives 
be problematic?  The criticism comes from the claim that moral obligations to the state 
should not be able to override obligations to one’s individual autonomy.  A less forceful 
version of the claim is that such obligations are permissible if they do not override our 
6 Provided that state is also justified in possessing the authority to create rules and impose punishments. 
7 Geoffrey Brennan, Lina Eriksson, Robert E. Goodin, and Nicholas Southwood, Explaining norms, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
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obligations to our individual autonomy.  Robert Paul Wolff suggested as much when he 
proposed instant direct democracy over (relevant) political decisions as a solution to the 
problem between moral obligations to the state and individual autonomy.8  Instant direct 
democracy over political decisions, however, is quite impossible he thought.  
Furthermore, it would likely only address the philosophical anarchist’s worry if those 
votes reached a consensus.  Therefore, given that such a process would be impossible, 
the state, he believed, is never justified in claiming obligations from its citizens. 
The other objection to consent theories as being coercive comes from David 
Hume.  Hume’s objection is to the voluntariness of tacit consent, though it works well 
against any form of consent.  The idea is that we cannot take one’s staying within the 
state, participating in the state’s activities, relying upon its services, etc. as a sign of her 
giving consent when she could not have done otherwise.  And, because it is virtually 
impossible for most individuals to do otherwise, then it is also the case that it is virtually 
impossible for most individuals to have tacitly consented.  That criticism does not just 
bite against theories of tacit consent.  It also affects explicit consent.  The claim is 
simple:  even if states were able to seek out and gain consent for their authority from 
each citizen, that consent would not count as morally relevant if those citizens could not 
have chosen otherwise. 
In practice, some might be concerned that indigenous secession is not a viable 
alternative given the financial circumstances that tribes currently face.  It is very likely 
that most indigenous groups seeking to secede would be unable to provide the same or 
even remotely similar expenditures on welfare that they currently receive from their 
settler states.  What most critics (and even supporters) of secession argue follows from 
this is that individuals within an indigenous state would be worse off, and thus that 
seceding would be irrational.9  And what is easy to glean from this is that given how 
potentially disastrous the conditions of an indigenous nation state would be, that 
choosing between it and the settler colonial state is no contest.  In other words, it is 
simply not a viable option to choose an indigenous nation state. 
5. How indigenous peoples can overcome these objections and consent can matter 
8 Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism, (University of California:  University of California Press, 
1970) 
9 That, at least, has been the prevailing criticism I’ve received when presenting the idea of indigenous 
secession at multiple locations. 
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If these objections to consent theory hold, then we should not pursue consent as 
a mechanism for indigenous peoples to express acceptance of moral obligations to their 
settler colonial states.  The most important objection, here, I believe is the numbers and 
institutions objection, that it would be impossible to ask each indigenous person from 
each tribe whether they would like to secede or not.  My response to the Wolff objection 
is simply to say that philosophical anarchism is an inappropriate way to think of one’s 
relationship with the state, and that is especially the case for many indigenous peoples 
who proudly identify themselves, in part, through their relationship to their collectives.  
The Humean objection is overcome if the conditions for secession being realistic are 
met.  Can those conditions be met, though? 
I think so.  What most of those critics fail to recognize is the historical 
wrongdoing that those individuals have suffered at the hands of the current state and the 
projected harm they should reasonably prospect from that.  And so, while the standard 
of well-being according to common Western metrics will surely decline following 
secession, the risk of the drastic, egregious, and feckless harm they would be subject to 
will also decline.  Whether that trade-off is acceptable is something that indigenous 
peoples should be able to decide.  And so long as that decision is one they can make, we 
can say that their decision is both viable and voluntary.  That said, it still seems 
ridiculous to think that the choice could go any way but in favor of the settler colonial 
states.  Note, however, that there is nothing in what I have said which requires a vote to 
take place right now.  If indigenous peoples want to wait and see whether reconciliation 
will lead to more just outcomes, then it is entirely within the scope of their right to hold 
off on having a vote.  The process, I would imagine, would have to work in similar 
fashion to how the Indian Self-Determination and Education Act is supposed to work.  
Under that act, Native American tribes should be able to assume control over the 
management and administration of their federal programs and do so when they feel 
themselves ready to assume control.  Similarly, tribes should be able to choose when to 
hold a vote on secession when they feel themselves ready to make that decision.  And I 
do not believe that readiness should not be determined strictly by an indigenous group’s 
current financial situation, if only because the likelihood that an indigenous state would 
be able to avail itself to international aid for development.  It just needs to be the case 
that indigenous groups can make that decision when they are comfortable making it. 
It is important to note, though, that this does not run the other way; that is, while 
indigenous peoples would not need to prove themselves financially capable of running a 
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state in order for their choice to “not secede” to count as legitimating a settler colonial 
state, the settler colonial states do need to reconcile in order for the choice of indigenous 
peoples to “not secede” to count as legitimating.  The reason here is simple:  
reconciliation provides evidence that the settler colonial states are able and willing to 
make just laws for their respective indigenous citizens.  Without that evidence, consent 
to the state would not be binding, as it would entail indigenous peoples subjecting 
themselves to an unjust situation.10 
  That leaves the numbers and institutions objection.  Indigenous peoples in both 
Australia and the US are spread out over large areas of land and can be found in some of 
the most remote parts of those states as well as in the most populated cities.  More so 
perhaps than any other group of people within these states, it would be incredibly 
difficult to track down each indigenous person, explain the contours of the situation and 
then gather his or her vote.  But is the consent of each individual required for a vote on 
secession?  No.  And this is perhaps where consent and a vote to “not secede” come 
apart most clearly.  Consenting to a state is an individual action, whereas the decision to 
secede or not is a collective action.   
Does the fact that consent and secession come apart here matter, though?  I don’t 
believe so.  Consent from each individual is always going to be a fool’s errand.  It is an 
ideal that most any political philosopher, short of the anarchistic ones, would relax.  
That said, out of concern for the rights of individuals as well as out of practical 
necessity, indigenous peoples ought to make the decision as deliberative and democratic 
as possible.  That said, in regards to the questions of how to gather votes and as to 
whether a simple majority, super majority, or some other arrangement is necessary for a 
vote to secede (or to revert back), we should leave the individual tribes to decide how 
that decision is to be made.  That is not to say that settler colonial states should not 
support the process nor that they should not help in making the process fair, only that 
the ultimate decision of how things are going to be decided ought to be determined by 
the tribes themselves. 
Given the entirety of the relationship between indigenous peoples and their 
respective settler colonial states, we should project indigenous peoples to continue to be 
wronged at the hands of settler colonial states.  Therefore, another consideration in 
10 For a similar claim, Joanne Lau argues that we are not morally bound to a majority decision which 
would subject us to treatment that consistent with our status as free and equal individuals.  Joanne Lau, 
“Voting in bad faith,” Res Publica, 20, (2014), pp. 5-14. 
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favor of leaving the decision in the hands of indigenous peoples is because we have 
solid evidence to believe that the settler colonial states would not include the interests of 
indigenous peoples when making the decision or would act directly against indigenous 
peoples’ interests.  No doubt many readers will find my suggestion that individual tribes 
or indigenous groups dictate the rules for a vote on secession troubling.  Much of that 
doubt, I believe, comes from reservations about indigenous culture, commonly 
portrayed in settler colonial states as savage, inferior, and largely unethical.11  Those 
portrayals present a false image of what societies built upon the precepts of indigenous 
cultures once were and what they can once again be.  
6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I argued how it is that a choice to not secede is analogous to 
expressing consent for the state.  It required that the choice to be secede be made under 
conditions in which it was an actual choice, it was voluntary, and individuals were 
informed about the choice they were making.  I also considered popular objections to 
the use of consent theories of legitimacy and either dismissed them or showed how they 
could be greatly diminished under the circumstances of indigenous referenda on 
secession. 
 Should indigenous peoples really secede, though?  Is getting the state to engage 
in reconciliation efforts to sufficiently improve its trustworthiness?  Whether any 
individual tribe or indigenous people should secede is a question for that tribe or that 
people to answer.  And so the answer the second question must be no, reconciliation is 
not necessarily enough.  That said, reconciliation in the way that I have described is, I 
think, still desirable; and if indigenous peoples in either state were able to get something 
like that, then it would certainly be a step in the right direction. 
11 For a good example, see Jeremy Waldron, “Supersession and Sovereignty,” New York University 
Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper 406, (2006), pp. 1-27. 
                                                          
  
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In this thesis, I have made my first attempt to answer the question of why 
indigenous peoples in Australian and the United States should accept or acknowledge 
the existence of moral obligations to their settler colonial states.  The answer I’ve 
written in this thesis, or at least tried to, is that they shouldn’t–at least, not unless those 
settler colonial states undertake some serious atonement in the form of political 
reconciliation, and not unless indigenous peoples are able to make that decision for 
themselves by having a realistic choice to secede.  I justified that answer by appealing to 
the high risk of future state harm for indigenous peoples by those states.  Given the long 
and consistent history of systemic and egregious acts of violence and harm committed 
against indigenous peoples by these settler colonial states, I claimed that it would be 
irrational to not expect that behavior to continue.  That said, I also argued that political 
reconciliation, if done properly, can provide evidentiary reasons for indigenous peoples 
to trust that the state will not, in the future, continue to be so destructive towards them.  
However, I also claimed that given the substantial amount of violence and harm 
wrought against indigenous peoples by those states, it is very unlikely that any amount 
of evidence would be sufficient to make the claim that indigenous peoples should trust 
their settler colonial states.  Instead, the best those settler colonial states could hope for 
is to build enough trust into the relationship so that indigenous peoples decide to 
willingly accept obligations to them by choosing to not secede from them. 
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 In attempting to answer the question of legitimacy, I have largely ignored an 
important and tangential issue, that of social attitudes towards indigenous people within 
these states.  Attitudes towards indigenous peoples within these settler states are far 
from decent.  The predominant, though not exclusive, attitudes amongst non-indigenous 
supporters of indigenous peoples tend to be those of either sympathy or pity.  While 
those attitudes can be supportive, they are often unquestioning and are tied up with a 
romanticized image of indigenous peoples.  On the other hand, among those who would 
adamantly deny that indigenous peoples possess any special claims against the state or 
worse, that indigenous peoples are inherently lazy, alcoholics, criminals, etc., the 
attitudes are very negative and often very aggressive, and frequently tied to a 
Westernized image of savage Indians or Black fellas.  In the middle, and by far the most 
prevalent, are those who don’t really possess any attitudes on the topic, because they 
have busy lives of their own and the topic does not affect them in any noticeable way.  
Addressing the pity parties, the white nationalistic parties, and the apathetic bunch will 
be necessary if political reconciliation is to be successful.  Without the support of the 
larger populations of the settler colonial states, indigenous peoples stand no chance of 
securing the type of reconciliation they are owed. 
 On the other hand, addressing those attitudes is more than just instrumentally 
beneficial to the project of political reconciliation.  While I do think the issue of 
authority is the bigger issue, addressing and changing the attitudes that non-indigenous 
peoples have about their indigenous countrymen is important on its own.  Even if 
reconciliation were successful and indigenous peoples opted to accept moral obligations 
to the settler colonial states, the outcomes indigenous peoples would face would still be 
diminished if society then went back to treating indigenous peoples as second class 
citizens.  We should seek to change those attitudes not just for a moment in order to get 
reconciliation done, but for the future so that, should indigenous peoples choose to 
remain citizens of their respective settler colonial states, they can have status as social 
equals within those states.
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